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EXCERPT 1
The year, 2017, will focus on “Harnessing the Demographic Dividend through Investments
in Youth”. There is thus a need for Africa to rely on the poten al of its youth through the
implementa on of basic Human Rights such as quality educa on and the crea on of jobs. The
African youth must remain a source of hope, and AU Member States must con nue engaging
young people to help overcome poverty in Africa. Youth Engagement Strategies should be
invested in to encourage youth par cipa on in a Pan African environment. The inclusion of
African Youth in discussions on how to encourage Africa’s growth will not only create a se ng
of acceptance but will also allow Africa’s sustainable development to be youth-driven.
African Youth should also explore dates that celebrate them such as African Youth Day established
in 2006 in Banjul to acknowledge that African youth have an important voice in Africa since they
are significant stakeholders in the con nent. The African Youth Day celebrated on 01 November
in recogni on of the African Youth Charter during the Summit in Banjul is, thus, an opportunity
for young Africans to engage and contribute to the development of the con nent in each region by
addressing key issues regarding economic growth, social problems, and sustainable development
in African socie es. Ar cle 26 of the African Youth Charter urges youth to partake fully in
ci zenship du es including, but not limited to vo ng, decision-making and governance. It also
encourages youth to engage in peer-to-peer educa on in order to enhance the promo on of youth
development in areas like literacy, use of informa on and communica on technology, disease
and violence preven on, and peace building.
Investment in African Youth is an opportunity to inspire future genera ons to emulate innova ve
and exci ng approaches to making a diﬀerence in the promo on and protec on of human
and people’s rights in Africa. Youths (and YALF) should therefore make maximum use of the
opportuni es given to them in order for Africa to achieve its goals as a collec ve en ty.

Dr. Salah Hammad
Senior Human Rights Expert,
Department of Poli cal Aﬀairs,
African Union Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
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EXCERPT 2
Two years ago, the Young African Leaders Forum embarked on the journey of mobilizing young
people to support the African Union Agenda 2063. Agenda 2063 as a consensual document
was borne out of a consulta ve process involving all segments of African society ranging from
the Regional Economic Communi es, Member States, Women and Youths to civil society
organisa ons, including youths of YALF.
The Young African Leaders Forum is a very strategic youth-led organisa on working systemically
to foster the mely realisa on of the African Union Agenda 2063 vision. The ini a ve and
ambi on of this organisa on is to move African na ons to the First World status. In order to
achieve their vision, they have counted it necessary to gather, share informa on and develop ideas
from African youth leaders through their journal of development. The Young African Leaders
Journal of Development (YALJOD) will host ideas and viewpoints about the development
of Africa. The journal is not merely a theore cal one. It will rather form the founda on for
numerous implementable projects which will be executed by YALF, other development focused
organisa ons in Africa, and even the governments.
There is no gainsaying that the a ainment of Africa’s long-term socio-economic development
agenda is con ngent on building strong ins tu ons and strong current genera on. The youth
should be equipped to tackle the root causes of conlict such as poverty, strong oversight over
governments to establish accountable state ins tu ons that would provide the adequate and
desired responses to the peace and security challenges that the con nent is faced with, which
have diverse impact on all genera ons but more especially youth, children and women. The
youth leader, like any one of us, have the responsibility to ensure that the AU and member
states deliver on their mandate of silencing the guns by 2020. Doing so would pave the way for
a prosperous Africa, which will occupy its righ ul place in the interna onal arena. YALJOD
provides the pla orm to exchange ideas on how all these can be achieved.
Alice Buhinja Mutesi
Post Conlict Reconstruc on Oﬁcer,
Peace and Security Department,
African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
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EXCERPT 3
The future belongs to those who will inherit it. The responsibility for ensuring the future
we want rests on all who have a stake in the future. Theore cally, we are all historical
stakeholders in the future, whether as those who will inherit, or as those who create it as
legacy. However, more meaningfully, the irst fron er stakeholders are the youth, whose
decisions and ac ons on the most part are currently subject to decisions and ac ons of the
older genera on. For the youth to play their role as the irst fron er, they must begin to take
up strategic posi ons as par cipants in the current decision making, ac on planning and
implementa on. If they wait for formal installa on as leaders, it will be too late.
This par cipa on begins with the young people acquiring the necessary knowledge,
iden fying the challenges and opportuni es, determining the future they want, recognizing
what needs to be done and making deliberate decisions to curve niches for their interven ons
at every level, in every sector, as far as is possible.
Fortunately, the future we all want as Africans has been well ar culated in the AU Vision
framework: Agenda 2063, the AU having made tremendous eﬀort to capture the voices
and perspec ves of all cons tuencies of the African peoples, including youth and women.
Furthermore, the AU also makes conscious eﬀort to include young people in decision making
processes whether the young people are already in formal leadership posi ons ort.no
It therefore behooves every African youth as far as is possible, to ‘make a commi ee of one’
and decide to be a leader in this ma er. Leadership involves recogni on of the challenge
and opportunity, whether in part or in whole, and se ng out to do something about it, and
seeking to inluence others posi vely towards the common desired end.
It is with this in mind that the ini a ve undertaken by young people under YALF is
par cularly encouraging. There is hope for Africa when young people embrace their
responsibility for Africa’s future by seeking to appreciate the causa ve and incidental
factors of why and where we are today, and recognize the implica ons of our collec ve
vision, in order to understand and iden fy their roles for today and tomorrow.
The YALJOD ini a ve shi s the erstwhile pervasive charge of the ages against youth who
may prefer to while away their crea ve talent and energy on rabble rousing in iden fying
faults in the system for the sole purpose of making demands on government and other
structures. Rather, youth under YALF are taking the responsibility for shaping the future
from wherever they are. They are calling on themselves to be part of the Africa-led solu on,
through scholarly discourse, nurturing crea ve intellectual tensions through which the most
fer le ideas will emerge to influence ac on at various levels in society.
I therefore highly commend and recommend YALJOD for every possible encouragement,
support and resourcing, that the eﬀort may reach the widest par cipa on and audience and
have the greatest possible impact.
Beatrice Khama Njenga
Head, Educa on Division, Department of Human Resources, Science and Technology,
African Union Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
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FOREWORD
Gree ngs and welcome as we celebrate the launch of the irst youth-led pan-African journal
of development, Young African Leaders Journal of Development (YALJOD). YALF’s vision is
that this new African journal dedicated to youth “will serve as a pla orm for sugges ng and
implemen ng community development ideas that will promote the living standards of Africans.”
As the tle indicates, the journal will publish original research, scholarly analysis and viewpoints
about the con nent’s development. Submissions for this first issue focused on challenges
confron ng various countries, with an emphasis on the impact on youth.
This inaugural publica on comprises 22 original research and diverse review ar cles from
authors based in Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe. It relects the voices of African youths who are confron ng concerns from several
vantage points as students, workers and ac vists.
Original research comprises a small but broad spectrum of topics: natural resources (oil sector)
governance; the role of entrepreneurship; the impact of conflict on the availability of selected
mber forest products; and understanding and addressing the “democracy-development” nexus.
The other ar cles examine a myriad of signfiicant issues namely: curbing terrorism among youth;
democracy and development; illicit financial lows; integra ng mental health interven ons;
developmental na onalism; educa on as a pathway to development; a Black theology response
to sexual violence; the impact of culture, patriarchy and the law; workplace violence; ethnicity as
a deterrent to development; mul lingual radio as a communica on tool in agriculture; an interrailway system: a development and uniica on mechanism for Africa; promo ng and solidifying
African unity through Pan-Africanism, and “Black” colonialism.
My wish, consistent with YALF’s goals, is that this journal becomes an important resource for all
youths as well as policy makers. The intent is that future issues, in addi on to the publica on of
ar cles and original research, will also publish expert opinions, book reviews and le ers to the
editor.
I would like to personally congratulate the members of YALF and the youth editors of YALJOD
for taking such a bold step in preparing this cri cal and mely publica on. Much success at the
launching of this first edi on at the African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa scheduled for
October 21, 2016.

Dr. Patricia Rodney
(Widow of Pan-African Historian, Walter Rodney)
CEO, The Walter Rodney Founda on, Inc.
Atlanta, Georgia, USA.
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PREFACE
“One Day, Africa will write its own story … and it will be a story of glory and dignity ”,
- Patrice Lumumba
The Young African Leaders Journal of Development (YALJOD) has been conceptualised with the
aim of highligh ng ideas and issues that would help realise the aspira ons of the African Union's
Agenda 2063 and the United Na ons Global Goals for Sustainable Development (SDGs), as well
as other con nental, regional and na onal development ini a ves in Africa.
This Journal brings together some of Africa’s top young minds and thought leaders, from
diﬀerent parts of the Con nent, who have come together to highlight and share their views,
perspec ves and proposed solu ons on some of the pressing developmental issues facing Africa
today, from the threats of terrorism and conflict; to democracy and good governance; gender
equality; educa on and healthcare provision; entrepreneurship; science and technology; and all
other spheres of life.
As we proceed in the 21st Century, we need to recognise that Africa is at a new transi on in its
development, needing a new type of leadership in the poli cal, economic, social and all other
sectors of the global agenda. Indeed, Africa is rising, and at the centre of this growing Con nent
are Africa’s youth, who are ready to make a diﬀerence. With Africa’s youth popula on pegged
at approximately 70%, and the Con nent’s popula on poised to double to two billion in the next
genera on, it is clear that the Con nent’s future lies in the hands of its youth.
What then are Africa’s hopes for the next 50 years, and the next one hundred years and beyond?
What are our hopes of realising the United Na ons Global Goals for Sustainable Development?
And indeed, what are Africa’s hopes of realising our very ambi ous Agenda 2063, if we cannot
adequately embrace the vision, knowledge and crea vity of our youth? And if we cannot inspire
them to confidently and asser vely face a globalised and compe ve world?
I believe that taking into account the perspec ve of young people is cri cal to social change,
poli cal and economic progress. It is also important to include the perspec ve of our youth in the
poli cal and economic decision-making process in Africa. This is because young people hold the
key to change, innova on, and ac on in all areas of development. It therefore, falls upon us that
for Africa’s poli cal, economic and social decisions and declara ons to result in eﬀec ve ac on
for sustainable development, the youths need to be eﬀec vely engaged, because the concerns of
young people top today’s global agenda - from educa on, to employment, access to healthcare
facili es, as well as informa on and communica on technologies, and all other areas of life. If
Africa does not integrate the knowledge, vision, crea vity and experience of its youth, Africa’s
young people will remain an untapped powerful resource and Africa would be losing out on its
major resource.
The Indian philosopher, Mahatma Gandhi once said “First they ignore, then they laugh at you,
then they ight you, then you win”. As expressed by Mahatma Gandhi, Africa was first ignored
and considered a dark con nent. When the explorers from the western world came they laughed
at us as being primi ve and laughed at everything we did from our cultural beliefs and our food,
right through to our religious beliefs. Then they fought with us during coloniza on and during
our struggle for poli cal independence. Eventually, we won and Africa is s ll winning as the rest
pg |vii
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of the world keeps coming back to Africa and are dependent on Africa’s wealth.
I believe that the future can be found in the past. Africa is the birthplace of mankind and is also
the birthplace of civiliza on with great early empires, a great tradi on of trade; a great history;
a wealth of diversity of peoples, tongues, and tradi ons; and a full spectrum of skin tones, hair
textures, rich religions, rich cultures and a rich heritage.
However, because we allow other people to write our history, Africa’s good and inspiring stories
of our rich heritage are never told. Posi ve stories about Africa, such as those of strong wise men
and women, rulers of great empires such as Shaka Zulu of South Africa, and strong asser ve
women like Yaa Asaantwe of Ghana are never told. Even the founding fathers of modern Africa
who have not been gone too long like Haile Selasie; Jomo Kenya a; Julius Nyerere; Kwame
Nkrumah have already been pushed out of the history books of our children. Those who are s ll
alive like Dr Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia are not given as much credit as is due to them. This is
because we let other people write our stories. And because we let other people write our stories,
all the great history of Africa is largely ignored and unknown, as most of it is not wri en at all.
I always get the impression that we underrate ourselves as Africans and underes mate Africa’s
real poten al. From the history that I know, much of the modern world was built on Africa’s
resources. From the history that I know, the modern western world was built on Africa’s labour, on
Africa’s sweat and toil, using Africa’s manpower, Africa’s wealth and Africa’s intellect- ini ally
as slaves, followed by coloniza on, right through to the pilferage of our wealth and resources via
priva sa on, foreign investment and tax evasion, from raw materials right through to brain drain.
It is no secret that Africa is a con nent that is rich in natural resources from oil and gas, to gold,
diamonds, copper, precious stones and virgin arable land. Africa is also rich in rare earths with
bio-diversity and the enormous carbon-sink that are the rain forests, who play a major role in
tackling global warming and climate change. Just like Africa gave birth to humanity and built
the world in the past, Africa is s ll building the world in the present and the world is dependent
on Africa to build and save its future and that of the en re planet. The rich natural resources
of Africa have once again prompted a 21st century scramble for the Con nent, with the East
and the West figh ng for a piece of Africa. Africa s ll has untapped resources such as mineral
deposits and virgin arable land. All these blessings make Africa a con nent of opportunity and
an emerging investment fron er. This posi ons Africa as a con nent that is signalling impending
economic migra on from the East and the West in the name of foreign investment and interna onal
development.
As the birthplace of civiliza on, there is every opportunity that Africa can now become the
birthplace of a new form of poli cs that goes beyond the Western model of liberal democracy.
As Africa inally emerges from the twin shadows of the Colonial Era and the Cold War, there is
a new vibrancy to African poli cs and the true spread of democracy in the wake of globalisa on.
Most African countries now have mul -party democracy, where compe on among the poli cal
par es is more spread out and fierce, giving the electorate a wider choice to select from, and
pu ng the government of the day to be accountable and to uphold good governance. Africa’s
new asser ve poli cs rejects the belief of the ‘one policy or one solu on its all’ as imposed in
the past.
As is evident now, the Con nent has now risen above the ini al setbacks of HIV/AIDS with
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some of our African countries being among the fastest growing economies in the world. Africa
has survived slavery, colonialisa on, brain drain, resource and wealth pilferage. Surely, Africa
can survive disease, poverty, corrup on and conflict!
Africa is a hub of professional and intellectual resource with its own intellectual, cultural,
inancial, human, poli cal and social capital to rise to excellence. With the con nued increase in
the number of African universi es, Africa is educa ng its young people to be future leaders with
a higher percentage of Africa’s youth being educated in most African countries. In its pursuit
for excellence, Africa requires a new development strategy that invests in the poten al of Africa
by Africans to improve governance and to achieve sustainable, equitable economic growth in
order to put Africa on a path to meet its developmental goals, to eradicate poverty and achieve
prosperity.
Africa needs to believe in itself, in its power and its influence through its vibrant youth popula ons.
Africa needs to reassert itself as the provider of the world’s resources and the custodian of the
well-being of the planet. Africa is once again being seen as a con nent of opportunity, and the
last emerging investment fron er. Africa needs to claim ownership of Africa’s des ny, take
ownership of our con nent and our resources; ownership of our policies, poli cs, economic
and social development. We also need to take ownership of our problems and ownership of our
solu ons. While Interna onal Rela ons scholars talk about the "Asian Century”, I feel confident
to claim the 21st Century as the African Century because of our vibrant youth popula on.
Africa has the poten al to be a major player in world aﬀairs. But Africa cannot do this without
its youth making a full contribu on. The development strategy for Africa must be premised
on the youth as key and indispensable actors and leaders in accelera ng economic growth and
in achieving poli cally, socially and environmentally sustainable development. The talents of
Africa’s youth is exhibited in the way the various authors have ar culated the issues that they have
chosen to highlight in this inaugural issue of the Young African Leaders Journal of Development.

Her Excellency Ambassador Dr. Jus na Mutale,
Founder & CEO, Jus na Mutale Founda on for Leadership
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THE REVIVAL OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
IN NIGERIA AND ITS IMPACT ON SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
Olanrewaju Ojo Emupenne
Poli cal Scien st and Independent Researcher,
Nigeria.
ABSTRACT
Nigeria was under military rule for near to 30 years out of her 55 years of existence a er
independence. During this period, corrup on reached peak levels causing societal retrogression.
The dawn of the Fourth Republic in 1999 heralded the revival of elec ons in the country. It is
against this background that this study inves gates the extent to which democracy has advanced
and improved the living standards of ci zens and increased per capita income among others.
A total of 642 people, 393 males, 236 women and 13 respondents took part in the case study.
The study underscores the need for a policy road-map while hin ng at a strategic framework
for understanding and addressing the ‘democracy-development nexus’ in the Nigerian poli cal
system.
Key Words: Democracy, development, elec ons, military, socio-economic transforma on.
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
Nigeria is a federal republic located at the eastern end of the Gulf of Guinea, with an es mated
popula on of about 182,200,000 (UN, 2015), earning the country the tle of the most populous
na on in Africa and the seventh most populous na on in the world. Nigeria shares territorial
boundaries with the Republic of Benin in the West, Chad and Cameroon in the East, the Niger
Republic in the North and Atlan c Ocean in (Gulf of Guinea) the South. The country measures
approximately 923,769 square kilometres, made up of 909,890 square kilometres of land and
13,876 square kilometres of water (Na onal Bureau of Sta s cs, 2010).
1.1 STRUCTURE OF THE STATE AND GOVERNANCE
There is a consensus among scholars that Nigeria is a Federal State (Ijalaiye, 1979; Osuntokun,
1979; Osadolor, 1998; Tanumo, 1998; Anifowose and Babawale, 2010; Idahosa and Aghahowa,
2010). Nigeria, as a Federal State, is unoﬃcially divided into six (6) geopoli cal zones which
include North West, North East, North Central, South West, South East and South-South. The
country is ofﬁcially delineated into thirty-six (36) states and a federal capital territory.
Nigeria’s federal system consists of three ers of governance; federal, state and local governments.
There is a clear-cut separa on of power between the arms of government. The execu ve head at
the federal level is the president, governors head the states and chairpersons for local councils.
With regard to the law making process, the state and local government prac ce unicameralism
while bicameralism func ons at the federal level.
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A SYNOPSIS OF NIGERIA UNDER MILITARY REGIME
Nigeria became a republic in 1963, three years a er gaining independence from Great Britain.
And no sooner had the colonialists le the shore of the country than topsy-turvy of the poli cal
scene, tomfoolery of the poli cal gladiators and entrenched regional disharmony became the
order of the day (Ademoyega, 1981; Onovo, 1997; Iroanusi, 2000; Onah, 2000; Tonye, 2010).
On 15 January 1966, the military struck and overthrew a democra c government. There were
seven successful military takeovers and four unsuccessful coups between 1966 and 1999 when
the army handed over power to an elected government. The long spell of military rule was a great
setback for Nigeria and its nega ve eﬀects are s ll felt.
1.2 ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA SINCE 1999
One of the cardinal characteris cs of democracy is free, fair and credible elec ons. Olurode
(1987) and Akinboye (2004) allude that democracy is the pivot around which elec on revolves.
Elec ons have become an integral part of Nigeria's democra c governance. Anifowose (2004)
notes that ‘a conten ous poli cal issue in Nigeria since independence on 1st October 1960, has
been the poli cs of power shi ’. S ll, unlike earlier democra c experiments truncated through
coup d’état due to succession crises, in the current dispensa on, Nigeria has had four successful
poli cal transi ons.
2.0 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The Nigerian poli cal landscape reeks of unfulfilled electoral promises and the death of ‘dividends
of democracy’. There is a primordial accumula on of the commonwealth of our beloved country
depleted by poli cal ofﬁce bearers and their allies to the detriment of the helpless poor masses.
As a consequence, the nega ve eﬀects of this are enormous and they include the shortage of
infrastructural facili es, youth res veness, a high crime rate, brain drain, low life expectancy
and irregular migra on through Sahara or Mediterranean routes among others. Thus, this study
inves gates and illustrates the extent to which democracy has aﬀected the quality of life of
Nigerian ci zens.
3.0 THE RESEARCH QUESTION
The main aim of this study was to collect enough data to help in examining the extent to which
democra c ins tu ons speed up or decelerate developmental process in Sub-Saharan Africa with
specific reference to Nigeria. It also seeks to inves gate why the Nigerian leadership at the federal,
state and local levels has been incapable of addressing the problems connec ng corrup on,
systemic failure, ins tu onal decay and poli cal iner a leading to the underdevelopment of the
country.
Core research ques on: Does democracy accelerate or decelerate the developmental stride of
Nigeria?
Sub-ques ons:
1. Is every ethnic, religious or social group free and able to exercise their right to take part in
na onal poli cs?
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2.

Has any household gone without the life's necessi es including access to clean water,
healthcare and energy since 1999?
3. Since the return of democra c governance, has corrup on declined, the condi on of social
ameni es together with the security situa on improved? And has the condi on of the
medium, and small-scale enterprises and the value of na onal currency improved since the
return to democra c governance?
4. Do elected oﬃcials have the requisite qualiﬁca ons to do their job in an eﬀec ve and
eﬁcient manner?
5. To what extent are the elected oﬃcials accessible before and a er elec ons in Nigeria to
guarantee poli cal accountability?
6. Do incumbent poli cians embark on projects on the eve of elec ons to enhance their
chances of victory in the elec ons?
7. Are elec on results reﬂec ve of the wishes of the majority of the electorates?
8. Should Nigeria's electoral system prohibit poten al candidates with a shady character or
previous/current involvement in corrupt prac ces from contes ng for federal, state or local
government seats?
9. Are those elected oﬃcials able to improve the quality of service in government and ease the
poor's suﬀering while in oﬃce?
10. Has the economic condi on of Nigeria improved or deteriorated since the return to civil
rule?
11. Are Nigerians sa sﬁed with the way democracy works and the way elec ons in the country
get conducted?
12. Do Nigerian ci zens have conﬁdence in their elected leaders?
4.0 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
This study intends to provide a be er understanding of how viable democra c ins tu ons can
help in fostering human development and the actualisa on of the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGS) in Nigeria as well as the African region.
5.0 METHODOLOGY
This study adopts a blend of data from both primary and secondary sources.
5.1 RESEARCH DESIGN
The study employs a survey research design.
5.2 STUDY POPULATION
The popula on includes a reasonable range of actors such as scholars, policy makers, opinion
leaders, members of civil society, members of women groups, security sector personnel, youth
groups and very importantly, the poor and near-poor individuals in rural areas.
5.3 STUDY LOCATION AND SITE
The primary data was obtained from the six geo-poli cal zones of the federa on viz., Northeast
(Yobe State), North West (Kebbi State), North Central (Abuja FCT and Niger State), South West
(Lagos State), South East (Enugu State) and South-South (Edo State).
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5.4 SAMPLE SIZE AND SAMPLING TECHNIQUE
Six hundred and forty-two individuals were selected to be part of the study using probability
sampling with the intent that every Nigerian has a chance of taking part. The six geo-poli cal
zones got just representa on in the study; from the North West 116 respondents, 137 from North
East, 56 from North Central, 109 from South West, 122 from South East and 77 from SouthSouth. More so, an addi onal 25 respondents who did not state their geo-poli cal zones.
5.5 RESEARCH INSTRUMENT AND INSTRUMENTATION
Only one ques onnaire was used for this study, consis ng of six parts. The ques onnaire elicited
relevant informa on from the respondents. Part A consisted of items on respondent’s sociodemographic proﬁle. Part B, C, D, E and F consisted of 40 items that sought for respondent’s
percep ons on main concerns aﬀec ng Nigerians on a daily basis using Rensis Likert ive-level
scale Strongly Agree, Agree Somewhat, Disagree, Strongly Disagree and Have not Formed an
Opinion.
5.6 DATA COLLECTION
The researcher sent out ques onnaires to Nigerians in the selected states of the federa on. Data
was generated from the responses of 642 respondents.
5.7

ANALYSIS OF DATA

Por ons of the data collected got further analysed in details using analy cal tools such as the
Sta s cal Package for Social Scien sts (SPSS) and Microso Excel.
6.0

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The results of the study are presented and discussed in order of the research ques ons.
7.0 A SYNTHESIS OF THE STUDY
Through the study it was discovered that:
1. Democracy has not engendered sustainable development in Nigeria. The quality of life of a
larger percentage of the Nigerian popula on, in par cular, the rural poor has not improved
as expected. Elec on winners have neither done much to improve the quality of government
service nor helped to ease the poor's aﬄic on while in oﬃce.
2.

Since the return to democracy, Nigeria's state of na onal security has been in shambles and
misuse of oﬃce and corrup on has worsened.

3.

The value of Naira (the Nigeria’s na onal currency) has con nued to depreciate despite
assurances for its stabilisa on.

4.

Although most people seeking for elec ve oﬃces in Nigeria are academically qualiﬁed, the
study showed that majority of them lack the integrity to handle public funds; and adequate
knowledge with regards to the problems faced by their cons tuencies.

5.

Most of the elected oﬃcials are accessible during elec oneering campaign. But once
elec ons are over and they are sworn in, accessing them becomes nearly impossible.
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6.

Poli cal Business Cycle (PBC) is a norm in Nigeria's poli cal system. Poli cians o en
embark on projects on the eve of elec ons to boost their chances of victory and abandon
them soon as elec on season comes to an end.

7.

Nigeria's electoral system will be more transparent and apt if it restricts people with
ques onable character vying for poli cal oﬃces.

8.

The Economic condi on of Nigeria has improved, though not signiﬁcantly, since the return
to civil rule.

9.

The way democracy works and the way Nigeria conducts its elec ons is in general,
acceptable.

10. While the majority of Nigerians have conﬁdence in the current president to move the
na on closer to the ‘promised land’ considering his antecedent; the conﬁdence they have in
their state governors, senators, members of House of Representa ve and State Houses of
Assembly is at zero level.
8.0

CONCLUSION

Democracy is essen al to development if its fundamental principles are well ar culated and
holis cally harnessed. The type of democracy prac sed in Nigeria for the past sixteen (16) years
leaves nothing to be desired and is not at par with other na ons. This is the raison d’etre that, in
spite of Nigeria’s diverse resources, democra c governance has failed to produce meaningful
economic growth and sustainable development. Results and the ﬁndings from the analysed data
gathered have been jurispruden ally dissected to establish this fact. A erwards, panaceas on how
democracy can s mulate sustainable development in Nigeria were proﬀered. It is envisioned
that if the current government discards the terrible burden bequeathed on this country by past
government and embraces a new policy roadmap as bu ressed below, the country will be the
be er for it.
9.0 RECOMMENDATIONS
In the light of the above ﬁndings the following recommenda ons are made:
1. Nigerians should not go without the necessi es of life such as water, food, clothing, shelter
and energy.
2.

A conducive business environment should be created for both local entrepreneurs and
foreign investors. Necessary start-up capital should be provided for genuine small and
medium scale entrepreneurs at a reasonable interest rate.

3.

A strategic framework for tackling corrup on should be developed. An -gra agencies such
as Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Independent Corrupt Prac ces
and other Related Oﬀences Commission (ICPC) among others should be rejuvenated and
empowered to ‘bark’ and ‘bite’.

4.

En cing the electorates with infrastructural facili es and economic resurgence on the eve
of elec ons intending to win their votes should be discouraged through an enabling law.
Fulﬁlment of electoral promises should start from week one (1) when a poli cal oﬃce
holder assumes oﬃce.
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5.

Nigeria’s electoral system must take guidance from a legal framework that complies with
global best prac ces.

6.

Poli cal accountability should be encouraged. As such, any individual, regardless of how
highly placed, that is implicated in electoral fraud should not only be disqualiﬁed but also
prevented from vying for any elected oﬃce in the country.

7.

Since elec ons are crucial for the future of Nigeria, the Independent Na onal Electoral
Commission (INEC) must be an independent execu ve arm of government in the truest
sense, with the funds for mee ng the ﬁnancial needs of the body drawn from a consolidated
account.

8.

The major cause of the problems bedevilling Nigeria such as violence, terrorism, crime,
illegal migra on, rural-urban dri to men on a few, is poverty. Thus government at the
federal, state and local government levels should adopt a prac cal and sustainable strategy
to reduce abject poverty in Nigeria.
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ABSTRACT
The idea of development has always been nurtured. It is as old as the history of Africa itself. Even
though the con nent is believed to host the star ng point of development, man has struggled
to con nue doing so there. Shying away from reality will not be the solu on, but facing reality
with all its encumbrances. Perhaps, many people are ignorant of what pan-Africanism can oﬀer;
hence, they relegate pan-Africanism and the African development prospect to mere academic
studies. Against this backdrop, the paper seeks to substan ate the signiicance and role of panAfricanism in the development of Africa.
INTRODUCTION
The African Union (AU) Agenda 2063 project is aimed at achieving a united and prosperous
Africa. To realise our vision of a united and prosperous Africa, there is the need to adopt a
paradigm – a prac cable theory about how things should be rightly said and done. Our people,
especially the youth, must understand the importance of pan-Africanism and work sellessly
towards promo ng it. Africa has found it diﬃcult to evolve a consistent ideology. The cultural
mul farious nature of African na ons occasioned by the arbitrary par oning by their erstwhile
colonial masters is not helping ma ers. Change is only possible when the people are united.
Stalling a tudes have threatened the development of our con nent.
African development has been stunted by crises of ideologies. The struggles by diﬀerent ethnic
groups indigenous to na ons for poli cal and social domina on of others have also created fear,
emo onal a achment and resistance to ra onal synthesis of the diversity which could promote
the na on’s development. The Biafran emancipa on struggle in Nigeria stemmed from this
same perceived poli cal domina on; whereas this ethnic group would have held onto unity and
contributed from a strategic posi on to the country’s development. This diversity has cost us so
much. Nelson Mandela understood it and revealed his dream of an African con nent that is at
peace with itself. For him, the realisa on of a united Africa where leaders work in synergy is
the surest way to the con nent’s development. Perhaps, Kwame Nkrumah had be er words to
pass the necessary message. He opined:“It is clear that we must ind an African solu on to our
problems, and this can only be found in African unity. Divided we are weak; united, Africa could
become one of the greatest forces for good in the world.”1 I beg to rephrase Nkrumah’s ‘could’ to
‘would’. This is rather a statement of fact applicable to any part of the globe. How can a united
and mul talented people not prove formidable? Even God had to dispel such threatening unity
at the Tower of Babel. I wish to state the fact that it is the ideology and values of a people that
direct their development.
What has been the case before now? Africa’s underdevelopment has been largely blamed on
colonialism. Walter Rodney’s "How Europe Underdeveloped Africa" also lent credence to the
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truth of this claim. But whilst we may yet ponder, what has been the impact of our self-governance
over the last ive decades? Professor Kwasi Agyeman tells us more: “ If we were to be honest with
ourselves, we surely would not ind it too diﬃcult to be convinced of the fact that Africans have
been irresponsible and harmful to Africa in terms of self-governance. I would like to stake out the
case that we have failed ourselves.” 2
Intently, anyone would agree with Professor Agyeman. Governance in Africa has suﬀered several
hangovers. This governance, however, does not only refer to poli cal governance. Our ac ons
as lead individuals at diﬀerent levels of the African society have also contributed to this failure
which Professor Agyeman emphasized. Now that we have go en to the point of introspec on,
we realise that the con nent’s development can best be geared by its people. Ins nc vely and in
a mely fashion, the African Union (AU) took to its pedestal and ini ated a vision plan which
provides a general pla orm for everyone to foster our collec ve development. Africa has now set
a target for itself for 2063. Our aim is to propel an African con nent which will be rightly seated
amongst other con nents in the First World status. This paper urges all Africans, especially the
youth, to work more unitedly and exude utmost believe in themselves (and Africa) as having
the ability to manage their problems and chart a course for their development using African
resources.
PAN-AFRICANISM: ITS TRUE MEANING
It is not surprising that the idea of pan-Africanism thrives mainly in the context of poli cal
aliena on. But when we look at its etymology, the term “pan-Africanism” originally depicts an
all-inclusive Africa. It is the idea that people of African descent have common interests and should
be united. This unity, however, should not be limited to the poli cal space. It ought to reﬂect in
other spheres of our society as Africans. The slogan ‘Africa for the Africans’, popularized by
Marcus Garvey, lays more emphasis on the fact that pan-Africanism is rather a movement for
coopera on between all people of the African descent. This coopera on aims at strengthening
the bonds of solidarity and fostering the collec ve progress and development of the people. PanAfricanism is a shared posi ve feeling amongst Africans. It arouses the consciousness that one is
an African and his allegiance lies with Africa. It is the sense of unity and oneness people of the
African descent exude, when they meet, interact and work together. Pan-Africanism transcends
the realm of ideology, it is prac cable and ought to reﬂect in all our dealings as a people.
Unfortunately, the essence of pan-Africanism has been devalued by Africans. Disunity has proven
to be the worst barrier for the con nent. The absence of unity, even amongst African leaders and
the youths, shows the lack of understanding of the power and signiﬁcance of pan-Africanism.
Real leaders must be willing to sacriﬁce all for the welfare of their people; hence any leader who
places self-aggrandisement above the ci zenry debases the essence of pan-Africanism. It is not
enough to originate from Africa, we must do so much together in order to promote the status of
our con nent and improve its percep on. The future of pan-Africanism lies in the strength of our
society and our ability to bring together young people, social workers, poli cal organisers, trade
unionists, ac vists, scholars and women’s right promoters behind a common vision of moving
Africa to the First World status. Our history as a people is history that needs to be told, that needs
to be learned and that needs to be recorded; as such we must selﬂessly work together so as to
fulil the goals of the Agenda 2063 and create the Africa we want. Every African, including the
reader, must show responsibility towards the con nent by doing as li le as can be done in order
to promote its status. Pan-Africanism is faith in Africa. It does not deny the fact that Africa has
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its numerous problems and leadership challenges, rather it proﬀers solu ons and denies the fact
the ability to lord it permanently over Africa. We can work out the Africa we want if we believe,
work and stay together.
IDEA OF DEVELOPMENT
It is the social will of the African people that their standard of living be improved. Our struggle
as a con nent is geared towards achieving a prosperous Africa conducive for Africans and for
our visitors. Our collec ve wish is to enjoy the dividends of development, but this can only be
realised when we experience a great range of development on diﬀerent spheres. Development is
an unavoidable datum of life. It was deﬁned by Michael Todaro as involving: “The reorganisa on
and reorienta on of en re economic and social systems. In addi on to improvements in incomes
and output, it typically involves radical changes in ins tu on, social and administra ve structures
as well as in popular a tudes and some mes even beliefs and customs.” 3 This deini on of
development hinted on the need for ‘radical changes’ even in the a tudes, beliefs and customs
of a people. The essence of pan-Africanism is to raise the belief of the average African about
the prosperity of the con nent whilst inculca ng inherently values of responsibility towards this
prosperity. Thus, pan-Africanism remains the vital ingredient needed to successfully achieve the
development of Africa and the agenda 2063 vision plan.
As soon as Africans start exuding the spirit of pan-Africanism, there would be a massive unfolding
of inner poten ali es which will undoubtedly promote our development. In this line, the African
Philosopher, Pantaleon Iroegbu explained development to be: “…the progressive unfolding of
the inner poten ali es of a given reality. It is to de-envelop, that is to bring out to light, the
existen al, func onal and epistemic, which was enveloped, folded or hidden. As it applies to
a people, development is the integra on of diﬀerent givens: na onal, physical, acquired and
human, of a people towards the full working out, permanently and cumula vely, of their being as
persons of their community and of their real produc vity.” 4
Four major types of development aﬀects a con nent posi vely. They invariably boost a people’s
standard of living and protect their freedoms, rights. These developments are: economic
development, social development, poli cal development and individual development. Let us
a empt brief explana ons:
Economic Development
This type of development is greatly inﬂuenced by the industrial advancement of that society.
It refers to the sustained, concerted ac ons of socie es and policymakers that improve the
standards of living and economic health of a people. It improves the quality of life by crea ng or
retaining jobs and suppor ng or growing incomes. For B. Ohiani, economic development is “the
qualita ve and quan ta ve increase of factors of produc on and goods and services produced
with these factors, equitable distribu on of wealth produced by a given popula on of an area and
increase in the standard of living of a given popula on over a measurable period of me.” 5 This
type of development adopts new technologies, transits from local agriculture-based to industrybased economy and improves living standards.
Social Development
This type of development places people at the centre of development. It is deﬁned as priori zing
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human needs in the growth and progression of the society. Again, Ohiani explains social
development to be “the con nuous increase in the consciousness of the people about their
environmental and human factors, promote their wellbeing and their ability to control these
factors so as to control their standards of living.” 6 The focus of social development is to improve
the lives of regular ci zens, especially the poor, to make the society a be er place for everyone.
To a large extent, it involves listening to poor people and promo ng their voices in development.
Poli cal Development
This is best described as poli cal modernisa on. It may be deﬁned in terms of the capacity
of the poli cal system to sa sfy the changing needs of the members of the society 7. This type
of development involves the moral maturity and discipline of the operators of poli cs. It is
important because there must be poli cal order for progress to exist in any society. For a na on
to experience order, it must have an agent of order which is the government in power. This agent
of order controls or determines the economic and social development of the society, thus, any
development without poli cal development is no development at all.
Individual Development
This type of development is also known as personal development. It is paramount as it provides
the founda on for development. Man is the bedrock of the society, and without ﬁrst solving the
problem of the individual, it is impossible for any na on to develop. Individual development
covers ac vi es that improve awareness and iden ty, develops talents and poten al, builds human
capital, enhances the quality of life and contributes to the realisa on of dreams and aspira ons.
This type of development involves both the moral courage and intellectual adroitness of an
individual. Its nature determines the nature of the society as man is the measure of all things.
Since the economic, social and poli cal types of development all rest on individual development,
it suﬃces for Africa to lay more emphasis and give more primacy to individual development.
There is need for our con nent to invest more in the development of its people, especially the
youth and future leaders, who will in turn promote the economic, social, poli cal and other types
of development.
PAN-AFRICAN LEADERSHIP
The founda on of a na on’s development is individual development. The extent to which an
individual can aﬀect a na on or con nent depends on the posi on occupied by such individual.
A leadership that is personally developed has the moral courage to live up to expecta on and
understands the dynamics of a changing world. Such a leadership will place the interest of the
people above that of the self, and exude competence in the face of technical challenges. Whilst
describing the challenges faced by Nigeria, the prominent African scholar, Chinua Achebe, had
8
asserted that “the trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership.”
This
failure which Achebe talked about was and is s ll traceable to the lack of personal development.
Our goals and visions as na ons within Africa can be best achieved when our leaderships are
anchored by individuals, with character and competence, who are commi ed to promo ng the
social will of the people they serve. Since we have now unanimously agreed to project ourselves
to the First World status by 2063, there is the need to ins tu onalise what is called pan-African
leadership if sustainable development is to be indeed sustained in Africa. By pan-African
leadership, I mean uniﬁed and codiﬁed con nental governance and leadership system, modus
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operandi which will help spread the dividends of development throughout all African na ons
in record me. From diﬀerent fronts, this kind of system would undoubtedly promote the living
standards of Africans and help project the con nent to the First World status. When taken into
serious considera on, the following points and ac vi es will help us realise that Africa we want.
Firstly, the rate of ci zenry living below poverty line is a barrier to our legacy as a people; but
since poli cal development is the determining factor for both economic and social developments,
it suﬃces to pay detailed a en on to the emergence of successive and progressive African
poli cs. This kind of poli cs can come to stay when Africa indoctrinates the principle of personal
development by systemically establishing a ﬁrm poli cal ins tu on which will be headquartered
in any African na on and supervised by the African Union. The most important task will be to
establish eﬃcient governments and eﬀec ve spirited leaders – with competence and character
– who are devoted to development, and have the ability to promote it. Genuine development
cannot aﬀord to sacriﬁce the well-being of the majority; hence without ﬁrst strengthening good
governance in Africa, it is impossible for the con nent to achieve our Agenda 2063 vision plan.
Secondly, educa on remains the best legacy and it is necessary we make huge investments ahead
of 2063. In order to automa cally install personally developed individuals into strategic leadership
posi ons in the con nent, the AUC, ECOWAS, AFDB and the likes must invest thoroughly in the
educa on of youths, especially those showing thorough understanding of the rudiments of panAfricanism and the Agenda 2063. Already, the African Union’s Pan African University scheme
and the ECOWAS Fellowship Programme, amongst others, serve as pla orms for the prepara on
of Africa’s future leaders, but more can be done in the educa onal sector, and swi ly, to meet up
with our target in 47 years.
Thirdly, because we live in an age of sophis cated orchestrated designs by na ons, companies
and individuals to posi on themselves in such a way as to become colossal and powerful with
myriads of tentacles of domina on, our integra on, which is an expression of pan-Africanism, is
highly necessary. Civil socie es, companies, government agencies, development organisa ons;
NGOs and NPOs alike are required to work together to build up sustainable development projects
from the grassroots all over Africa. The agenda 2063 is an open call for all Africans to lend a
helping hand to li ing Africa; thus it is needful for all Africans (even the diaspora) to support
mo ons which are geared towards improving the standards of living on African soil. If we are
to be a bit cynical, we would realise that the spate at which NGOs, civil socie es struggle to
survive in Africa has somewhat contributed to some of the internal crises within our borders.
For instance, when indigenous youths come up with a fantas c development idea and approach
a prominent, powerful body in the con nent and are turned down, they eventually seek support
for their ideas from outside the shores of the con nent. Such experiences o en build nega ve
momentum and the belief that these foreigners are more dedicated to the development of their
communi es. This could possibly spur the naive ones into rebelling against their own leaders,
governments in the name of “ﬁgh ng for the development of their country”. Inasmuch as I agree
that somethings are not right with African leaderships, I do not believe in violent resolu ons.
Rather, I believe in diplomacy, nego a on and the sharing of that feeling of belonging which
could peacefully pave ways in even the most diﬃcult ma ers against the government. However,
many young people do not think the same way but believe in violent outbursts. Not looking
too far to the death of Muammar Gaddaﬁ, a recent case study was the #SHUTDOWNZIM and
#THISFLAG campaigns in Zimbabwe which was reportedly claimed to be sponsored by some
foreign inﬂuence. Whether sponsored or not, African big bodies, governments, companies and
organisa ons need to show full support to the youth and carry them along if we are to raise young
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people with pan-African consciousness who would not be used like pawns in a chess game.
Several ‘African’ NGOs, NPOs partook in the #SHUTDOWNZIM exercise and were ready to
create chaos which would have thrown nega ve spotlight on Africa, whereas we should be more
united in the spirit of pan-Africanism and seek be er ways to project the agenda 2063.
Fourthly, the common idiom, “as you make your bed, so you must lie on it”, reminds us of
the fact that the future has its founda on in today. To prepare a more formidable ground for
Africa’s future leaders, our present leaders (presidents, heads of state) ought to exude the spirit of
oneness and speak from one voice. How do we expect the globe to take our concerns into serious
considera on when we don’t speak as one authen c voice? Of course, pan-African leadership is
a ni y-gri y for Africa’s development; and this is why one of the foremost goals of the agenda
2063 vision plan is to build the much needed unity in the con nent. Imagine that Africa seeks
permanent representa on on the UN Security Council so as to eﬀec vely tackle our problems of
peace and security issues, but only few of our leaders have been passionate enough to declare our
collec ve aspira on before the globe. Yet, we are classiﬁed as one of the world’s most populated
con nents and every year our leaders a end the UN General Assembly. One is tempted to ask,
where does the allegiance lie?
Finally, the outgoing AUC Chairperson, Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s email dated January
24, 2063 must con nue to serve as an encourager when we lose the zeal to individually carry
on the torch of development in our diverse communi es. Not only did it reveal that the agenda
2063 plan became successful when pan-Africanism had its root amongst the early genera ons,
it also appraised the roles played by successive genera ons of African youth. This goes to show
that the togetherness of African youth is key to the realisa on of agenda 2063 and the eventual
development of Africa. We ought to be overwhelmed by communal jingoism as our development
as a people can only be bolstered when we stop ac ng as ﬁ y-ive fragmented individual countries;
and start ac ng as one powerful group.
CONCLUSION
Pan-Africanism is key to our development as a people. Our abundant natural resources are
suﬃcient to place our na ons on the forefront of global development, but good governance
enshrined in the ideals of pan-Africanism is essen al to carry all African na ons along. In
bu ressing this point, Professor Obi Oguejiofor rightly asserted that: “From whatever angle
the solu on to the problems of the con nent may come, it is evident that proper governance or
management of the available resources of all kinds is essen al in moving the con nent forward
and in ensuring that the proper atmosphere exist to enable what could be done to be done in order
to advance on the way of progress”. 9
Africa’s present and future leaderships must reposi on their various na ons on the threshold of
a new pan-African orienta on which will recognise our collec ve future in the agenda 2063,
call for changes in a tudes and mindsets as well as inculcate the right set of African values –
like honesty, transparency, discipline, integrity and the love for Africa and its people. This is
impera ve because only pan-Africanism can synthesise diﬀerent African cultures, ideologies and
informa on, and help us build a formidable society.
God bless Africa!
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This paper seeks to understand the rela onship between Africa’s poten al, the increase in illicit
ﬁnancial lows, and the leadership challenge in resource management. It looks at the resources
that the con nent possesses (human and natural), the serious challenge of illicit ﬁnancial lows,
and the need for deliberate and resolute leadership within and beyond the con nent’s borders. It
makes an asser on that there is a need to eﬀec vely manage the resources of the con nent and
proposes the need for concerted eﬀorts to ﬁght the illicit lows of resources out of the con nent
- a trend that doesn’t seem to slow down. It implores the need for ac ve par cipa on of all
Africans in the management of resources as a sure way to maintain the rise. In and of itself, it
is not an exhaus ve analysis because the topic under discussion is broad and interlinked with
important aspects like development.
INTRODUCTION
There is a shi in the global portrayal of Africa. From the dark con nent ravaged with diseases
and poverty to a sleeping giant now rising. This centre stage has been earned as a result of
resources. Africa is the second largest con nent a er Asia and home to around 1.2 billion people
50 % of whom are younger than 19 years old. Africa has about 30.2 million km 2 land and that
accounts for 20.4 % of the earth's total land area. The world’s second largest rainforest is found in
Africa. The largest propor on of natural resources - gold, diamonds, gemstones, oil, and copperpg |015

are found in Africa. In the midst of this rise is the systemic corrup on that needs more than
pronouncements, but ac on, to ﬁght. The con nent's youthful popula on gives it the advantage
of a large and cheap workforce that will be useful in the exploita on of its natural resources. This
also entails that there will be a ready demand and market for products. More importantly, the
youthful popula on will contribute to the various na ons' tax base and bring development to the
various countries.
AFRICA’S RESOURCES
Africa is synonymous with natural resources from minerals, natural gas, oil and woodlands.
Minerals are found in various parts of the con nent and have been used to bring about economic
development in some cases while others, the source of conﬂict. Wherever you look in Africa, there
are mineral resources. In the south, Botswana has about 35 % of Africa’s diamonds and produces
copper, nickel and soda ash while South Africa is the largest producer of gold diamonds and is the
world’s largest producer of chrome, manganese, pla num, vanadium and vermiculite. It is also
the second largest producer of ilmenite, palladium, ru le and zirconium. Zambia has over 75%
of the con nents copper and is the world’s largest producer of emeralds from one single mine
found in the impoverished district of Lufwanyama on the outskirts of the Copperbelt province.
Mozambique has about 32 % of aluminum and there has been recent discoveries of huge reserves
of natural gas. In the east, Tanzania is the fourth largest producer of gold on the con nent and
has deposits of iron ore, nickel, copper, cobalt, silver and more. In the west, Niger has 44 % of
uranium while Guinea is responsible for 95 % of the con nents bauxite produc on. With these
resources, it would be expected that the con nent would be developed. On the contrary, the
men on of Africa’s resources does not translate to a con nent with ci es well planned, a vibrant
working class or hopeful youth soon to graduate from university and join the working class.
Africa’s resources have been plundered, will con nue to be looted and a source of conﬂict if no
deliberate ac ons are taken. The Democra c Republic of Congo is a good example of instability
stemming from resources. With the largest world reserves of co an, the most important metal
in the produc on of laptops and smartphones, the DRC has known no peace. It is the largest
producer of copper in Africa and has a signiﬁcant share of the world's cobalt reserves. In 2009, it
was es mated that the country had $24 trillion worth of untapped resources.
ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS
It is es mated that more than 50 billion US dollars is lost from Africa annually through illicit
ﬁnancial lows. This is twice the amount that comes to Africa in form of aid. Illicit ﬁnancial
lows are facilitated by interna onal tax havens and jurisdic ons that enable the crea ng and
opera ng of disguised corpora ons, shell companies, anonymous trust accounts and fake
charitable founda ons. Other techniques used are money laundering and transfer pricing. The
plunder of the con nent’s resources makes news almost everyday. Corrup on is rife in many
African countries and according to Transparency Interna onal, the top most corrupt countries in
the world are in Africa. It is probable that even more resources are lost from Africa in the absence
of a clearly deﬁned mechanism to ascertain the loss.
The recent increase of China’s interest in Africa has brought with it, serious challenges in
resource governance. This trend will con nue if Africa does not collec vely deﬁne the terms of
engagement with the East. In looking at the resource ou lows, it is important to keep in mind that
there is a need for more accountability in the management of exis ng resources. And the primary
custodian for accountability are the leaders.
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LEADERSHIP IS KEY
The one important issue that needs a en on and clearly stands in the way for Africa’s turnaround
is the leadership challenge. Most African countries are fairly stable and have embraced democracy
as a form of government. It is also true that a number of countries with vast natural resources
have seen and s ll experience a fair share of conﬂict. There is need to get the leadership right
and this is closely connected to the level of educa on and awareness of the popula on. African
leaders have facilitated the loo ng of resources from the con nent by not taking responsibility
in formula ng policies and ensuring execu on of the same for the development of the con nent.
There is need for African leaders to clearly denounce corrup on and ins tute measures that will
curb the vice. Leaders should not be assumed to be ﬁgh ng corrup on, they should be seen to be
doing so and should act in the ﬁght against corrup on. This sends a clear message to those that
have been involved and those that may wish to be involved. Nigeria’s President Muhammadu
Buhari is on record for sta ng categorically that his inten on is to wipe out corrup on. His
demand for the return of money kept in Bri sh Banks should be supported by all those that are for
the development of Africa. Notable, also, is the ferocious ﬁght that has been put up by Tanzania’s
President John Magufuli who has adopted the reputa on of a broom. Tanzania has endemic
corrup on and is placed at number 117 out of 168 countries globally. With resolute leadership,
the illicit ﬁnancial lows can be reduced signiﬁcantly. The war against illicit ﬁnancial lows is the
single most important war that Africans should ﬁght. Because if the resources do not low out and
are kept within the con nent, schools and universi es can be ﬁnanced, roads can be constructed,
health care facili es and other social infrastructure can be built. There will be no need for African
leaders to ly to Europe and Asia to access good medical services leaving the people that elected
them to power to die in ill-equipped hospitals. The ﬁght against illicit ﬁnancial lows needs
more than two commi ed leaders, it needs independent ins tu ons like the Africa Union and the
Africa Development Bank as champions.
It is gra fying to note that ins tu ons like the African Development Bank are now taking centre
stage in this discourse. There is a clear realisa on that the con nent is capable of rewri ng its
history and the me is now. The Bank's ﬁve point development plan is carefully cra ed and
inspired by the fact that yes, Africa does have the resources to make this a reality.
NEED FOR GLOBAL SUPPORT
In April, the world woke up to a shock of the Panama Papers - a revela on of how money is
stored away and tax is evaded. In his address to the world, President Barack Obama called for
joint global eﬀorts to ﬁght tax fraud. This call comes at the right me when Africa has been
struggling with tax fraud by mul na onal corpora ons for years. Tax fraud and transfer pricing
could account for major ways in which money lows out of Africa. African leaders through
established ins tu ons like the African Union and the African Development Bank should seek
ways to work closely with the United States of America to ﬁght illicit ﬁnancial lows.
CONCLUSION
Africa will rise, Africa is rising! The me is now for Africa to rewrite history and change the
fortunes of the con nent. All the indicators for the rise are in favour of Africa and all that is
needed is deliberate leadership and joint eﬀort to make the narra ve a reality.
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ABSTRACT
Discovery of signiﬁcant oil resources in Uganda has been met with both op mism and skep cism.
In as much as the country’s government argues that the discovery and exploita on of the oil will
be a boost to the country’s development process, scholars, members of the poli cal opposi on
and sec ons of the civil society contend that there is reason to fear for a possible oil resource
curse. It is against this background that this study was undertaken; to scru nize the content,
process and implementa on of the policies rela ng to exploita on of the oil and to determine
whether these policies guarantee that the country will not suﬀer the resource curse. The study
uses data generated from key informant interviews, which it augments with evidence culled from
government publica ons, including policy documents and sector reports, and related literature.
The study found that although the oil sector policies are comprehensive and were adopted
through inclusive technical and poli cal processes, the implementa on of these policies is not
transparent. Hence the country could become a vic m of the resource curse. Recommenda ons
towards redressing this problem are made.
BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION
Since a ainment of poli cal independence in the 1960s and 1970s, most of the countries in the Great
Lakes Region have been stuck in a vicious cycle of conﬂict, including the genocide in Rwanda,
the conﬂict in Burundi, the conﬂict in Southern Sudan, the ethnic clashes in Western Kenya, the
protracted conﬂict in Somalia, the ethnic clashes in various parts of DRC and rebellions by the
Uganda Na onal Rescue Front, Allied Democra c Forces and West Nile Bank Front. Among other
factors, the conﬂicts have been responsible for economic stagna on and retrogression, despite
the region’s enormous natural resources endowment (OSAA, 2006). Although the conﬂicts have
revolved around poli cal struggles for the control of the state, several studies have pointed to
the signiﬁcance of contested rights to access to natural resources in causing and sustaining the
conﬂicts (Huggins et al, 2005; Muwanga, 2012; OSAA, 2006; Kameri-Mbote, 2005). However,
over the last two decades, eﬀorts at the na onal, regional and interna onal levels have helped to
mi gate majority of the conﬂicts and peace has slowly returned to most parts of the region.
Presently, a key concern the countries face pertains to the long-term sustainability of this peace.
Evidence that the post-independence conﬂicts in the region were caused and sustained by
contested rights to access natural resources lends credence to the hunch that accountable and
visionary governance of the region’s natural resources that is targeted at posi ve transforma on
of its poli cal economy is pivotal to the sustainability of this peace. Accordingly, the discovery
(and planned exploita on) of oil resources in various parts of the region does not only present an
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opportunity for the socioeconomic transforma on of the region; it also threatens the prospect of
sustainable peace in the region.
Thus, a United Na ons panel of experts on natural resources and conﬂict in Africa concludes
that the countries need to mi gate the risk factors associated with the management of the oil
sector—to maximize its poten al for promo ng transforma on whilst restraining its poten al
for promo ng conﬂicts (OSAA, 2006). To achieve this objec ve, the countries need quality
informa on on these factors that is suited to their peculiarity—to adopt suitable policy op ons.
Although policy alterna ves could be drawn from the experiences of other countries, these must
be tailored to the unique needs of the region. Customiza on of these policy alterna ves to the
region’s peculiarity would beneﬁt from rigorous examina on of the alterna ves and the way they
may relate to this peculiarity. However, review of related literature (e.g. Kameri-Mbote, 2006)
shows that this examina on has not been conducted. Thus, this study is proposed to plug this
gap through scru nizing the risk factors in natural resource governance that are relevant to the
region’s oil sector and ways in which they could be mi gated--to promote equitable development
and sustainable peace in the region. The research drew on the case of Uganda’s nascent oil
sector. It employed Process Tracing research method because it allows within-case analysis in
the evalua on of causal processes. The other jus ﬁca on for using the method was that it does
not solely rely on the comparison of varia ons across variables in each case, but also inves gates
and explains the decision process by which various ini al condi ons are translated into outcomes
(George and McKeown, 1985).
Since a ainment of poli cal independence in the 1960s, the countries of the Great Lakes Region
of Africa (GLRA) (i.e. Burundi, DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) have struggled
to achieve economic development. Notwithstanding, some progress that some of the countries
have been able to realise is seen from their socioeconomic indicators, but most of them remain
underdeveloped and majority of their ci zens are trapped in extreme poverty (see, for example,
UNDP, 2012).
Two explana ons have been primarily advanced for the persistent underdevelopment of these
countries. The ﬁrst is that these countries lack the resources required to invest in infrastructural
and human capital development, hence they are trapped in a vicious cycle of underdevelopment
and poverty (Siggel, 2005). The second explana on is that the countries have failed to achieve
development because they do not exploit their resources op mally for developmental purposes
(Todaro & Smith, 2011)—because their leaders collude and make egocentric poli cal se lements
that result into plundering of the resources (cf. Eichstaedt, 2011). Meanwhile, groups that are
excluded from such arrangements remain disgruntled and usually mobilize to cause poli cal
instability in a bid to compete over the right to control/ exploit the resources (Lindemann, 2010).
For example, in Uganda, Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2013) observe that this kind of poli cs has
closely shaped the character and performance of ins tu ons and actors responsible for delivering
development since the a ainment of poli cal independence in 1962. They note that successive
poli cal leaders and regimes sought to establish “dominant ruler” forms of poli cal se lement,
with a li le sustained eﬀort to depersonalize public ins tu ons or build stable and inclusive
poli cal coali ons.
Over the last ten years, three of the GLRA countries (i.e. Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania) have
discovered substan al oil deposits. For instance, in Uganda, poten al revenues from the oil
that has been explored are es mated at $148 billion (Lesedi 2010, NDP 2010). It is hoped that
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commercial exploita on of these oil resources could generate signiﬁcant income that the countries
could invest in infrastructure and human capital development (Collier, 2011; NDP 2010).
Accordingly, discovery of the oil is seen as presen ng enormous poten al for the countries’
economic development and poverty allevia on.
Nevertheless, the proposi ons of public choice theory give credence to the hunch that, in as much
as discovery of oil in the region presents an opportunity for the socioeconomic transforma on of
the region, it also presents threats in terms of the so-called oil-curse (Thorp et al 2012; Jonathan
Di John, 2007; Weisshaar, 2007; Bategeka & Matovu, 2011; Kiiza, Bategeka & Ssewanyana,
2011). This is especially so when the history of the countries’ resource related conﬂicts and bad
resource governance are taken into account. According to Lipsey and Crystal (1999), full blown
public choice theory deals with three u lity maximizing groups: 1) elected oﬁcials, who seek to
maximize the votes they can get at elec ons; 2) civil servants, who seek to maximize the salaries
they draw from the public purse; and 3) voters, who seek to maximize u lity from social services.
Consequently, there may be nobody to a end to the general interest of society and the interests
of others in the investment of public resources.
In the context of oil in the GLRA, the groups in society that public choice theory iden ies
can usefully be categorized into two: 1) the elites (poli cal leaders, civil servants, individuals
owning large businesses and opinion leaders etc.); and 2) the populace. It is an cipated that the
elites will govern the development of the oil sector and the u liza on of its proceeds within the
constraints of the poli cal se lements that they make among themselves. Authors like Di John
and Putzel (2009) note that developmental poli cal se lements could manifest in the structure of
property rights and en tlements, which give some social actors more distribu onal advantages
than others in the regulatory structure of the state. Conversely, other se lements are narrow
and, from the theore cal point of view of public choice theory, there is reason to fear that the
elite may look out for their egocentric beneits from the oil sector, with the consequence of
promo ng corrup on and environmental degrada on (see, for example, Ako, 2013). In turn, this
could lead to socioeconomic dispari es and poli cal exclusion, conlict, poli cal instability and,
consequently, persistence of underdevelopment despite exploita on of the oil resources.
A ainment of poli cal stability and, subsequently, inclusive development requires that the
poli cal se lements on the oil resources reached guarantee implementa on of policies that
a ract the best returns from the oil sector and ensure that these returns are strategically invested
in the promo on of economic development and poverty reduc on (Bebbington 2013; Thorp et
al 2012). Accordingly, there is need for up-to-date informa on about the poli cal se lements
rela ng to the oil sector that the poli cal regimes in the region are making - to reach value
judgments on the eﬀec veness with which the poten al of the sector is being harnessed in favor
of both poli cal stability and economic development. Indeed, authors like Golooba-Mutebi and
Hickey (2013) have highlighted need for rigorous studies on the way oil is being governed within
the current poli cal se lement; the way oil is reshaping the contours and func oning of the ruling
coali ons; the ideas shaping the governance of oil and how the presence of oil is reshaping
the poli cal imaginary in countries of the region; the role transna onal actors are playing and
their impacts on the poli cal se lement; the na onal–local and intra-local dynamics involved
here, and the implica ons they have for the nature and func oning of the poli cal se lement at
diﬀerent levels; and the implica ons oil has for inclusive development in the region.
However, a survey of the literature leads to the conclusion that, hitherto, few studies have delved
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into these concerns. Currently, there are few comprehensive studies scru nizing the oil sector
related poli cal se lements that the elites are making and implemen ng and the implica ons
of these se lements for poli cal stability, poverty allevia on and overall development of the
GLRA. Moreover, even the few studies dealing with oil governance (e.g. ESID, 2011; Ako, 2013,
etc.) that are available, focus on countries outside the GLRA.
This paper will report the ﬁndings of a study that was undertaken to plug this knowledge gap.
Drawing on the case of Uganda’s nascent oil sector, the study employed process tracing research
methodology to respond to three research ques ons: What is the content of the poli cal se lements
rela ng to the oil sector policies that have been promulgated in Uganda? By what processes were
these poli cal se lements reached and to what extent were the processes poli cally inclusive?
How are the oil-sector related poli cal se lements in Uganda being implemented and how is
this linked to the country’s economic development? Accordingly, the paper discusses the extent
to which the oil resources in the region are being governed in ways that secure development,
poverty reduc on and poli cal inclusion a er which it propounds recommenda ons for policy
and further research.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
The discovery, explora on and planned exploita on of oil resources in Uganda have a racted very
signiﬁcant op mism and pessimism for the country’s prospects for stability and development.
Diﬀerent groups have diﬀerent expecta ons and concerns and the country’s policy makers and
implementers; ci zenry; civil society; and development partners are keen to ensuring that the
country does not only avoid the oil curse but also that it uses the proceeds from the nascent oil
sector to develop the country. The informa on that the proposed study hopes to generate will
guide the aforemen oned actors in the country’s oil sector in their eﬀorts to ensure that the country
avoids the oil resource curse and uses the proceeds from the oil sector to transform the country. In
par cular, the signiﬁcance of the study derives primarily from its intended empiricist/ diagnos c
approach by which it hopes to ill gaps in past studies on the oil sector in the country (e.g. Kiiza,
Bategeka&Ssewanyana, 2011), which mostly follow an idealist/ prescrip ve approach. Through
scru nizing the processes of oil related legisla ons, policies and prac ces, the study will scru nize
how and why the diﬀerent actors in the country’s oil sector are ac ng out their roles as well as
the implica ons of their ac ons for relevant policy and prac ce. The study will inform eﬀorts to
ill gaps in the oil and gas revenue management policy—to ensure keener a en on to managing
relevant oil-related expecta ons—thereby mi ga ng risk of the oil resource curse and the threat
to stability and development that it presents. Hence, the ministries of energy and inance; relevant
local and regional governments; non-governmental organisa ons; and oil explora on/ produc on
companies will ind the study useful. Beyond Uganda, the study may be useful to other countries
in the region, since legisla on on the management of oil resources in all the countries in the
Great Lakes region is only budding. Finally, the study will make reference and contribute, to
discourse on the interplay between the management of natural resources, stability and sustainable
development so future researchers in related ﬁelds may ind it useful.
GENERAL OBJECTIVE
The general objec ve of the study was to inves gate the nature of the poli cal coali ons
responsible for the oil related policies and ins tu ons in Uganda.
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SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES
1.
2.
3.

To inves gate the ways in which the discovery and planned exploita on of oil are inﬂuencing
the func oning of the ruling coali ons in Uganda.
To inves gate the ideas that are shaping the governance and development of the oil sector
in Uganda.
To inves gate the ways in which interna onal actors are inﬂuencing the ideas shaping the
governance and development of the oil sector in Uganda.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1.
2.
3.

How is the discovery and planned exploita on of oil inﬂuencing the func oning of the
ruling coali ons in Uganda?
What ideas are shaping the governance and development of the oil sector in Uganda?
How are interna onal actors inﬂuencing the ideas shaping the governance and development
of the oil sector in Uganda?

SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The study was carried out in Uganda. Focus was put on the processes, content and implementa on
of the legisla ons and policies rela ng to the oil sector in Uganda. Speciﬁc reference was made
to the way per nent poli cal se lements have been reached and implemented, as well as the
implica ons of these for the performance and contribu on of the oil sector to the country’s
development. Accordingly, the study reached representa ves of the key oil policy making and
implemen ng organisa ons (including the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Ministry
of Finance and Economic Development, Parliament of the Republic of Uganda, oil explora on
and produc on companies, etc.); per nent civil society organisa ons, the academia and oil
policy think tanks. Uganda presents a par cularly important case for study because it is just
emerging out of a protracted insurgency that has been a ributed, at least in part, to contest for the
right to control natural resources, the inference being that it is extremely important to manage
the newly found oil wealth in ways that will ensure that insurgency does not resurface in the
region. Genera ng quality informa on on per nent poli cal coali ons and the ways in which
these are inluencing the governance of the oil sector could guide eﬀorts to ensure that the oil
wealth is developed and used in ways that will ensure that insurgency does not resurface in the
region. On the other hand, focus on the processes, content and implementa on of the legisla ons
and policies rela ng to the oil sector is jus ﬁed by the realisa on that although wri ng rela ng
to the oil sector in Uganda is increasingly appearing, past authors on the subject have focused
primarily on what the country should do rather than what it is doing and why it is doing it. And
now that related legisla ons and policies are coming out and being implemented, the researcher
is interested in extending the discussion to consider what the country is doing and how/why it is
doing it.
RELATED LITERATURE AND KNOWLEDGE GAP
The oil sector in Uganda has a racted notable a en on from the scholarly community, civil
society, policy think tanks and development partners. Accordingly, wri ng on the sector has
appeared in the form of scholarly ar cles (e.g. Kashambuzi, 2010; Henstridge and Page, 2012;
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Collier, 2011, etcetera); reports from civil society organisa ons (e.g. Interna onal Alert, 2011);
and development research policy papers (e.g. NDP, 2010; Modise, 2011; Vision 2040, 2012).
Three other forms of wri ng relevant to the sector are: 1) legisla ons and policies on the oil
sector in the country (i.e. Oil and Gas Revenue Management Policy, 2012; Na onal Oil and Gas
Policy 2008; Petroleum Explora on, Development and Produc on Bill, 2012); 2) mass media
reports on the oil sector (e.g. Ssekikka, 2013; 2014); and 3) scholarly ar cles on highly valuable
(natural) resources in general (e.g. ADB & AU, 2009; Guichaoua, 2012; Karl, 2007; Collier,
2010; Bebbington, 2013).
A major point of congruence in the aforemen oned and other literature is that, although the
discovery of oil in Uganda presents the country with an opportunity to develop, it also presents it
with a threat of the oil-curse and Dutch disease. Thus, the authors contend that government, and
other actors in the country’s oil sector, should develop the oil resources innova vely, to ensure
that the outcomes of the oil sector are posi ve and impact on the country’s development and
stability in signiﬁcant and sustainable ways.
Two key variables relevant to the outcomes of the oil sector are: the way the sector is governed,
and the way the proceeds are invested into the country’s development processes. The way
the oil sector is governed and proceeds from it are invested into the country’s development
processes are a func on of per nent legisla ons and policies and the way these are implemented.
Subsequently, these have been the subject of very signiﬁcant debate in its literature and there
is very signiﬁcant knowledge on what government should do and what it shouldn’t do to avoid
the oil resource curse. However, a key gap in the literature relates to the fact that very li le
research has been conducted on what might inﬂuence government’s decisions and ac ons in the
oil sector. Although notable a en on has been paid to legisla ons and policies rela ng to the oil
sector and how these are being implemented, suﬃcient a en on has not been paid to the nes ng
nature of these laws and policies. An insigh ul analysis rela ng to this gap in the literature is by
Poteete (2007). According to Poteete, behind policies, ins tu ons, and state building lie poli cal
coali ons. He adds that poli cians with narrow and unstable coali ons see ren er poli cs as an
a rac ve coali on building strategy albeit these poli cians’ use of ren er poli cs as a poli cal
coali on building strategy hinders state building. On the other hand, poli cians with broader and
more stable coali ons are less likely to turn to ren er poli cs to bolster poli cal support, in part
because they are more apt to believe that they will reap the beneﬁts from investments in state
building.
In Uganda’s case, it is par cularly noteworthy that, at the me the country’s oil resources are
being discovered and their exploita on is being planned, the legi macy of the ruling (NRM)
government is signiﬁcantly contested. A er nearly 30 years in power, a growing poli cal
opposi on and an increasingly cri cal cadre of civil society and diploma c organisa ons are
challenging the legi macy of the ruling party more signiﬁcantly by the day. From Poteete (2007)’s
point of view, circumstances like these could dispose key policy makers to ren er poli cs—with
the view to build poli cal coali ons that will enhance their grip on power despite increasing
perceived illegi macy. In turn, such inclina on towards ren er poli cs might result into failure
to adopt sound macroeconomic policy op ons that regulate the low of the proceeds from the oil
sector into the domes c economy and, subsequently, prevent the oil curse and Dutch disease.
Thus, Poteete (2007) poses a per nent ques on: “under what condi ons are governments able to
overcome poli cal pressures to spend their new income now and adopt macroeconomic policies
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that protect long-term economic growth?”
In the context of the proposed study, it is par cularly noteworthy that this ques on is relevant to
Uganda’s nascent oil sector, especially considering that challenges to the ruling party’s legi macy
could incline it towards ren er poli cs. This being the case, it is essen al that quality informa on
is generated in ways in which the discovery and planned exploita on of oil is inluencing the
func oning of the ruling coali ons in Uganda; the ideas that are shaping the governance and
development of the oil sector; and the ways in which interna onal actors are inﬂuencing the ideas
shaping the governance and development of the country’s oil sector. However, informa on on
these is generally nonexistent. An apparent reason for this knowledge gap is that scholars and
commentators on the country’s oil sector have focused primarily on what the government should
do or should not do in developing the oil sector albeit they fail to take cognizance of the role of
the overall ideas, poli cal pressures and subsequent poli cal coali ons that may determine what
the government does or does not do. This study is proposed to ill this gap, by extending the
debate on the development of the country’s oil sector from asking what the government should
do to avert the resource curse to why the government may or may not do what it needs to do to
avert the curse.
DESIGN
The study was carried out following a case study design through which cross sec onal data was
collected on the poli cal coali ons responsible for the oil sector policies and ins tu ons that are
being developed in Uganda. The design was well suited for the study because its speciﬁcity of
focus which enables iden ﬁca on of key features of the poli cal economy of natural resources
in Uganda, thereby allowing the researcher to gain insight into per nent poli cal coali ons
and the ways in which they relate to the impact of the oil sector on Uganda’s poli cal stability
and development (Bell, 2005). The cross sec onal nature of the study ensured that all the data
necessitated was collected at one point in me (Amin, 2005), which was important considering
that poli cal coali ons are dynamic and could change over long periods of me. Implementa on
of the study involved the use of process tracing methods through which qualita ve data was
collected about the nature of the poli cal coali ons responsible for the oil related policies and
ins tu ons in Uganda.
POPULATION AND SAMPLE
The popula on of the study included all the stakeholders in Uganda’s oil sector. These include
the government of Uganda, civil society organisa ons, oil related policy think tanks, opposi on
poli cal organisa ons, oil companies and Uganda’s ci zenry. Data was collected from members
of each of these categories of stakeholders. These were selected following snowball sampling
techniques because it was hoped that the key actors in Uganda’s oil sector and poli cal discourse
that were contacted ini ally might know other actors that would provide the informa on required
for the study. The actual selec on of respondents in the study was systema zed and targeted at
the a ainment of satura on.
DATA SOURCES AND COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS
Data was collected primarily from the key actors in Uganda’s oil sector and poli cal discourse.
This was done using individual and group interviews. Therefore, interview guides and recording
equipment were used. The interview guides were unstructured, to ensure that the ques ons put
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to each respondent or group of respondents are tailored to the peculiarity of the respondents’
knowledge or/ and jurisdic on. Before using them to collect data, the interview guides were
submi ed to the research project supervisor for valida on and revised in accordance with the
feedback received on their quality. Secondary data was also culled from relevant reports and
publica ons.
RESEARCH PROCEDURE
The study progressed through three major stages namely, prepara on for data collec on; data
collec on and analysis; and repor ng. During the ﬁrst stage, an ini al sample of respondents was
selected and data collec on instruments developed and validated. Data collec on assistants were
also selected and trained. During the second stage, interviews were conducted. Lastly, during the
third stage, the data collected was transcribed, analysed and compiled into a report. This stage
also involved the prepara on and submission of manuscripts and policy reports for publica on.
DATA MANAGEMENT AND ANALYSIS
The interviews were recorded electronically. Therea er, the records were transcribed and
subjected to content analysis, to iden fy the key themes arising out of the respondents’ responses.
The content analysis was conducted using qualita ve data miner (QDM). The themes on the
nature of the poli cal coali ons responsible for the oil related policies and ins tu ons in Uganda
that were iden ﬁed were then cross-referenced to relevant secondary sources and literature to
reach conclusions on the variables involved in the study.
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Before data collec on, the research proposal was submi ed to the University’s Research Review
Board and Uganda Na onal Council for Science and Technology (UNCST) for ethical clearance.
And all the respondents were kept conﬁden al.
FINDINGS, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Content of the Poli cal Se lements Rela ng to the Oil Sector Policies in Uganda
The na onal gas and oil policy for Uganda (2008) and Petroleum Explora on and Produc on Act
(2000) embody the contents of the poli cal se lements rela ng to the oil sector in the country.
These include: 1) the country’s goals and objec ves for the oil sector; 2) the guiding principles
for the development of instruments for the development and regula on of the sector; 3) the roles
and privileges of stakeholders in the country’s oil sector. According to the policy, the country’s
goals are to: ensure eﬃciency in licensing areas with the poten al for oil and gas produc on in the
country; establish and eﬃciently manage the country’s oil and gas resource poten al; eﬃciently
produce the country’s oil and gas resources; promote valuable u liza on of the country’s oil and
gas resources; promote the development of suitable transport and storage solu ons which give
good value to the country’s oil and gas resources; ensure collec on of the right revenues and
use them to create las ng value for the en re na on; ensure op mum na onal par cipa on in
oil and gas ac vi es; support the development and maintenance of na onal skills and exper se;
ensure that oil and gas ac vi es are undertaken in a manner that conserves the environment
and biodiversity; and ensure mutually beneﬁcial rela onships between all stakeholders in the
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development of a desirable oil and gas sector for the country.
To promote a ainment of these goals, the policy outlines seven guiding principles for the
development of the country’s oil sector: using the exhaus ble oil and gas resources to create las ng
beneﬁts to society; manage resources eﬃciently; transparency and accountability; compe veness
and produc vity; protec on of the environment and conserva on of biodiversity; co-opera on
with per nent stakeholders; and capacity and ins tu on building. The policy expounds on these
guiding principles, demonstra ng the keenness to ensure that the oil resources are democra cally
governed in an eﬃcient way that will guarantee the best returns for the country while at the
same me avoiding the resource curse. In fact, the oil and gas policy discusses the need to, and
makes provisions for amendment of the Petroleum Explora on and Produc on Act (2000)—to
ensure its adherence to the aforemen oned guiding principles and, ul mately, realisa on of the
country’s goals in the oil sector as cited above. The document goes ahead to specify the roles
and responsibili es of the diﬀerent actors in the oil sector. Rela ng to this, it is noteworthy that
roles are speciﬁed for a diverse range of stakeholders (including legislators, technocrats, local
leaders, representa ves of oil explora on and produc on companies, cultural leaders and even
members of the grassroots). The inference here is that the contents of the poli cal se lements
rela ng to Uganda’s oil sector are all inclusive, taking cognizance of the claims of all the
relevant stakeholders. A er all, upon careful considera on, it is notable that adherence to these
guiding principles would go a long way in securing the oil-sector goals cited above, which are in
themselves notably inclusive, showing care for the current and future genera ons.
PROCESS OF THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS RELATING TO THE OIL SECTOR
POLICIES IN UGANDA
Two key points discernible from the discussion on the content of the oil-sector related poli cal
se lements in Uganda are that: 1) the poli cal se lements are forward-looking and focus on
emula ng best prac ces from around the world with the view to ensure eﬃciency, proﬁtable
produc on and environmental conserva on (mindful of oil’s nature as a non-renewable
resource); and 2) the poli cal se lement aspires to be all inclusive, reﬂec ng the views and
interests of a diverse range of stakeholders in the country’s oil sector. These are invariably strong
components of the discourse on the country’s oil sector. However, beyond the issue of these
plans and aspira ons, are the even more important issues of whether/ how they are actually
implemented. It is against this background that this study traced the processes of the oil-related
poli cal se lements—to generate answers to ques ons in this regard.
The ﬁndings were that the oil-sector related se lements were originated by the ruling coali on,
albeit per nent stakeholders were provided with an opportunity to inﬂuence their ul mate content
at diﬀerent stages and in a number of ways. Speciﬁcally, the oil policy was dra ed by the Ministry
of Energy with input from the interna onal community, experts and poli cal stakeholders.
Subsequently, the policy was discussed and endorsed by cabinet—to form the background to
oil-sector related legisla ons. The Ministry of Energy (2008) recounts this process thus: The
Na onal Oil and Gas Policy is a result of an intensive consulta ve process which started with the
review of oil and gas policies from Algeria, Chad, Egypt, East Timor, Indonesia, Kenya, Libya,
Malaysia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, Sao Tome and Principe, South Africa,
Tanzania, United Kingdom, USA and Venezuela. Three consulta ve mee ngs and workshops
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were held with technical staﬀ of various government ins tu ons between 25th-28th April, 2006;
17th-18th July, 2006; and 31st July-1st August, 2006 a er which a working document of the dra
policy was formulated.
The dra policy was then forwarded to representa ves of local and urban authori es, cultural
ins tu ons in the Alber ne Graben, civil society organisa ons and academic ins tu ons for their
review before par cipa ng in a two-day stakeholder’s consulta ve workshop held between 29th
and 30th November, 2006. Many views received during the workshop were incorporated into
the dra policy. It was presented and discussed at the Permanent Secretaries mee ng held on 7th
August, 2007.
Addi onal consulta ve mee ngs were held on 10th, 12th of August and 3rd December, 2007
in Hoima, Arua and Kasese respec vely. The mee ngs were a ended by area Members of
Parliament, oﬃcials of the District Execu ve Commi ees and Council Members of the districts
of Hoima, Masindi, Kibale, Bullisa, Arua, Nebbi, Moyo, Amuru, Gulu, Kabarole, Kyenjojo
Bundibugyo, Kasese, Kamwenge, Bushenyi, Rukungiri and Kanungu.
Guidance was received from H.E. the President when he reviewed the dra policy with the
Ministries of Energy and Mineral Development, Finance, Planning and Economic Development
and Jus ce and Cons tu onal Aﬀairs at State House, Nakasero on 25th September, 2007. A
consulta ve workshop was held for Cabinet on 26th September 2007 in which the dra policy
was presented for considera on before formal submission for approval. The comments received
during these mee ngs enriched the policy immensely. The policy was approved by Cabinet on
30th January, 2008.
The foregoing shows that the process of formula ng the oil and gas policy was technical, poli cal
and consulta ve. It was technical in a way that it drew on the exper se of a mul disciplinary of
experts in the related areas of mining, oil resources management and natural resources economics.
Then it was poli cal in a way that it drew the input of poli cal leaders across the en re poli cal
spectrum in the leadership of the country, including councilors at the local council level, cultural
leaders in the oil-rich Alber ne Graben, members of parliament, cabinet ministers and the
president. Finally, the process was consulta ve in a way that it did not only invite and integrate
the views of people at the grassroots, but it also integrated insights drawn from the experiences
of other countries that are involved in oil explora on and produc on across the en re con nent,
including those that are more developed and those that are not.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS RELATING TO THE OIL
SECTOR POLICIES IN UGANDA
The Ministry of Energy is in charge of implemen ng the poli cal se lements rela ng to the
oil sector in Uganda. Implementa on of the oil policy has been primarily through the passing
of relevant legisla on and conclusion of Produc on Sharing Agreements with interna onal
oil explora on and produc on companies. Review of the oil policy shows that it touches on
both these items. Speciﬁcally, the policy ar culated the need for amendment of the Petroleum
Explora on and Produc on Act of 2000 to enable a ainment of the goals the country is pursuing
through the oil sector. It also ar culates the need for and modali es for the considera on and
determina on of relevant produc on sharing agreements.
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Two important achievements in the implementa on of the oil-related poli cal se lements are
that the Petroleum Explora on, Development and Produc on Act 2013 has been passed and
various produc on sharing agreements signed (Musoke 2013). However, interviews conducted
with members of Uganda’s parliament early this year show that there have been two shor alls in
the implementa on of the otherwise good and inclusive oil related poli cal se lements. First, the
members of parliament noted that although a generally good piece of legisla on, parts of the Oil
and Gas Law of 2013 required more cri cal considera on albeit the bill was passed hurriedly. In
an interview, a Honourable member of parliament said that, “The controversial Clause 9, which
gives control over explora on and produc on licensing to the minister in charge of petroleum.”
Although respondents from the Ministry of Energy gave a counter argument that there was
urgent need to pass the law to provide a legal framework within which the oil opera ons would
be regulated, a counter argument was that the debate and passing of the law were marred by
inﬂuence pedaling and intrigue, with the result that the law was passed only hurriedly. Of
par cular conten on was the issue of the rights of the minister (of energy) in the conclusion of
oil produc on sharing agreements, with skep cs fearing for the possibility of various forms and
levels of corrup on and their a endant consequences. One of the members of parliament talked
to, said that, “Retaining the controversial clause 9 in the act is only meant to advance the state’s
commercial interests in the oil sector."
The second problem cited in the implementa on of the oil sector related poli cal se lements
is that discussion and sharing of the produc on sharing agreements are strictly secret. A major
point of conten on here is that when the ﬁnal component of the oil process, namely, concluding
of the agreements is done secretly, moreover in a legal dispensa on where the minister is given
a propor onately large amount of authority over the oil resources, corrupt tendencies may not be
checked and the country’s best interests may not be served. It is noteworthy that, when interpreted
concurrently, the ﬁndings on the content, process and implementa on of the oil sector policies
in Uganda, it becomes apparent that the problem is with the implementa on of policies that
are otherwise well reached and inclusive. This appears to explain the widespread skep cism,
dissent and concern rela ng to oil witnessed in Uganda’s media (see, for example, Musisi (2014),
Nakayi (2013) and scholarship on the oil sector in general (see, for example, Mbabazi (2012),
Hickey (2013).
RECOMMENDATIONS
The present study points to recommenda ons aimed at enhancing transparency in the
implementa on of the poli cal se lements rela ng to the oil sector. The study appears to show
that although Uganda has adopted very good policies and following an inclusive and consulta ve
process, this is a necessary but insuﬃcient condi on for success in the oil sector and for preven ng
the oil curse. It is recommended that government gives itself to the transparent execu on of
the sector policies as the suﬃcient condi on for success in the sector. At the present stage, it
is recommended that government discloses the produc on sharing agreements that have been
reached. A er all, this is in line with the provisions of the access to informa on act. This will help
to give contentment to those involved in the process of developing the policy that indeed, their
views are being carried through and their interests catered for as promised in the policies. It may
also help to ensure that rec ﬁable gaps are highlighted for redress. And now that the Petroleum
Explora on, Development and Produc on Act 2013 is already in place, it is recommended that
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the ministry of energy reconsiders some of the voices that may not have been given expression
when the bill was debated. These might form part of future amendments that will be aimed at
overcoming the shor alls in the oil sector that this study highlights among others.
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ABSTRACT
Na onalism has long been a subject of discussion in the literature of development. It helps
facilitate development by crea ng a strong sense of na onal iden ty which allows the ci zenry
to commit to na on-building. This paper examines the role of the African youth in promo ng
the con nent’s development through developmental na onalism. Africa’s young people are
recognised as the con nent’s greatest assets and the most suited to play this role. The fact that
the con nent needs development suggests a compelling need for the poten als of youth to be
harnessed to drive any development agenda. In the past, young people played historic roles in
promo ng development through na onalis c causes but today’s youth are facing increasing
diﬃcul es in sustaining this legacy. This paper, therefore, makes a case for rebuilding this past
legacy and for the empowerment of Africa’s young people to drive the con nent’s development.
DEVELOPMENTAL NATIONALISM: THE ROLE OF THE AFRICAN YOUTH
The Merriam-Webster dic onary deﬁnes na onalism as loyalty and devo on to a na on, a sense
of na onal consciousness exal ng one na on above all others and placing primary emphasis on
promo on of its culture and interests as opposed to those of other na ons or suprana onal groups
(Merriam-Webster, 2015).
In the same vein, the Encyclopaedia Britannica also deﬁnes na onalism as an ideology based on
the premise that individual’s loyalty and devo on to a na on-state surpass other individual or
group interest (Encyclopaedia Bri anica, 2015). While na onalism does not connote disdain for
other na ons or other group interests, it represents patrio sm, na onal pride and absolute loyalty
to na onal interest before all other interests.
Na onalism has long been a subject of discussion in the literature on development. Musluk (2010)
argues that na onalism came forth in many third World countries as an understanding which is
thought to pave the way for development as it imagines a na on based on integrity (Musluk, C,
2010). This view is supported by Law (Law, C., 2010) who argues that in mul -cultural socie es
like Canada and the United States, na onalism has helped to facilitate development by crea ng
a na onal iden ty based on shared poli cal values. Where a strong sense of na onal iden ty
exists, the ci zenry commits to na on-building. The implica on for mul -cultural socie es like
Africa is that na onalism could be paramount for the realisa on of the social, economic and
cultural aspira ons of our people.
In what follows, an argument on why the youth are most suited to champion the cause of
na onalism is presented. The diﬀerent roles youth have played in promo ng na onalism are also
discussed ci ng examples from the global and African experience.
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HISTORIC ROLE OF YOUTHS IN PROMOTING NATIONALISM
The world’s greatest asset is the youth. Not only are they energe c, ebullient and boisterous,
when they are meaningfully engaged, their produc vity is higher than that of any other age
group. Countries with a dominant youth popula on are considered as having an important
advantage over countries with an ageing popula on. This is why countries like Japan with an
ageing popula on are doing everything possible to reverse the trend. Japan’s quest to reverse her
current ageing popula on is explained by the produc vity argument already adduced.
With this, it is clear that the youth have an important role to play in promo ng na onalism. This is
so because young people have the needed energy to champion na onalis c causes. Young people
are very important stakeholders in society as the leaders and followers in the nearest future.
As the trustees of posterity, the youth should, therefore, be concerned about playing important
na onalis c roles to shape the future of their society. History shows that Africa's youth have
not fallen short in playing this important role. At very cri cal moments in history, young people
have played very prominent roles in fast-tracking development through na onalis c causes on a
na onal and global scale. A few of these roles are highlighted below:
• Youths as Champions of a Freer, Fairer and Safer World
The Youths have made immense contribu ons towards promo ng human freedom and dignity. In
doing this, they sacriﬁce to help in achieving freedom for the human race. For example, the former
Cuban leader, Fidel Castro was a young student at the University of Havana when he pushed for
the Cuban revolu on which culminated in the overthrow of Cuban President Fulgencio Ba sta’s
military junta. In the same vein, President Nelson Mandela’s ﬁght against the apartheid regime
in South Africa was mo vated by his experience as a young black South African student when
he was expelled from the University College of Fort Hare for joining in a student protest. The
acclaimed Arab Spring that has revolu onised freedom and governance in some Arab countries
of North Africa and the Middle East was driven by young people, who felt dissa sﬁed with the
state of their na ons.
For Africa, many cases abound. People like W.E.B. Dubois and other Pan-Africanists were at
the prime of their youth when they pushed for the decoloniza on of Africa and the West Indies
through the Pan African Congress. In the same vein, Kwame Nkrumah, Herbert Macauley,
H.O. Davies, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo and others were young people when they
founded organisa ons that fought for Africa’s decoloniza on. It was also in the University that
Wole Soyinka and some other young students founded organisa ons that fought corrup on and
injus ce against black African students.
• The Youth and the Democra sa on Process
The role young people have played in the democra sa on process cannot be over-emphasized.
Apart from confron ng and even bringing down many military regimes across the world, youth
movements have played very prominent roles in deepening democracy. Because the youth
community is enlightened, they are wiser in their vo ng decisions and can easily mobilise to
vote out a bad government.
• The Role of the Youth as a Pressure Group
Young people when well organised can serve as an important pressure group that can shape
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governance and accountability. In 2010, when there was a leadership vacuum in the Nigerian
Presidency, young Nigerians played prominent roles in suppor ng the Pastor Tunde Bakare-led
Save Nigeria Group (SNG) through protests to bring pressure to bear on a so-called cabal to
allow the then Vice-President, Goodluck Jonathan, to act as President. This was achieved through
the invoca on of the doctrine of necessity and a looming leadership crisis was avoided. In 2012,
young people partnered with labour and civil society groups to protest against the sudden removal
of fuel subsidy on January 1st, 2012 when most Nigerians got stuck in their hometowns a er the
Christmas holidays. The protests brought pressure on the government to reach a compromise with
labour and civil society groups. The outcome was a be er deal for the Nigerian masses. In the
same vein, student unions have at diﬀerent mes fought for the interest of the student community
and called ruling governments to order when necessary. One area this o en plays out is when
governments increase school fees without taking into account the impact this would have on
family income and the standard of living in such families. Student movements have successfully
resisted such arbitrary increases most mes. The basis for resis ng these hikes in school fees is
that such increases, reduce access to educa on by the poor, a situa on that perpetuates an eli st
society while absolute poverty remains endemic. A recent case is the University fee protests led
by South African Students which caused the country’s president to agree to freeze fee increases
across South African universi es.
• Youth Groups and the Socialisa on Process
Youth groups and organisa ons serve as a hotbed of socialisa on. Such groups like clubs,
socie es and student unions have contributed in fast-tracking the socialisa on process. This
helps in preparing youth members to thrive and survive in the larger society. A key part of this
process is the ideals of integrity, honesty and contentment which young people are encouraged to
imbibe to make them responsible members of society.
• Youths as Tomorrow’s Na onal Manpower Stock
Youths make up tomorrow’s na onal manpower stock. In literature, the role of human capital
development has been widely discussed. The 1998 human development report was the irst to
recognise the cri cal role of human development in na onal development. The report recognised
human capital as the real wealth of na ons and the ul mate driver of sustainable development.
In line with this, Awopegba (2003) posits that the development of human capital has been
recognised by development planners as an essen al pre-condi on for a country’s economic and
socio-cultural transforma on. As young people such as students mature and become professionals
in their chosen endeavours, they join the labour force and become part of the country’s stock of
human capital. When they are engaged in their ﬁelds of speciality, they contribute to society's
progress and development by oﬀering their services with vigour and enthusiasm; and displaying
quality leadership skills cri cal for the con nent’s development.
DEVELOPMENTAL NATIONALISM: CONCERNS WITH TODAY’S AFRICAN
YOUTH
Is today’s African youth ac ve in promo ng na onalism? Or are these examples more like
reliving the good old days? A few young people are s ll very involved in acts of na onalism and
na on-building. Many of Africa’s young people are involved in the ac vi es of Civil Society
Organisa ons (CSOs) and Non-Governmental Organisa ons (NGOs) where they are making
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modest contribu ons to na onal development. Nigeria and Tanzania have also conducted a
successful 2015 elec on that saw the youth play an ac ve role, par cularly through social media.
However, it is easy to see that more progress was made in the past than at present as far as youth
contribu ng to the promo on of na onalism is concerned. For some reasons, there has been
a rapid deteriora on in the role young people played in promo ng na onalism and na onal
development on almost all fronts. More African youths are taking to crimes like armed robbery,
kidnapping, rape, fraud, internet scam etc. both at home and abroad. Only on April 28th, 2015,
four Nigerians were put to death in Indonesia for contravening that country’s drug laws. The
damage such events do to Nigeria’s na onal image can only be imagined. More African youths
are concerned with how to get rich and popular through shortcuts and only a few are ready to
work hard and contribute posi vely to na on-building.
Unlike in the past, youth par cipa on in poli cs has become a sorry tale. The youth wings of most
African poli cal par es have more or less become militant wings which unscrupulous poli cians
use to in midate opponents and have their way. Even the educated youths are not spared. In
a recent paper presenta on tled “Good Governance: Sustainability of Democracy, the Role
of Students in the Forthcoming General Elec ons” to mark the Interna onal Day of Students,
Pastor Tunde Bakare lamented that “not only has students’ unionism fallen from its pinnacle of
intellectual doggedness and ideological astuteness, it had also lost its ac vist steam, become a
mere appendage of ruling poli cal par es and a tool in the hands of corrupt poli cians,” (The
Punch, 2014).
REDEFINING THE ROLE OF THE AFRICAN YOUTH IN PROMOTING
NATIONALISM
The prominent roles played by students in the past in promo ng na onalism can be re-ignited.
All that is to be done is to shape and redeﬁne these roles where necessary. Some of the measures
that could be taken to re-ignite the role of students in developmental na onalism might include:
• Establishing Youth-led Community Development Service (CDS) Groups in Communi es
and Schools
Youth-led Community Development Service (CDS) groups should be established in our schools so
that young people can contribute to the building of communi es around them. Such groups would
be concerned with core development issues aﬀec ng communi es including poverty reduc on,
HIV/AIDS preven on and management, family and community health, drug abuse and other
salient community development issues. This will not only foster peer-to-peer interac on among
young people and allow for the free low of innova ve ideas, it will enable young people to be
ac ve in community development and ins l a strong sense of responsibility in them. This could
also help reduce crime and foster peace and stability in our communi es. The impact of these
community development service groups would be striking as it would help take development
to the grassroots while making young people responsive to the needs of their communi es. My
experience with Project Change Ini a ve (PCI), a student-led community development ac on
pla orm within the University was awesome. PCI helped not only to promote the ideals of
good studentship in campuses but enabled members to have a sense of ownership of the campus
community and be concerned about its well-being. If we could have such ini a ves across all
African campuses, it could indeed have a posi ve impact.
pg |034

• Promo ng Volunteerism in Communi es and Schools
One way the role of the African youth in promo ng developmental na onalism could be enhanced
is by encouraging them to volunteer for just causes. Through volunteerism, young people would
learn to do things that would beneﬁt society while expec ng no remunera on and by doing
this, they would ill themselves and the con nent with hope. Non-Governmental Organisa ons
(NGOs) should, therefore, put mechanisms in place to engage youth volunteers in facilita ng
their development work.
• Engaging Youths in Agenda Se ng, Policymaking and Implementa on
The African youth should be engaged in agenda se ng, policy making and implementa on
primarily on issues that aﬀect them. It is impera ve that eﬀorts should be made not only to
engage the youth but to make them the fulcrum of public policy making and execu on. Engaging
young people like students in agenda se ng and implementa on will not only bring fresh ideas
and greater energy to the delivery of good governance but also guarantee sustainability in the
near future and the much-needed stability that every country needs to thrive and blossom.
• Encouraging Eﬀec ve Partnership between Youth Groups and Civil Society Organisa ons
(CSOs)
Since the youth community represents an enlightened populace, civil society organisa ons
should be encouraged to improve on their partnership with youth groups including student bodies
in their campaigns. This would add steam to the eﬀorts of such organisa ons to get leaders to be
responsible, accountable and deliver the much-needed dividends of democracy in Africa.
• Redeﬁning Student Unionism
Student unionism must be redeﬁned to allow students to contribute produc vely to na onal
development. This redeﬁni on must be in such a way that unionism would not be le to unserious,
unintelligent and self-seeking charlatans who have dragged student unionism in their quest for
self-glory. All eﬀorts must be made to restore student unionism to its glorious days.
• Making Civics Part of Educa on Curriculum
Civics should be made part of our academic curriculum from the kindergarten level to the ter ary
level. This should form part of a catch-them-young strategy aimed at inculca ng in young people
the prac cal aspects of ci zenship, their rights and du es, the du es of ci zens to each other as
members of society and to the government. In the same vein, the relevant government agencies
in each African country should embark on eﬀec ve campaigns targeted at young people aimed
at sensi sing them on their rights, obliga ons, conduct and privileges to enhance their role in
developmental na onalism. This will educate the youth that ci zenship represents the ideals of
integrity, selﬂessness, fearlessness and service and not the vices of corrup on, selishness and
personal aggrandisement.
• Promo ng Good Governance and Accountability
Good governance and accountability is key to promo ng developmental na onalism among the
African youth. Government at all levels must be responsible and keep the social contract by
ensuring that society provides an enabling society for its people to thrive and be responsible
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ci zens. A situa on where poli cal leaders and their cronies abdicate their obliga ons to the
ci zenry and instead steal the commonwealth and ﬂaunt their aﬄuence leaves nothing good for
the young people to learn. Instead, it provokes the ‘get-rich-quick or die trying’ appe te in our
youths which makes them resort to all forms of an -social ac vi es to survive or "belong". Our
leaders should lead by example and focus on building strong ins tu ons that will guarantee the
eﬀec ve delivery of good governance and accountability. The average African youth is talented
and hardworking but faces a tough challenge from a society that oﬀers limited opportuni es and
has allowed high youth unemployment to fester. If Africa can provide an enabling environment
for her young people to thrive, then she can sit and watch her youth populace unleash their
poten als and energy and make her an enviable con nent.
CONCLUSION
That Africa direly needs development suggests a compelling need for the poten als of young
people to be harnessed to drive developmental na onalism. Although this paper has suggested
measures to achieve this, these measures would prove worthless if mechanisms are not put in
place to bring them to frui on. We therefore need more ac ons than words to reposi on the
African youth to deliver on their poten als in crea ng the Africa we all desire: a new Africa.
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ABSTRACT
There have been many theories given on how Africa should develop, regardless, this paper argues
on why it is important to focus on educa on as one of the major tools to move Africa forward.
It scru nises the current educa on systems in African countries and how they are not tailored to
equip the African child with the mindset and skills required for leadership. Instead of wai ng for
aid and relief, this paper champions the need for Africans to arise and oﬀer solu ons to Africa's
problems. The challenge calls for stock-taking of the “state” of the diﬀerent African countries
so that the proper educa on system can be targeted to them. For Africa's educa on system to
respond to the needs of poor children and to contribute to wealth crea on in communi es and
society at large, it needs to take poverty into special considera on when planning educa on
services.
EDUCATION: A PATHWAY TO AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT
Africa is the world's second-largest and second-most-populous con nent with 1.1 billion people
as of 2013 accoun ng for about 15% of the world's human popula on. The con nent hosts a
large diversity of ethnici es, cultures and languages, with its history da ng back to the late 19th
century when European countries colonised most of its territories. Colonisa on of Africa is s ll a
topic of contest to this day as many, like Prof Walter Rodney, believe it to have destroyed Africa.
In his book “How Europe Underdeveloped Africa”, Prof Rodney explains how colonialism
enriched Europe and reduced Africa to abject poverty. He argues that the riches of Africa and her
raw materials fuelled the economies of imperialist countries.
Decade a er decade, poli cians and interna onal organisa ons are failing to reduce poverty in
Africa, nor are they able to help generate growth or build basic infrastructure. Worse s ll between
1975 and 2000 Africa was the only place on earth where poverty intensiied. It's only recently
that the situa on has improved (Causes of Poverty in Africa, 2011).
Like Dr Mar n Luther, I have a dream. A dream for Africa, like World Bank’s mission carved in
stone at Washington headquarters, the dream is “an Africa free of poverty”. This is Africa with
improved living standards and access to all basic needs. Africa where every person has enough
food, water, shelter, health and educa on. Africa where all na ons are democra c and ci zens
have a say in their own future. Africa that is independent of foreign aid, able to manage and handle
herself without struggle. Africa that will not depend on imports but will rather be a net exporter
of goods and services to other countries. Yes! Africa that has achieved gender equality with
empowered women and girls, having its own resilient infrastructure, able to promote inclusive
and sustainable industrialisa on and foster innova on.
Is it possible or just one of those dreams that a beggar would ride if wishes were horses? Let
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us ask countries that have experienced economic growth like China. Once among the poorest
countries in the world, today China’s poverty rate has fallen from 85% to 15.9% accoun ng for
nearly all the worlds’ reduc on in poverty. The answer I get from them is, it is possible.
But where do we begin? There have been so many theories on how Africa should develop,
stretching from economics to technology. Regardless, I concur with Nelson Mandela's saying that
"educa on is the most powerful weapon which can be used to change the world”. Developing
structures and increasing Africa’s GDP is necessary, but that is not where it begins. The Genesis
is you and me, just as the United Na ons states: “people are the real wealth of any na on” .
Development according to United Na ons is thus about expanding the choices people have to
lead the lives they value. It is much more than economic growth, a very important means of
enlarging people's choices.
Africa’s vicious cycle of poverty must be broken and human development should be the focus.
The best form of human development that cannot be ignored is educa on. No country has
succeeded if it has not educated its people. Educa on is important in not only reducing poverty
but as a key to wealth crea on. Educa on is pivotal in breaking the vicious cycle and this is why
it is ranked number 4 in the sustainable development goals: “Ensure inclusive and equitable
quality educa on and promote lifelong learning opportuni es for all” .
But why should educa on ma er to Africa? The United Na ons argues that educa on provides
a direct path towards food security and out of poverty, ci ng that educated parents can earn an
income, produce more food through agricultural ini a ves, and feed their children. Children who
complete primary educa on are more likely to achieve food security as adults and end the cycle
of poverty in their genera on. Educa on increases people’s conﬁdence, enabling them to become
self-suﬁcient and be er able to contribute to their communi es.
Educa on is thus an area of focus worth brooding over by developing countries because it further
allows for gender equity, a huge struggle in many African communi es. According to the United
Na ons girls and women who achieve higher levels of educa on are greater contributors to
the overall economic development and to children’s welfare within communi es. Achieving
educa onal equity for girls – including educa ng communi es on the value of girls’ educa on –
is an essen al factor in sustainable poverty allevia on (CFC, 2016).
As we focus on educa on, what is required under this umbrella is the quality of educa on by all
African communi es. According to Motsoko Pheko, " quality educa on is the key to crea ng,
owning and controlling Africa’s wealth and mentally decolonizing her people’s captured minds.
Africa needs a diverse educa on tailored to the economic needs of her people. That educa on
must be free for the poor. No African child must be without educa on, merely because of his
or her condi on of poverty. African children must be taught the true history of Africa, not the
colonial history of Africa’s invaders that is full of perﬁdy to protect their colonial interests”
(Motsoko, 2012).
Instead of wai ng for aid, and a way out from our dire situa ons from developed countries, I
believe it is me Africa owned its educa onal systems and curriculums. Obama hits the nail
on the head when he said “Change will not come if we rely on another person or another me
to come and make those changes. We have to be that change, we are those people we’ve been
wai ng for, and we can achieve those changes we have been longing for” (Obama, 2016). This
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somewhat mo va onal speech can inspire Africa to take ac on and try more than it has.
The challenge calls for stock-taking of the “state” of the diﬀerent African countries so that the
appropriate educa onal system can be targeted to its people. For the educa on system to respond
to the needs of poor children and to contribute to wealth crea on in communi es and society
at large, there is need to take poverty into special considera on in the planning of educa on
services.
In their paper, Mark J. Epstein & Kris Yuthas highlight how educa onal programs adopt
tradi onal Western models of educa on, with an emphasis on math, science, language, and
social studies. These programs allocate scarce resources to topics like Greek mythology, prime
numbers, or tectonic plate movement—topics that may provide intellectual s mula on, but have
li le relevance in the lives of impoverished children (Mark J. Epstein & Kris Yuthas, 2012).
Poor children have many disadvantages compared to their be er-oﬀ counterparts. They are less
healthy, their language skills less developed, and they are less well equipped- socially, emo onally
and physically to undertake school programs. If their disadvantaged posi on and diﬀerent dayto-day experience are not taken into account by school educa on, it is no wonder they do not
beneﬁt from the school system.
For too long, governments and organisa ons inves ng in educa on in developing countries have
operated under the unques oned assump on that improved test scores were clear evidence that
their investments have paid oﬀ. But if, as we argue here, according to Mark J. Epstein & Kris
Yuthas mastery of the basic primary school curriculum is not the best means for improving
life's chances and reducing poverty in developing countries, that model is broken. Inves ng in
interven ons that produce the highest test scores is no longer a valid approach for alloca ng
scarce educa onal dollars or the scarce me available to develop young minds. It is me to seek
the interven ons that lead to the greatest social and economic impact for the poor.
It is a necessity for the educa onal systems in Africa to priori se preparing all children, rich or
poor, to achieve at school, and empower them by heightening their awareness of their rights and
responsibili es. Show them their abili es and enhance their self-conﬁdence to enable them to
improve their lives.
Mark J. Epstein & Kris Yuthas further propose that what students in impoverished regions
need is not more academic skills, but rather life skills that enable them to improve their ﬁnancial
prospects and well-being. These include ﬁnancial literacy and entrepreneurial skills; health
maintenance and management skills; and administra ve capabili es, such as teamwork, problem
solving, and project management. It is vital that educa on systems heed the lessons of successful
and less successful ini a ves implemented by NGOs, private individuals, religious bodies and
government themselves and translate these ini a ves into policies, strategies and speciﬁc ac on
that can be taken to scale. We will never eradicate poverty without quality educa on.
The con nent will have the poten al to develop with li le or no help from the developed countries
if it has a skilled human resource, well equipped with the ability and knowledge of harnessing
Africa’s natural and human resources. Africa is not a poor con nent, it has great poten al that
requires the right skill to cul vate it. That cul va on lies in its people, therefore developing them
in knowledge and skill should be of vital necessity.
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ABSTRACT
Conﬂict is a pervasive reality which resonates and occurs globally in diverse forms. UNDP
(2014) noted that conﬂict and a sense of personal insecurity have pervasive adverse impacts on
human development and leave billions of people living in precarious condi ons. Conﬂicts have
short and long term impacts which aﬀect both conﬂic ng and non-conlic ng par es in diﬀerent
ways. This is most poignant at work, where workplace conﬂicts can escalate, inﬂict enormous
harm on ﬁrms, employers, managers, employees, unions etc and pose a great threat to societal
as well as na onal stability and progress. Hence, it becomes expedient for stakeholders at work
to promptly and amicably se le conﬂicts whenever it erupts. It is against this backdrop that this
paper calls for synergy between workplace par es and ins tu on in developing accessible and
transparent mechanisms for resolving workplace conﬂicts in Nigeria, given the complexi es of
our economy and low industrial capacity u liza on in private and public enterprises.
Keywords: Conflict Management, Workers, Employers, Workplace, Nigeria
CONFLICT
The world has become less peaceful every year since 2008, highligh ng the importance of be er
understanding conﬂict and violence risk (GP1 2014). In aﬃrming this, UNDP (2014) noted that
more than 1.5 billion people live in countries aﬀected by conﬂict— about a ﬁ h of the world’s
popula on. Conﬂict has been said to be innate in human nature and a dis nguishing feature
of human socializa on processes. It has also been iden ﬁed as a vital ingredient in a aining
development and highlighted as a permanent ﬁxture in human interac ons and existence.
According to Withers and Wisinski, (2007), conﬂict is an inevitable part of our working lives,
although it may not occur on a daily basis, when it happens it can be overwhelming. This is
normal, natural and some mes necessary for con nued growth and development. Anywhere that
there are more than two people, there is bound to be conﬂict. This is because people are inherently
diﬀerent, that is, in terms of interests, orienta on and background. Conﬂict occurs when these
diﬀerences come to light. Workplace conﬂicts are a clash of interests and resultant disputes of
varying intensity between workplace actors such as trade unions and employers associa ons. It
revolves around sharing the gains of work; incompa bility of goals, interests and values; and
a empt to control or dictate the direc on of things or policies in the workplace. It is of immense
socio-economic and poli cal import for workplace par es. This is in line with the stand of Coser
(1956) that conﬂict too has to do with a struggle over values or claims to status, power, and scarce
resources, in which the aim of the conﬂic ng par es are not only to gain the desired values but
also to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals. Ingram (2016) opined that conﬂict is inevitable
in workplace se ngs, and conﬂicts can arise between co-workers, supervisors and subordinates
or between employees and external stakeholders, such as customers, suppliers and regulatory
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agencies. Conﬂicts may also take the form of disagreements that emerge when goals, interests
or values of workplace par es are incompa ble and par es try to thwart each other’s eﬀorts to
achieve their objec ves. Weber (1949) pointed out that conﬂict is part of social life, meaning that
conﬂict is normal, essen al and accepted as part of man’s daily endeavors.
TYPES OF WORKPLACE CONFLICTS
Conﬂicts are a key element of human and organisa onal interac ons at work. However, the
two par es despite being partners in progress and joint key players in the workplace schema
may have partly congruent and partly divergent interests. The interac ons between , among
and within these par es over employment and other work related ma ers could produce both
agreements and disagreements, generate tensions, opposing viewpoints and contradictory stands
which could set the stage for the erup on of conﬂicts. Conﬂicts are very frequent occurrences
in Nigerian industries (Yesufu, 2000; Fagbemi, 2004; Obono, 2007; ILO, 2009; Onyejeli, 2011;
Akinwale, 2011). In the Nigerian workplace, there are three major types of conﬂicts, managementunion, union-union and management-worker conﬂicts respec vely. These conﬂicts are caused by
diverse factors. In connec on with this, Ojeifo (2000) noted that in many organisa ons in Nigeria,
internal (intrapersonal) and interpersonal conﬂicts are consuming so much organisa onal me
and a en on that organisa ons are star ng to look as though conﬂict is their primary business.
Allowing conﬂict to fester in workplaces o en creates net nega ve eﬀects and lose-lose outcomes
especially in a na on with low capacity u liza on and produc vity like Nigeria. A theore cal
framework that can be u lized to expound on workplace conﬂicts is John Burton’s human needs
theory. Burton (1990) was of the opinion that in analyzing conﬂicts, one must be able to iden fy
and separate interests, values and needs. For instance, workers' needs are quite diﬀerent from
the desires of employers, so also the values and interests of workplace par es are poles apart.
Withers and Wisinki,(2007) expounded that we can divide most of what people ﬁght over at work
into three general categories. Two of these three categories are: not enough to go around and
goals that workers want to reach. They claimed further that most o en at work, conﬂicts seem
to be about resources, turf boundaries, or conﬂic ng goals. The deﬁni on by Tille and French
(2007) that conﬂicts occur when one or more employees or groups perceive their values or needs
to be incompa ble with others or the organisa on is quite applicable in this sphere. The reward
systems, management style and nature of work in Nigerian organisa ons are prone to manifest
conﬂict.
The type of conﬂict that occurs between trade unions is commonly referred to as inter-union
disputes. This occurs mostly as a result of overlapping jurisdic ons, in which case two or more
unions may make membership claims within the same organisa on and sector. Also, the tussle
for superiority in the workplace may enhance this kind of conﬂict. An example is what happens
in the Nigerian Universi es between the two key unions, the Academic Staﬀ Union of Nigerian
Universi es (ASUU) and the Senior Staﬀ Associa on of Nigerian Universi es (SSANU).
Another example can be found in Hospitals between the various professional groups.
The second type is intra-union conﬂicts. This basically occurs between and among members
of the same union. For example, conﬂict between or among elected or appointed oﬁcials and
even ordinary members over the control of power, policy disagreements and u liza on of funds.
Ojeli (1977) stated that the causes of industrial conﬂict in Nigeria is the lukewarm a tude
of employers and government in responding to the demands of the workers or trea ng their
demand with levity; and also, non-recogni on of the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) as an
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organ for harmonizing possible conﬂicts between the employers of labor and employees. Nonimplementa on of valid agreements, impugning and/or abnega on of workers’ rights could also
lead to crisis in the workplace, especially when the employers have a pedigree of constantly
viola ng workers' rights and denying them of their en tlements.
MEANING OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
People naturally approach the se lement of conﬂict in diverse ways depending on dynamics,
peculiari es, abili es and skills of the representa ves of each of the conﬂic ng par es; past
experiences of par es; willingness and commitment of par es to reach resolu ons; the posi on
of the law; and the expecta ons of all other stakeholders. In as much as conﬂicts in the workplace
are natural occurrences and unavoidable phenomenon, Tille and French (2007) noted that in
managing conﬂict in organisa ons, it is important to iden fy the underlying cause(s) rather than
accept events or issues at face value. This is because, conﬂicts mean very diﬀerent things to
diﬀerent people. It is may also be hinged on the type of profession, sector or industry.
Withers and Wisinski, (2007) pointed out that when handled eﬀec vely, conﬂict can help people
meet their goals and objec ves within teams or departments in an organisa on. However in order
not to capsize the organisa onal ship, it is very important for unions and employers to deploy
conﬂict management techniques that would reduce the tendencies to conﬂict, diminish the span
of conﬂicts with crippling eﬀects, divert the energies in conﬂict towards mutually beneﬁcial
outcomes and improve synergy between the par es to avoid preference for conﬂict. Conﬂict
management connotes systema c, organized, orderly and methodical approach to stop or reduce
the eﬀect of conﬂicts.
Eﬃcient handling of conﬂicts presupposes that the workplace rela onship is naturally conﬂict
prone. Workers and employers have diﬀerent views on how the workplace rela onship and issues
should be handled. To many Nigerian workers and their representa ves, management should
improve the social, economic and poli cal beneﬁts workers derive from work. Workers desire
enterprises where their emoluments are jointly decided, taking cognizance of the state of the
economy, industry-wide benchmarks and principles of fairness and equity. Also, conﬂicts would
occur less in organisa ons where employees are well paid, mentored, challenged, promoted,
involved, appreciated, valued, empowered and trusted. Conﬂicts can be palliated by more
understanding and empathy on the part of the workplace par es. McCabe and Rabil (2001)
enthused that conﬂict management systems have been described as providing for workplace
jus ce.
NATURE OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
Conﬂict management is an ongoing, con nuous and never ending exercise to cope with, and rein
in conﬂict. Ingram ( 2016) pointed out that managing conﬂict is a key management competency
and all small business owners should study and prac ce eﬀec ve conﬂict management skills to
maintain a posi ve workplace environment. Conﬂic ng par es should be involved in all conﬂict
management eﬀorts for it to be eﬀec ve. Others such as regulatory ins tu ons or the appropriate
agencies of the state may be peripherally involved. Rela onships between owners and workers,
owners and workers' groups, managers and the managed, state and workers and owners and state
in Nigeria are prone to diverse forms of constant conﬂicts because of our peculiar nature, varied
and dissimilar interests, values, percep ons, norms, desires, and ideologies.

pg |043

On one side of the divide are the managers who are the representa ves of the owners and are
responsible for the day to day running of the enterprise , while on the other side are workers
and their representa ves who are legi mately elected members of the workers’ unions. The
Government is expected to be an unbiased umpire and impar al arbiter to guarantee that the rights
and interests of the par es are nego ated in atmospheres devoid of in mida on and typiﬁed by
freedom. Society gains most when conﬂicts in organisa ons are immediately addressed. In the
Nigerian context, workers and their representa ves feel that the state is usually on the side of
the employers instead of being neutral. They have the mindset that the ac ons, statements and
policy direc ons of Government does not portray it as the objec ve party that it should be. The
tough economic terrain within which organisa ons in Nigeria operate creates a fer le ground
for conﬂicts and strike ac ons which bode ill for the na on’s nascent democracy and to ering
economy. Iche (2016) asserted that Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) may cut jobs as part
of cost-saving measures as a result of the prevailing economic situa on in Nigeria. With this
comes the inability to adequately pay oﬀ disengagement beneﬁts leading to conﬂicts. This is a
poten al danger currently facing Nigerian ﬁrms.
Shagwert (2011) emphasized that the essence of labor movement is: workers organizing themselves
and ge ng together with their communi es to iden fy some real injus ces that are systemic
throughout the country. Hence, the rights of workers represented by unions to collec vely bargain
with employers' representa ves in fulﬁllment of the workers’ right to belong to groups that best
protect their personal interest should be given eﬀect at all levels of industry to promote peace
and harmonious condi ons that are germane for the purpose of advancing na onal development.
According to Wright (2011), recent studies point to the posi ve role played by unions in helping
to resolve workplace disputes. Autonomy from management and the availability of eﬀec ve
dispute resolu on skills and exper se puts union representa ves in pole posi on to peacefully
resolve workplace conﬂicts. When workers unionize and are strengthened by laws and ins tu onal
frameworks for the purpose of furthering peace and enhancing condi ons necessary for las ng
prosperity for all, engagements between the independent representa ves of the workers and
employers to reach consensus for common growth and mutually beneﬁcial improvements would
increase commitment and enhance contribu ons needed for enhanced workplace performance
for the common good of all par es. Nigeria’s case is exacerbated by its low ranking of 5 on the
2015 ITUC Global Rights Index as one of the worst countries for workers rights. Countries with
the ra ng of 5 are the worst countries in the world to work in. While the legisla on may spell
out certain rights, workers have eﬀec vely no access to these rights and are therefore exposed to
autocra c regimes and unfair labour prac ces.
SCOPE OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
The scope of conﬂict management can be based also on analysis of the par es involved. Nigerian
workplaces have their value system through which priori es are determined. When diﬀerent
priori es collide, conﬂict is o en the result. How we engage these diﬀerences becomes cri cally
important (Withers and Wisinki, 2007). Conﬂict management could entail engagement of par es
at the bipar te or the tripar te level. The principle of tripar sm which is the system of Industrial
Rela ons in Nigeria speciﬁes the equality of the three stakeholders, but conceptually and even
in prac ce, the argument of engagement of equals does not hold water. This is because the
Nigerian government as one of the biggest employers of labour in Nigeria, the manager of the
na onal economy and the apex poli cal ins tu on, o en calls the shots. Clarement and Davis
(2005) advocated for collabora ve conﬂict management which is concerned with conﬂict at the
group or organisa onal level. It depends upon the willingness of employees at the workplace to
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work collabora vely to resolve diﬀerences and can include a third party facilitator. Against the
backdrop of pervasive and diverse conﬂicts in the world of work, responsive and strategic union
leaders and employers/management are expected to be proac ve advocates of coopera sm and
conﬂict management in the workplace; op mum developers of workers and employers through
entrenching posi ve work a tudes and skills that will reduce the propensity for conﬂicts to the
barest minimum; willing users of posi ve conﬂict management steps and posi ve nego ators
for union and organisa onal progress; and exemplary in values, results-driven, ethics-based
proac ve leaders with the con nued existence of the organisa on as their salient concern through
partnership and coopera on with employers and workers respec vely.
CONCLUSION
Inarguably, conﬂict is inevitable in Nigerian organisa ons, but its proper management for
mutually beneﬁcial outcomes can make it construc ve. To achieve this, the Labour Movement,
Nigerian Government and Nigerian Employers Consulta ve Associa on should seek to engage in
result-oriented nego a ons and dialogues that can guarantee win-win outcomes for all. Mutually
formulated workplace conﬂict preven on strategies which are focal to increasing organisa onal
performance should be the main agenda for trade unions and employers. In this era of heightened
compe veness among organisa ons, it has become essen al for organized labour to work with
the organized private sector to iden fy and inculcate values, a tudes and ideals that can evolve
and sustain good work ethics and a culture of partnership to ameliorate workplace conlicts.
The quest for organisa onal eﬀec veness in this present age and the unknown future begins
with a personal commitment by workers, their employers and their representa ves to display
posi ve work a tudes and create an environment that can promote cordial labour-management
rela ons and prac ces. Finally, with respect to the larger society, UNDP (2014) opined that the
presence of responsive and accountable ins tu ons of governance is cri cal to overcoming the
sense of injus ce, vulnerability and exclusion that can fuel social discontent. Hence, the Nigerian
Government should create conﬂict resolu on frameworks and mechanisms that can adequately
deal with workplace conﬂicts and assuage the interests of the two workplace par es for the
con nued growth, peace and stability of Nigeria.
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ABSTRACT
Livestock accrues beneﬁts to women that include food, income and insurance against crop failure.
This gives rise to the need for gender-friendly policies that promote and encourage women to
own livestock. Women remain in the ranks of poor livestock keepers, although they make up twothirds of the popula on of livestock keepers. Factors that inﬂuence livestock produc vity among
women range from rights to land, access to high yield breeds, applica on of new technologies and
prac ces, access to educa on and extension services, and rigid cultural systems among others.
These factors handled in a gender sensi ve manner would go a long way to realise increase in
livestock produc on and income.
INTRODUCTION
This paper draws from studies conducted in various parts of the world to iden fy challenges
that women face in livestock farming. It seeks to inﬂuence women’s capacity to par cipate in,
and proﬁt from animal husbandry. Addressing gender dispari es in livestock produc on means
understanding its relevance and addressing diﬀerent issues such as needs, livelihoods, priori es,
interests, age, ethnicity, socio-economic status, and ability. Gender is a cri cal issue that crosscuts
livestock produc on. By understanding the various roles that gender plays in livestock produc on,
we can improve their outcomes and eﬀec veness.
The paper posits that many countries, especially in Africa s ll face challenges with enac ng
legisla on that relates to ac onable access and control of resources at community and household
levels for women. There is urgent need to support projects that serve as entry points for women
and aim at capacity building, to augment women’s knowledge and skills; with the desired end
being improved livelihoods and economic growth for their communi es and families. The study
has further provided recommenda ons for possible solu ons, best prac ces and ini a ves for
gender approach to support comprehensive, sustainable social and economic development.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The study uses the gender perspec ve to present livestock as a source of livelihood as developed
by the Interna onal Livestock Research Ins tute. This point of view takes a livelihood approach
that impinges importance on assets, markets and other ins tu ons. The framework hypothesises
three pathways out of poverty: securing current and future assets, improving and sustaining
the agricultural systems' produc vity important in livestock farming and facilita ng greater
par cipa on of the poor in livestock-related markets. This framework has been used before to
explore livestock as a source of women’s livelihood (ILRI, 2010).
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WOMEN AND ACCESS TO ASSETS
In most developing countries, rural popula ons are heavily dependent on agriculture for their
livelihood. Livestock is also a key asset for rural livelihoods. (AGA, 2013). Rural women are
major par cipants and play a crucial role in livestock farming and are responsible for many
daily tasks. Rural women and men, depending on the region and livestock sub-sector, o en have
speciﬁc knowledge about diﬀerent aspects of animal husbandry. But women’s access to adequate
knowledge, improved technologies, ﬁnancial services, and other relevant social services remains
a cri cal issue. The livestock sector has predominantly been trending upward, with the smallscale produc on systems experiencing growth thereby suppor ng livelihoods and subsidising
the gross domes c product signiﬁcantly (WCILD, 2016). The main users of the locally adapted
livestock breeds are women. They play a central role in animal resource management, thereby
conserving them. They are usually responsible for the breeding decisions with a preference for
animals that are disease resistant and easy to manage thereby reducing their workload (KöhlerRollefson, 2012).
Despite women's involvement in livestock farming, gender roles are customarily prejudiced
against rural women who face many obstacles unlike men in obtaining the necessary tools
that help them reach their full poten al in the livestock sector. Women have limited access to
resources, hardly any extension services and limited par cipa on in decision-making. They
enjoy a smaller share of the income derived from livestock farming compared to their male
counterparts. Recognising and integra ng these diverse roles and speciﬁc dynamics into projects
and programs can improve their outcomes and eﬀec veness.
Gender dispari es also have nega ve consequences on the women’s ability to earn a stable
income and have an adverse impact on the household income earned from livestock produc on.
The nature and work of the women who operate within the livestock sector make them suscep ble
to various health and safety issues such as the heightened exposure to zoono c diseases (Patel
et al., 2016). Another challenge that women face in the livestock sub-sector is limited to access
to natural resources and control. Despite women being crucial contributors to agriculture and
food security, their management of biodiversity, energy, water and land remains way lower than
the men. Ownership of livestock is par cularly a rac ve to women in socie es where, due to
cultural norms, women’s access to land and mobility is restricted. The land user's ability are
hampered as they are unable to upgrade and develop livestock ac vi es, since they o en lack
grazing land and also lack collateral for investments (AGA, 2013).
Women have limited access to technologies, training and extension services. Culture limits
women’s mobility and freedom to leave their homes. So, they are systema cally challenged
from taking part in extension mee ngs or group ac vi es. Women are o en le out of the maledominated networks and training. The women’s lower status and input to households restrict their
control and decision-making power over assets and income. In many rural areas where cultural
and social norms are unyielding, women are not engaged in the decision-making process.
Limited access to ﬁnancial services is another challenge for women that results from many factors.
SIDA (2015) notes the lack of collateral, customary rules and limited credit schemes designed
for women as part of the challenge. These constraints narrow the business scope preven ng
women from hiring needed employees or forcing them to use obsolete technology. Ensuring
women have control and access to resources such as land, livestock, markets, informa on and
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credit strengthens their inluence and social empowerment. This paper a empts to encourage
governments to design livestock policies with a targeted gender approach that will encourage
poverty reduc on and food security.
Despite their major role in the management of livestock assets, women have poor access to
markets and play a limited role in the commercialisa on of livestock and livestock products. This
tendency o en arises due to various factors including low levels of literacy, customary prac ces
that prevent women from freely leaving the house, their marke ng strategies and informa on
inadequacy. Thus, a market imbalance exists between the sexes in the beneﬁts accrued from
livestock-related income (Patel et al., 2016).
EXPLORING WOMEN’S ROLE IN INCREASING AND SUSTAINING LIVESTOCK
PRODUCTIVITY
The rela onship between women and the produc vity of livestock is a growing area of interest
among scholars due to the diﬀerent purposes for which women keep livestock. Some women
keep livestock for non-produc ve cultural reasons, they have livestock because culture dictates.
On the other hand, others have livestock for food, security and income; which are produc ve.
However, the non-produc ve reasons usually outweigh the produc ve ones hence posing a
challenge in improving livestock produc vity. Other studies have also shown that livestock farms
managed and operated by women for non-produc ve use do be er than male-owned ones (ILRI,
2010). The lack of rights inﬂuences how these women engage in produc ve livestock ac vi es
such as investments and income genera on, oscilla ng them towards non-produc ve livestock
farming at the expense of produc ve farming. To address this phenomenon, various interven ons
need to be put in place such as encouraging the rearing of high yielding breeds, and applying of
new technologies or prac ces (SIDA, 2015).
Köhler-Rollefson (2012) posits that three-quarters of Asian women's household responsibili es
include managing livestock. Related studies show 90 percent of Nepal women as engaged in
livestock produc on compared to 75 percent of the men (Herath, 2009). A study conducted in
Central and Eastern Kenya by Njuki (2004) indicates that more women are responsible for the
feeding of ca le while men concentrate on watering and disease management. Iden fying the
diﬀerent roles undertaken by women in livestock farming is vital in recognising the various
challenges they face; giving room for developing projects and programs tailored to their speciﬁc
needs.
PROMOTION OF WOMEN PARTICIPATION IN LIVESTOCK MARKETS
Keeping of livestock has a myriad of beneﬁts that accrue to it. The animals reared are a source
of food and ﬁbre and can also be sold to the market for their meat and other by-products. The
income earned can be used to access other commodi es needed by the livestock keepers. The
same animals (livestock) act as insurance against crop failure; that is, considering that they also
produce dairy products which contribute towards nutri on. With the excep on of ca le that
requires rangelands, most livestock require small spaces for rearing. Livestock also provides
manure used to produce biogas and provides excellent means of transport as well. Some keep
goats to control weeds, as well as for their meat and protein beneﬁts. Empowered women can
gain access to land and are able to make choices that grow the economy and enhance food
security (Interna onal Animal Agriculture, 2016).
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With small holding farmers accoun ng for 80% of Africa’s agricultural output, women are the
backbone of rural and na onal economies and by extension development. They cons tute 75
percent of the world’s agricultural labour force in some parts of the world. They also make up
two-thirds of the 600 million poor livestock keepers (Kohler-Rollefson, 2012). It is impera ve
that policy makers appreciate the role that women play considering their sheer numbers. In as
much as they make up the largest agricultural workforce, they s ll ill the ranks of the poorest
among livestock keepers.
The no on of beneﬁts-sharing would work well as it assumes that goods and services are
resul ng from the beneﬁts the environment provides to its range of poten al users (Uprety, 2006;
Costenbader, 2011). Beneﬁts-sharing in this context applies to proper sharing of environment
beneﬁts (like the grasslands) among farmers who beneﬁt from its pastures, and the lands are
likewise rejuvenated from organic manure from the livestock resul ng in a win-win situa on
and also reducing conﬂict on reserve lands because of legi mate mul ple land use. Promo ng
and suppor ng sustainable rangeland management can accomplish this result, enhancing nutrient
recycling, soil fer lity, preserving other forms of biodiversity and wildlife. Making speciﬁc
poli cal choices to design beneﬁt sharing mechanisms that seek the most promise would be a
win and no regrets solu on (University of California, 2016).
More than half the world's lands are used for livestock related produc on (Stanford Report,
2010). Policy inﬂuences the consequences of livestock produc on, which varies with the policy
context and ins tu ons involved and the produc on systems. One challenge women have faced
under livestock farming has to do with access to grasslands. Many of these lands have been
placed under conserva on which has resulted in conﬂict with authori es over the lands use. The
lands teeming with wildlife have been encroached upon in a search for pasture for the livestock.
However, encouraging the women to perform integrated livestock farming is a part of the solu on.
The women can u lise paddocks, or be er yet zero-graze the livestock which is then fed from the
wastes generated from the farm produce. Zero-gazing also reduces the need for expanses of land
and more livestock can be kept in smaller spaces and are easier to take care of. This way, women
are not constrained for land and can produce more with less.
COMMERCIAL LIVESTOCK FARMING: MARKETING AND EXPORTS
The Horn of Africa has beneﬁted from donor programs that have made signiicant investments in
livestock in pastoralist areas. A en on has since extended to live animal exports from the region.
Commercialisa on of agricultural outputs and by extension the export trade are a force in driving
out poverty and at worst reducing its eﬀects/levels. This hinges on the assump on that a linear
rela onship exists between access to superior export markets and poverty allevia on according
to Aklilu & Cately (2009).
A study commissioned by the Inter-governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) Livestock
Policy Ini a ve and ins tuted by FAO challenges the understanding that pastoralists are
universally poor. The IGAD report states that the poverty indicators that are used in such studies
have no bearing on the pastoral se ng. Even so, they found livestock holdings to be a be er
poverty measure than household incomes. This calls for policy-makers to appreciate be er this
concept and its economics logic to be able to plan be er (Ibid). This makes a case for encouraging
women to get more involved in livestock farming and apprecia ng that livestock farming is not
a sentence to abject poverty.
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Most pastoral cultures keep livestock for reasons such as social status. The men under these
se ngs have the ﬁnal word on ma ers related to the animals and the women and in some cases,
children are limited to providing labour. In the oﬀ-chance the women own any livestock; it is
basically on a subsistence basis. A change in a tude among women would be easy to inculcate if
they could collec vely as a group be given animals to rear for commercial returns. Considering
they already play the role of labour, this should not create a ripple in their social se ng. The
incomes generated would go a long way to collec vely empower the women. In the event that
women make any proxy sales, the proceeds are s ll handed to the men who are culturally en tled
to the assets with women having a passive role.
The women’s limited power and inﬂuence are in part contributed to by their lack of wealth
or stock ownership. Limited access to markets and informa on, risk tolerance, their levels of
vulnerability and low business acumen among others equally work against them. However, these
factors can be worked on for the be erment of the women to reduce their passive response and
reluctance to markets and exports. The strategy should employ poverty-focused approaches
targe ng pastoralist areas as this would support and explicitly encourage herd growth among
the poorer families, empowering them in the process; developing secondary infrastructure like
roads, mobile phone communica ons to levels similar to the non-pastoral areas and development
of markets where none exists. Easier access to traders oﬀers reduced transac on costs and would
also render trade monopolies less likely, making the poorer herders more bankable. Financial
facili es should be tailored to their aspira ons, along with preven ng avoidable animal deaths
with clear policies and appropriate veterinary services (Aklilu & Cately, 2009).

CONCLUSION
For women to beneﬁt from livestock farming, the nature of support should be well deﬁned to
appreciate their makeup as the largest livestock farming labour force who perform the bulk of the
work. It thus stands to note that empowered women have genera onal beneﬁts that tap into the
household, not usually the case with men. As a result, there exists a saying that if you educate a
woman, you educate the en re village, to support what several studies have established. That said
whatever ac ons are taken have to consider the impediments to women’s development without
rocking cultural se ngs. It should also note the diﬀerent needs women have. It calls for more
involvement of women in the making and implementa on of these solu ons and policies to
create prac cal resolu ons with far reaching results.
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ABSTRACT
According to the 2009 African Governance Report (AGR II), by the United Na ons Economic
Commission for Africa (UNECA), many democracies in Africa are suﬀering from an authoritarian
hangover. Many African countries adopted the system of democracy because it enjoys global
endorsement as the best form of government and panacea for underdevelopment. But it is a truism
that development in Africa remains impeded. This is because many African leaders are ignorant
and negligent of the philosophical principles upon which democracy is formed. This paper seeks
to discuss, within an African framework, the link between democracy and development. The
clamour for democracy all over the globe is not accidental. Those who go about agita ng for
democracy are convinced that no society desirous of development can ignore democracy. The
democra c experience of developed na ons lends credence to the truth of this claim. There is a
close link between democracy and development. This is not to say that a country cannot develop
without democracy, but where both exist, the outcomes are be er.
MEANING OF DEMOCRACY
Of Greek origin, the word 'democracy' is derived from two words, "demos" which means "the
people" and "kra en" which connotes "to rule". Put together, it is "demokra a" which means
"rule by the people".
Pericles - an Athenian Statesman in 431 BC provides an elaborate picture of this concept: “Our
Cons tu on is named a democracy because it is in the hands not of the few but in the hands of the
many. But our laws secure equal jus ce for all in their private disputes and our public opinion
welcomes and honours every branch of achievements...” (Macridis, 1982).
In the modern era, democracy is deﬁned as a system of government in which the whole eligible
members of a state hold supreme power through their elected representa ves. A be er clariﬁca on
can be derived from Abraham Lincoln's deﬁni on of democracy as a government of the people,
by the people and for the people.
Democracy has its fundamental principles, features or characteris cs. Various deﬁni ons of
democracy are formed from these fundamental features. The features include equality of men,
individual rights, free exis ng poli cal par es, consensus or majority rule, separa on of power,
checks and balances, the rule of law, freedom of the press and judicial autonomy.
Equality of men
This is the fundamental tenet of democracy. It stresses that all human beings are born equal. In
this sense, equality simply means equal opportunity for all and a rejec on of inherited poli cal
principles, eli sm and classes.
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Individual Rights
Democracy considers the dignity and integrity of every individual as sacred and inviolable. These
rights are the rights that the law accords to all individuals. They include the right to life, private
and family life, freedom of expression and fair hearing.
Free Elec ons
This is another core feature of democracy. Free elec ons give the people the chance to choose
good leaders of their choice. In line with democra c ideology, vo ng decisions are based on the
rule of the majority. This implies that if only two contestants are involved in an elec on, the one
who has more than half the number of votes cast becomes the winner. The principle of simple
majority.
Existence of Poli cal Par es
This is a necessary feature of democracy. This would enable voters to vote for the poli cal par es
they want in speciﬁc oﬃces. In America, for instance, there are two main poli cal par es, the
Republican and Democra c par es.
Majority rule, Minority Rights
According to Irish and Prothro, "the majority and minority rela ons in a free elec on are, when
you stop to think about it, the most valuable aspects..." (Routeledge, Kegan and Paul, 1967). This
feature points that the majority rule holds, yet the minority rights are protected.
Separa on of Power
According to Lord Acton, "all power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely".
Separa on of power means that power is shared among the three arms of government; the
execu ve, the legislature and the judiciary.
Checks and Balances
Ensuring a separa on of power means that the principle of checks and balances is provided for
and prevents the abuse of enormous power by the various arms of government. Adhering to the
principle of checks and balances is essen al to ensuring that no arm of government dominates
power.
The Rule of Law
Respect for the rule of law by both the leaderships and the ci zenry is the basis and founda on
of a prosperous democra c state. This would imply that no person is above the law.
Freedom of the Press
The press is described as the fourth estate of the realm of government behind the execu ve,
legislature and the judiciary. Since the press is the means to a reliable "spotlight and microphone"
in any government, there cannot be a true democracy without a free press.
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Judicial Autonomy
This is referred to as "independence of the judiciary". It is the duty of the judiciary to protect
the integrity of the law as enshrined in the cons tu on. The judiciary is the vital link and nexus
in the uneasy but necessary rela ons between the execu ve arm and the legislature. Democracy
therefore needs a judiciary that is courageous, impar al, resourceful, unbiased, reliable and above
all, independent.
A democracy that does not have the above features is not a true democracy.
DEVELOPMENT
The term development has no universally accepted deﬁni on, yet it is an unavoidable datum of
life. Many scholars have a empted to deﬁne the concept of development. For instance, Labret
deﬁnes development as "the ascent of man, matura on, growth and crea vity of all human
poten als achieved at the lowest possible cost in sacriﬁced values and human suﬀerings" (Marcel
Onyibor, 2003).
An African philosopher, Pantaleon Iroegbu, also a empted a working deﬁni on of development.
For him “ development is the progressive unfolding of the inner poten als of a given reality. It
is to de-envelop, that is, to bring out to light, the existen al, func onal and epistemic, which
was enveloped, folded or hidden. As it applies to a people, development is the integra on of
diﬀerent givens: na onal, physical acquired and human, of a people towards the full working
out, permanently and cumula vely, of their being as persons of their community and of their real
produc vity” (Owerri, 1994).
Be it as it may, development is the growth or forma on and change of something over me. It is
the gradual growth, increase and change of a par cular phenomenon over me. It must be about
man because he is the agent and purpose of development.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT
Rich con nents tend to be more democra c than poor con nents. Understanding the link
between democracy and development could be more crucial for policy making at the na onal and
con nental levels. Besides giving ci zens more poli cal freedom, democracies are, on average,
less likely to be at war with each other than dictatorships. A lack of democra c governance
structure could prove an obstacle to sustainable development.
In the United Na ons Secretary General's 1994 Agenda for Development, it is stated that:
“Democracy and development are linked in fundamental ways. Because democracy provides the
only long-term basis for managing compe ng ethnic, religious and cultural interests in a way
that minimises the risk of violent internal conﬂict. Because democracy is a fundamental human
right, the advancing of which is itself an important measure of development” (UN, 1994).
Democracy is an important way to reassure freedoms and is a vital requisite for the economic
development of any con nent. Thus, this paper posits that developing and strengthening a
democra c system is an essen al component of the process of development.
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WHY DEMOCRACY HAS FAILED IN AFRICA
Democracy has failed in Africa because African leaderships lack the moral courage to live up to
its expecta ons. Characterised by greed, ignorance and negligence, many African leaders do not
prac ce democracy in the light of the founda onal principles upon which democracy is formed.
John Locke and other pro-democracy philosophers had based the ideals of democracy on the
principles of discipline, tolerance, truth, nobility, restraint, jus ce, selﬂessness, self-control and
equity.
These principles have helped Europe and America develop. African leaders lack the moral
courage to live up to expecta on; hence, they dri from the path of democracy without diﬃculty
to sa sfy their own whims and caprices, ending up prac sing pseudo-democracy.
WHAT AFRICA REQUIRES
Having studied the rela onship between democracy and development, it will be per nent to note
that a democracy premised on the principles of selﬂessness, nobility, tolerance, truth, equality,
jus ce, honesty, self-control and restraint, will promote the social, economic and poli cal
development of Africa.
Hence, Africa requires genuine operators of democracy. There is need for leaders with the
moral courage to meet democra c expecta ons. Africa requires leaderships that will embrace
true democracy and prac se it in the light of the solid founda onal principles upon which prodemocra c scholars had based the ideals of democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
African countries are limited in unifying themselves due to the boundaries and various requirements
which hinder their free and perfect mobility, manifested in visa requirement, mul -currencies,
diﬀerent leadership, insecurity, unemployment, poor resource u lisa on and poor produc on.
Leadership, perfect mobility and industrialisa on are the major sectors to Africa’s uniica on
and prosperity. There is always the thinking that perhaps the means used by the imperialists to
exploit Africa’s minerals and par oning, that in return led to Europe’s industrialisa on, could
be the very means to Africa’s uniﬁca on, industrialisa on and becoming a ﬁrst world con nent.
The eﬀort to ﬁnd a possible means of providing sustainable development and uniﬁca on in
Africa informed the decision to write this ar cle. It is about the history, uses, eﬀects, beneﬁts and
descrip on of the railway system.
Today, Africa is facing a lot of poli cal leadership problems and corrup on mainly because
the resources which were abundantly endowed to Africa were plundered through the railway
development. Par oning of Africa was also another tool deployed to make it impossible for
Africans to relate and defend what belonged to them. This ar cle intends to show how the railway
is Africa’s greatest tool to radical development and uniﬁca on.
HISTORY OF THE RAILWAY
According to Wikipedia, rolling stock in railway transport systems generally suﬀers lower
fric onal resistance than road vehicles, and the passenger and freight cars (carriages and wagons)
can be coupled into longer trains. The opera on is carried out by a railway company, providing
transport between train sta ons or freight customer facili es. Power is provided by locomo ves
which either draw electric power from a railway electriﬁca on system or produce their own
power, usually by diesel engines. Most tracks are accompanied by a signalling system. Railways
are a safe land transport system when compared to other forms of transport. Railway transport is
capable of high levels of passenger and cargo u liza on and energy eﬃciency, but is o en less
ﬂexible and more capital-intensive than road transport, when lower traﬃc levels are considered.
The oldest, man-hauled railways date back to the 6th century BC, with Periander, one of the
Seven Sages of Greece, credited with its inven on. Rail transport blossomed a er the Bri sh
development of the steam locomo ve as a viable source of its power in the 18th and 19th centuries.
With steam engines, one could construct mainline railways, which were a key component of the
Industrial Revolu on. Also, railways reduced the costs of shipping, and allowed for fewer lost
goods, compared with water transport, which faced occasional sinking of ships. The change from
canals to railways allowed for "na onal markets" in which prices varied very li le from city to
city. The inven on and development of the railway in Europe was one of the most important
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technological inven ons of the 19th century. In the United States, it is es mated that without
railway system, GDP would have been lower by 7% in 1890.
BACKGROUND OF RAILWAY DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA
During the 1870s, Africa was under imperialism. A lot of tools were used such as health centres,
railway, religion, gi s, guns and poli cal arms to exploit Africa's minerals. When we analyse
cri cally, they were used to facilitate the exploita on of minerals in the whole of Africa. And
silently the railway played the major role since it was used to directly link the mines to the
Africa’s coasts.
Very li le informa on is known about the impact of railway contribu ons during the exploita on
of Africa’s minerals by the western world. Except the slave commodity which was selftranspor ng, commodi es like gold, copper, coﬀee, co on, limestone, silver and many others
were eﬃciently plundered by the use of the transporta on means of a railway. Tonnes of minerals
were delivered at diﬀerent coasts by the railway and this led to the industrialisa on of Europe,
India and Britain. This is one of the major reasons behind their transforma on into "irst world"
relying on cheap transporta on means and the presence of cheap raw materials from Africa. A er
the successful plunder of Africa’s minerals, it was le and abandoned. It is believed in some
quarters that some of the raw materials that were mined from Africa are s ll in treasuries and
stores abroad. It is no wonder that Europe, Britain and America prefer and consume mostly pure
and quality products up to date. They set high standards because they have pure inputs.
This railway had unique advantages over other forms of transport such as the cheapest transport
fares, maintenance and breakdowns costs compared to cars, aircra , and animals. In terms of
haulage capacity, it was or is the best for moving bulky goods in large quan es. In terms of
accidents they were not expected and in any case, few injuries or damages were experienced due
to their low speed. They were secure and very reliable in terms of safety and deliveries. They
were not hindered by stops, traﬃc or weather.
Most, if not all countries in Africa, are connected by roads which are aﬀected by traﬁc and
associated with robbery terror, accidents causing extra payments, delays, loss of loved ones and
valuable belongings. Airfreight, which is safer compared to road transport and mely is very
expensive to maintain and aﬀord since Africa is s ll underdeveloped with a huge popula on that
has a low income to spend even on basic needs. It is said that majority of the people in Africa
spend less than a dollar each day.
USES AND EFFECTS OF AFRICAN INTER-CITY RAILWAY DEVELOPMENT
Currently in Africa, our rail system is facing low development and receiving inadequate a en on
in terms of improvements that can promote perfect mobility in Africa. Not enough a en on
is being paid to its possibili es and the outcomes of its deployment. This system should be
developed so as to improve the lives and unity of people. This ar cle will a empt to show how
this system will assist people living in Africa in a number of ways. Fully developing the railway
system will lead to eﬃciency and eﬀec veness which will increase resource u lisa on and
reduce unemployment on the African con nent. The system will also s mulate specialisa on
and quality output since systems and sectors (countries) will be linked by railway.
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Developing the railway system will improve the health of many people by connec ng them to
quality services. For instance, South Africa has one of the best health care services in Africa but
accessing it by other na onali es is very expensive when the cost of transporta on is factored
into the total cost of treatment. If the transport cost were to be lower from the recipient na on to
South Africa then the medica on may be more aﬀordable.
Africa has developing countries which suﬀer from poor services like health care, take the example
of Uganda. In situa ons like health emergencies, childbirth, transplants and even snake bites,
people lose their lives to poor medical a en on. The public structure is limited with lack of
equipment leading to the loss of very many lives. Doctors are not well paid and this hinders their
eﬃciency and increases the occurrence of strike ac ons. The country's healthcare system also
faces the problem of few technical personnel, so that even when equipment is available, there are
only very few people skilled enough to operate them. In Uganda’s case, people have a poor a tude
towards work so trying to improve any system calls for the importa on of skilled labour which
is expensive. The development of railway will assist Ugandans and other na onali es to access
quality health services in South Africa. This will reduce the death rate and gear development in
Africa.
Besides health, another cri cal sector that will be improved is the agricultural sector. S ll using
Uganda as a case study, the country's GDP relies heavily on agriculture. The main products of
subsistence agriculture in Uganda include maize, Irish potato, orange, coﬀee, tomato, banana.
These products are perishable and sensi ve to changes in weather. If the railway system is
developed it would assist Uganda to proﬁt greatly from easier sourced and cheaper inputs like
fer lizer. Time will also be reduced to transport perishable crops to Sudan and other regions (it
would normally take 1-2 weeks to reach the Sudanese market travelling by road, during which me
many of the crops would have become damaged or ro en). The risk of accidents, breakdowns and
insecurity inherent in road transport will also be reduced. Crops can be sold at their normal prices
when they are not ro en, damaged, or adversely aﬀected by weather condi ons like extreme heat
common with road transport. Sellers can thus make a decent proﬁt and increase in GDP can be
assured.
Unlike in Uganda, Sudan and other East African countries, the ﬁlm and entertainment industry
is enjoying faster development in West African countries like Nigeria and Ghana. The ﬁlm and
entertainment industry can be used to boost tourism. Developing a func onal railway network
across Africa will further promote this industry because its players would have easier and more
aﬀordable access to diﬀerent loca ons, cultures and people. This will s mulate crea vity, create
jobs, as well as promote and market the diﬀerent African cultures, trends and fashion. It will help
to project Africa in a posi ve light and improve the amount and quality of informa on available
on the con nent's unique features and desires. It will also help to increase the apprecia on for
African civilisa on, thereby reducing the inﬂuence of western civilisa on on the lives of young
Africans.
Educa on in Africa is another sector that will be posi vely aﬀected by inter-city railway system in
Africa. Uganda for example has one of the best educa onal systems but is faced with a number of
issues such as strikes and delayed salaries of teachers. Once there is perfect mobility, teachers and
other workers would be able to oﬀer their services to countries where there is be er remunera on
and be er working condi ons. Students would have a broader choice of where to receive formal
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educa on and academic materials will easily be delivered and accessed.
An inter-city railway system can serve as an instrument in the uniﬁca on of African countries.
Infrastructures like an interconnected railway network will be aﬀordable, fast, reliable and
sustainable, allowing Africans to move conveniently from one country to another. Unfortunately,
such infrastructure is s ll underdeveloped, a major manifesta on of poor governance, underu lisa on of resources, increased unemployment among others.
It is recommended that Africa develop an inter-country railway infrastructure. The system
currently available on the con nent was developed on a closed system basis, for example,
na onally. Unifying all the African countries through railways would be quite hard if the system
is not opened up through inter-country infrastructure development.
In addi on to the above, insecurity and conﬂicts between and among Africans such as xenophobia
in South Africa, recent conﬂicts between Zambians and Kenyans, terrorism in Kenya and Uganda
by Africans are all due to boundaries and fear of insecurity as Africans.
In the developed countries of the Western world, infrastructural developments that can further
propagate industrialisa on are given ﬁrst priority. For Africa, to be fully uniﬁed, a railway system
connec ng all the major ci es and towns must be developed. This will reduce the bo lenecks
created by na onal boundaries and it will promote industrialisa on with resultant eﬀects like
increased resource u lisa on, job crea on and massive reduc on in unemployment rate in the
whole of Africa.
DESCRIPTION OF THE INTER-CITY RAILWAY SYSTEM
An inter-city railway system will aim at connec ng all the major towns and ci es in Africa. It will
be developed with upgraded technology which will make it very fast and reliable, enabling quick
access to diﬀerent ci es and na ons. It will have ﬁxed schedules and huge capacity, enabling
it to transport large numbers of people per li . The system’s lanes will be designed to have
4x4 matrixes such that there is transport in diﬀerent direc ons (West, East, South and North)
simultaneously. This will assist the system to access and cover every part of Africa in a frac on
of the me that other systems might take. It will also be operated in a way that allows it to be an
eﬀec ve and eﬃcient transport system in Africa.
OBJECTIVES
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

To improve the transporta on and movements of people on the African con nent.
To increase resource u lisa on on the con nent.
To lead to industrialisa on of the African con nent.
To empower diﬀerent sectors in Africa to interlink and expand.
To avail informa on to decision makers and other par es.

BENEFITS AND OUTCOMES OF RAILWAY SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA
1.
2.
3.
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It is a cheap means of transport that can accommodate the movement of low income earners
from one country to another.
It is easy to maintain.
It will interlink all the African countries which will lead to Africa’s uniﬁca on.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

It will lead to increased resource u lisa on which increases jobs, output and proﬁts.
It will assist thousands to access quality services like healthcare, tourism and entertainment.
It will also help to improve governance in Africa.
Transporta on in Africa will be enhanced.
Tourism and adventure will be promoted and improved.
It will lead to be er u liza on of me and resources in Africa.

In conclusion, the development of the African Inter-city Railway Connec on System will be a
big instrument to Africa’s uniﬁca on and prosperity.

REFERENCE
h ps://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rail_transport

pg |062

Tendaishe Tlou

ADDRESSING SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHALLENGES TO
CURB YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN TERRORISM IN AFRICA
Tendaishe Tlou
Researcher and Writer,
Kwekwe, Zimbabwe.
ABSTRACT
The scourge of terrorism has become an interna onal crisis a er the 9/11 a acks in America.
Terrorism has deeply encroached its claws in Africa on the premise of socio-economic challenges
along the clash of civiliza ons. In countries such as Nigeria, Somalia, Central African Republic,
Kenya and the Maghreb region, terrorism is a threat to peace and security, compounded by spiraling
youth unemployment rates, the youth bulge, porous borders, poverty, arms prolifera on, weak
governments, economic problems among other challenges. It is yet to be seen how Africans will
unite to deal with this threat to security on the con nent given the above men oned problems.
At the same me, one will assess the ramiﬁca ons, advantages, and pi alls of the youth bulge
and foreign interven on to curb the spread of terrorism towards obtaining sustainable peace and
security on the con nent.
INTRODUCTION
In this youth-dominated epoch, terrorism in Africa has become a vantage point to express
disgruntlement and is a topical issue to the extent that scholars are a ribu ng this phenomenon
to a plethora of factors; yet terrorism is as old as mankind itself. Many conﬂict theories have been
suggested to explain this crisis which has become an existen al threat to humanity. However, the
most earth-breaking theory which has tried to explain the salience of terrorism is the renowned
20th-century ‘Clash of Civiliza ons’ by Samuel Hun ngton. This theory seems more prescient
and accurate showing how discord between civiliza ons is becoming the greatest threat to world
security, stability and peace in light of the recent terrorist ac vi es in Kenya, Nigeria, South
Sudan, Mali and the Central African Republic and the possibility of emula on of such events in
Malawi and Tanzania in the near future against which this theory is going to be tested. The author
will also endeavour to prescribe solu ons for this scourge.
Keywords: Clash of Civiliza ons, Youth, Terrorism, Religion, Violence, and Conﬂict
The ‘Clash of Civiliza ons’ is a theory that was formulated by Samuel Hun ngton (1993) ensuing
the end of The Cold War and the triumph of Liberalism over Socialism. Neo-liberal scholars such
as Francis Fukuyama traversed it as a moment marking the ul mate end of conﬂict in the world
because liberal democracy had prevailed over dictatorship and tyranny in the world. Just about
the same me, Hun ngton diﬀered and proposed yet another theory that conﬂict was going to
be complex and dynamic because it was going to be rooted in culture and not the conven onal
sources such as ideological fraterni es. The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of yet
another conﬂict. The thrust of Hun ngton’s (1993) argument was that “the great divisions
among mankind and the domina ng source of conﬂict will be cultural. The principal conﬂicts of
global poli cs will occur between na ons and groups of diﬀerent civiliza ons. The fault lines
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between civiliza ons will be the ba le lines of the future along ethnical, gender, racial and most
importantly, religious diﬀerences. ”
This quota on asserts that the aspect of ‘civiliza ons rallying’ is the central element in mobilisa on
for a common cause, being the impetus for conﬂict including terrorism as it will be shown in this
paper. However, I argue that terrorism is perpetuated by socio-economic challenges faced by
youths along cultural diﬀerences. The means jus ﬁes the ends.
There is not one unanimously agreed deﬁni on of terrorism. However, for the purposes of this
study, Schmidt and Jongman (2005) are of the view that terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method
of repeated or simultaneous violent ac ons employed by semi-clandes ne individuals, groups or
state actors mainly for idiosyncra c, criminal or poli cal reasons whereby the direct targets of
violence are not the main targets. This implies that the violent tac cs employed by terrorists are
meant to convey a message to the government which will be accused of diﬀerent laws at diﬀerent
mes. In the same vein, Crenshaw (1995) maintains that terrorism is a" conspira onal type of
violence calculated to alter the a tudes and behaviour of a par cular mul tude or audience,
a government or a community, conveyed through the media so that the intended message is
appropriately put across." (Igna us, 1992).
According to Lederach (1995) conﬂict is an intrinsic and inevitable disagreement between two
or more par es that is perpetuated by incompa ble interests or goals, dissa sﬁed human needs
(poor service delivery), unequal and suppressive poli cal-social structures (structural violence)
than can be resolved or can lead to (direct) violence.
Perhaps the importance of the Clash of Civiliza ons is that its thrust is religion and ethnicity which
are arguably at the epicentre of most terrorist movements and violence in Africa and abroad. It is
interes ng to note that religious clashes are the most obvious examples of the ‘clash’ traversed by
Hun ngton (1993) and it is presen ng the world with great challenges not in the fashion of those
incurred in the past due to an ever increasing youth cohort. Coincidentally, terrorism illustrates or
provides evidence of compe on and conﬂict between contradic ng social, economic, poli cal
and cultural ideals (Kristoﬀ, 1997) to the extent of inci ng senseless bloodshed and killings.
Thousands of people are dying on a daily basis and ironically, youths are at the forefront in the
spread of terrorism tradi onally in the Middle East and now Africa. This also shows how the
state is losing its relevance in maintaining na onal security. In the face of globaliza on, iden ty
poli cs is prevalent par cularly between young Muslims and non-Muslims, especially Chris ans
each becoming the other’s "other". Although these elements have been the cause of conﬂict
between humans throughout history, the radicaliza on of religious beliefs accompanied by an
ever increasing youth bulge have since intensiﬁed the suspicion, hatred and animosity between
Muslims and the rest, hence the term "Islamophobia".
The dynamism and intensiﬁca on of youth Islamic fundamentalism are the drivers of many
rela ve terrorist a acks, yet the causes are yet to be thoroughly explored. Youths as far as South
Africa are ﬂeeing their homes trying to go to Syria to join the Islamic State (ISIS). Terrorists
tend also to be vicious and ruthless since fundamental issues of iden ty are at stake, however,
this fana sm is salient among the youth. Although tradi onally, rela ons between Chris ans
and Muslims have been stormy, the current confronta on between them suggests that the ‘clash’
has apparently reached its peak on the basis of a rapidly growing, energe c, over-ambi ous but
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unemployed youthful populace. Esposito (1992) is of the view that their (Chris anity and Islam)
historical dynamics o en ind the two communi es in compe on and locked in a deadly combat
for power, land and souls. For example, the Al-Shabaab (which in literal transla on means the
youth) and Boko Haram want to establish theocracies based on fundamental Sharia law which
they perceive to be able to address their socio-economic needs and which they perceive their
governments to be failing to resolve, in Kenya, Somalia and Northern Nigeria respec vely,
bringing to the fore why they are commi ng atroci es in all the three countries.
I explore the theme that the ‘needs’ behind these terrorist movements can no longer be disregarded
because they are far beyond the red line given the deplorable crimes against humanity they
are commi ng. Hence, in the deﬁni ons of terrorism, the act is labelled as idiosyncra c,
conspira onal or a crime to convey a par cular message to change the a tudes or behaviours of
the one intended, in pursuit of (unrealis c) social, poli cal and ﬁnancial goals with the objec ve
of ins lling anarchy, fear and panic through violence in a bid to be no ced. Hence, the axiom
‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom ﬁghter.’ In my view, the string of terrorist rampages
in Africa since 2010 has sparked pervasive condemna on amongst African popula ons with
unequaled solu ons to eﬀec vely deal with this scourge. The recurring a acks also show that
over the years, Boko Haram has gained conﬁdence, expanded to Chad and Cameroon and is
adamant to con nue making demands to these countries’ governments.
Recurring abduc ons and violence have put terrorism in a posi on of strength. In my opinion, this
renewed conﬁdence has given more youths an a acking impetus that their ideals can no longer be
conﬁned to, for example Northern Nigeria alone, but to the rest of the country and in due course
these terrorist a acks might spread to the rest of the region. The more they are not listened to,
the more they spread. This possibility must not be undermined because unemployed youths are
increasingly becoming disgruntled, expanding in numbers and governments are failing to contain
them, let alone curb their violent ac vi es. My view is that if more youths are empowered, the
lesser they will see the need to join terrorist movements.
The terrorist scourge resonates that youth poverty is the cause in light of the exponen al progress
made by smaller terrorist groups in forging es with the rich Al-Qaeda and ISIS which guarantee
youths with both strategic and ﬁnancial resources. The ﬁght between the West and terrorists is
compounded by the fact that the former does not want to relinquish its so-called ‘war on terror’
whilst the la er’s growth is generated by large numbers of both educated but unemployed and
disaﬀected youths who become recruits to fundamental Islamist causes. In my view, this statement
implies that the West is actually playing into the hands of Al-Qaeda and ISIS which agitates
the forma on of an Islamic caliphate throughout the world so that the West, in its delusional
objec ve to end terrorism by interven on, is actually deploying troops and conveying massive
ﬁnancial resources to diﬀerent parts of the world un l it bleeds to bankruptcy, is weakened and
forced to withdraw from all regions, especially America, a country which Islamic youths blame
for their problems. For example, deploying troops in Nigeria, Kenya, and the Maghreb is exactly
what terrorists want so that youths ind a reason to join terrorist cells and ﬁght. Upon joining,
youths are promised ﬁnancial gains so that they can take care of their families.
On the lip side of religious fundamentalism, terrorism is grounded in perpetua ng fear. Barber
(2001) is of the view that fear is terrorism’s only weapon. He con nues to argue that fear is a
far more potent weapon against those who live in ‘hope and prosperity’ than those who live in
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‘despair with nothing to lose.’ In this case, the vic m becomes the perpetrator. Terrorists ins ll
fear by ins ga ng violence in its en rety which explains their unwavering presence on media
pla orms before and a er a acks. Aziz (1993) raises the ante by arguing that ba les for Islam
are not won through the gun, but by striking fear into the heart of the (perceived) enemy; fear
that youths are constantly living in, (imposed by socio-economic challenges) and the fear of the
unknown, which ‘jus ﬁes’ striking fear back in the hearts of others.
The African Union must an cipate and proac vely act against the emula on of similar incidences
in Malawi, Ghana and Tanzania where there is a considerable concentra on and rapidly growing
number of young Muslims, Chris ans and poverty. There have already been some reports of
youth violence along religious lines in Zanzibar. A larger segment of Africa’s popula on is
between the ages of twenty (20) to thirty ﬁve (35) amoun ng to 65%. This may, therefore, present
a case in which alarming numbers of youths are vagabond and des tute (Peters, 2011). This
increases the probability of contempla on by many youths to oust their governments by staging
terrorist a acks. Annually, youths in this age group are increasingly taking part in violent protests
and voluntarily joining terrorist movements, a cause for concern following the Arab Springs.
Outstanding examples include the recent capture and intercep on by Kenyan authori es, of a
university student who was allegedly radicalised because she was promised university tui on
assistance and medical interns who were in the process of manufacturing biological bombs for
anthrax a ack in exchange for "good" jobs a er comple on of their a achments (Winsor, 2016).
To curb terrorism, youth energy has to be redirected to posi ve outcomes and their ideas
and needs have to be taken into considera on. I am of the view that Islamic fundamentalism
is the misdirec on of energy and radicalisa on of religion which is as old as mankind itself.
Historically, both Chris ans and Muslims have been wrongfully massacred for one fundamental
reason or the other, but ethical people have always condemned this. This presents the world with
an opportunity to work hand-in-hand with peace loving Chris an and Islamic people that have
dissociated themselves from terrorist movements such as the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, and Boko
Haram. Tradi onally, all religions co-existed despite their challenges. In Tanzania and Malawi,
there are millions of both Muslims and Chris ans. However, there has never been protracted
religious violence since me immemorial.
For example, in December 2015 there was a cohort of Muslims during the Mandera bus a ack
in Kenya, who stood up for Chris an bus passengers under siege and stopped a massacre by
saying "kill us all or let them (Chris ans) go" (The Independent Reporter, 2016). The protagonist
Salah Farah who sustained bullet wounds during an alterca on with Al-Shabaab militants died in
January 2016. He died because he refused to be separated from and tried to save, Chris ans. He is
a true epitome of a ‘brother’s keeper.’ This kind of a tude save lives and presents an opportunity
for peace within the clash of civilisa ons. It must be borne in mind that most Muslims are not
radical and they do not jus fy what terrorist novices are doing.
No religion celebrates the killing of people such as the beheading of twelve journalists in Libya
by the ISIS (Al-jazeera, 2015) or killing of humanitarian workers by Al-Shabaab in Somalia.
These are just overzealous youths who see no value in humanity and are pursuing self-interests.
I vehemently argue that if fundamentalism can be created it can also be disintegrated through
peace educa on in the same way draconian and incomprehensible ideologies such as Fascism
and Nazism propounded by Mussolini and Hitler respec vely, were condemned in the build-up
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towards the infamous 2nd World War. War on terror and using gigan c military ﬁrepower is
not the answer; it only pushes the world on the brink of a 3rd World War. Humanity will only
be doing what terrorists expect of them when governments order and escalate bombings. This
century has seen the world making posi ve strides in peace and human security which entails that
terrorist violence has no place in this world. Farah’s gesture should be an example to the world
to co-exist as one community and promote religious harmony and tolerance. Humanity prevailed
before, it will prevail again.
I argue that most learned youths know that violence is detrimental to infrastructure and the
economy; hence they prefer to engage in dialogue, diplomacy and nego a ons. I argue that
many youths now believe in peaceful transi ons than the primi ve use of violence because it is
retrogressive e.g in America, Nigeria, China, India and other States which extensively promote
the civil society, infrastructural development, the music industry, sports, entrepreneurship, real
estate, tourism, manufacturing, science and technology due to the increasingly shrinking space
in the tradi onal industries. In the new millennium, high youth popula ons are now viewed
as cheap and readily available labour that can be divided towards development (World Bank,
2006). Hence, if the State-youth rela onship is carefully and strategically harnessed it can lead to
posi ve than disastrous outcomes.
The world must know that it is ba ling with an idea that was born out of human disgruntlement
and was formulated many centuries ago. This must also be countered by yet another powerful
idea. In line with Agenda 2063 that by 2020 all guns must be silenced in Africa, terrorism must be
curbed through a pervasive and well coordinated peace educa on, socio-economic development,
and youth empowerment programmes. An idea cannot be defeated through the barrel of a gun.
Guerrilla warfare employed by terrorists is some sort of a ri on strategy that seeks to divide
humanity. In the same vein, Rapoport (1984) argues that out of his study of what he terms ‘holy
terror’, religion provides the only jus ﬁca on for terrorism and in my view it must be used to
create opportuni es for peace because it unites us all.
CONCLUSION
An analysis of the events characterizing Africa in this dispensa on illuminates the reality of
the threat of terrorism on the con nent given the considerable concentra on of unemployed
youths, Muslims, and Chris ans. Therefore, African leaders, policy makers, and researchers need
to be pragma c and proac ve by formula ng interven ons to create harmony between religious
fana sm and to address youth challenges before the con nent evolves into yet another Middle
East. Given the fragile poli cal and socio-economic problems in Africa, the con nent cannot
aﬀord yet another cycle of violent conﬂicts spawned by religious diﬀerences as this threatens to
divide it further. Africa needs to take advantage of the lessons it has obtained from the events in
the Middle East, Kenya, and Nigeria. Negligence and ignorance are the last things that Africans
need on the con nent, but coopera on and pragma sm are the only way to tackle terrorism
sooner rather than later.
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INTRODUCTION
Ethnicity has been diﬀerently deﬁned but for the sake of our focus, it is a situa on of internal
instability of a person in which he/she manifests his/her inability to have a good rela onship
internally with himself/herself, others and God, which develops and snowballs into ethnic
pandemonium1. Invariably, one of the ways of exhibi ng this internal uncertainty is in common
diﬀerences exhibited due to ethnic diversi es; and because we so want to move into our safety
zone, we begin to see our ethnic group as not just being superior but longing for protec on and
advancement of territory. It is at this point that conﬂict begins because diﬀerent people possess
incompa ble values, needs and interests and have diﬀerent ways of achieving them 2. The ethnic
na onalism that has being spo ed in the above statements is summed in the deﬁni on which
states that it is a situa on in which the rela onship between members of one ethnic group and
another, or generally amongst ethnic groups in a mul polity (such as Guinea, Tanzania, Liberia,
Nigeria and many African countries) is characterized by a lack of cordiality, heightened mutual
suspicions and fears, by quarrelsomeness and a tendency towards violent confronta ons3.
In contemporary mes, we hear pronouns like: I, mine, our, theirs, my tribal man, my language
woman, my towns man, etc. forming the crux of describing the “we” versus the “them” which
o en make people to only get interested in things that aﬀect the “we” group to which they belong
4
while they o en do not get bothered about whatever happens to the “them” group
.
Interes ngly, it is important to note that the original usage of the word ethnicity was not divisive
but a way to celebrate the beauty in people's diverse cultures. It is meant to deﬁne the characters of
ethnic groups to know more about each other and what each stands for but again as stated above,
it's meaning has been basterdized to suit the aspira on of divisive poli cians whose ac ons have
given prominence to the newly metamorphosed word which reﬂects more of nega vity. This new
meaning of the word ethnicity is making many countries especially the developing ones to face
internal instability from the processes of poli ciza on of the issue of ethnicity and ethniciza on
of poli cs 5, stalling development as evident in Burudi, Rwanda, Liberia, Nigeria, Somali and of
recent Sudan.
PREDISPOSING FACTORS TO ETHNICITY
As we move into understanding how ethnicity impacts on the development of na ons especially
the African society, it is important that we conduct a prognosis of factors that are said to inﬂuence
individuals or groups in the society into promo ng the concept. It has been acknowledged that
social mobiliza on of people in a democra c society, existence of a pool of symbols conno ng
dis nc veness of a people, selec on, standardiza on and transmission of such pool of symbols
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in communi es by leadership and a par cular ethnic group being a reference point in rela on to
whom a sense of rela ve depriva on (real or imaginary) is aggregated 6 are all seen as promo ng
factors to ethnicity in communi es especially those with weak social ins tu ons. In Africa, these
factors are majorly the means of iden ﬁca on, which either takes one close to common wealth
or the contrary, which makes those at the advantage to promote it while those at the disadvantage
with regards to popula on, to disregard it.
In a more explicit manner as stated above, elite contesta on for poli cal power to capture states
which is characterized by cut-throat compe on in a sort of zero-sum game manner on the altar of
ethnic mobiliza on and ethno-religious and communal iden es have created a lot of insecurity
among ethnic na onals in the country 3 thereby calling for ethnic na onalism. People of a
par cular ethnic group feel the importance of mobilizing support for their ethnic group because
they stand at risk of marginaliza on and ex nc on on the extreme when they do not do it. Also,
mass poverty has been spo ed as a pre-disposing factor closely linked to poli cal mobiliza on.
This o en condi ons the minds and a tudes of people thereby making them suscep ble to elite
manipula on and mobiliza on. The elites use diﬀerences in culture as a dividing line in other to
achieve their vision ed to poli cal aspira on.
Systemic failure is also one of the factors that have made ethnicity to thrive in most African
socie es. As states become unable to sa sfy basic needs of the people due to bad leadership,
the poor people in-turn withdraw from the collec ve goals of the state into ethnic and religious
cocoons with high level sensi vity to the roles of those they regard as “them” in their perceived
marginaliza on and immisera on 7. This failure is used by the poli cians as an entry point
especially in states with weak ins tu on as stated elsewhere in the paper.
Fear of ethnic imperialism is one of the major factors that have caused ethnicity. People have
developed all manner of defense mechanisms in a way of protec ng themselves from being
annihilated by another ethnic group which may be drawn by past experiences. Explaining further,
a professor at the University of Belgrade stated that, ethnic conﬂict is caused by the "fear of
the future", lived through the past 8. This is because ethnic champions through their vantage
posi ons mortgage the state system to the beneﬁt of their people which o en goes a long way in
re-enforcing ethnicity either by the beneﬁ ng communi es or vic mized communi es.
These and many other factors have widened the scope of ethnicity in the country which are pointers
to where we can all start from if we must get it right, otherwise, we con nue to be a con nent in
perpetual antagonism of each other, tampering not just with interpersonal rela onships but
also leading to the loss of lives and property thereby promo ng underdevelopment that hitherto
characterises the African con nent.
EFFECTS OF ETHNICITY ON DEVELOPMENT
Due to our diﬀerent desire for ethnic interests as against na onal interest, people have become
entangled in a ﬁght of "all against all." They play the role of a parasite to the na on with each
ethnic na onality taking a bite from the na onal cake rather than contribu ng to its growth.
We have refused to align to the progressive life style where people work together to ensure
that the center holds. Our socie es have become common examples of instability, chaos and
underdevelopment as a result of ethnic na onalism which is expressed through militancy,
economic sabotage and poli cal propaganda. Today, people are killed, proper es are destroyed,
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hate speeches are promoted against one another in other to show our disgust for the crea vity
of God who decided to make us either Berom, Tutsi, Hutu, Swali, Tiv, Idoma, Ntonkon, Fulani,
Igbo, Yoruba, Hausa, etc. As a result of ethnicity, people have con nued to promote homogenous
se lements which again breed insecurity while stalling development. For instance, we have the
“no go” areas syndrome in communi es that have experienced one form of violent conﬂict or the
other. Very important to development is the fact that sharing of ideas is limited and this can be
seen in diﬀerence of development between rural areas were homogenous habita on exist and big
ci es where mul culturalism is prominent.
It is unfortunate that many government appointments are made based on religious or ethnic
grounds, pu ng meritocracy in oblivion. This is aﬀec ng the development of states within the
con nent. People see occupying public space at whatever level as empowerment rather than
service to the na on. Remarkably, the employment of a par cular person from a certain ethnic
or religious group is celebrated while the person is mandated to promote ethnicity in oﬃce. This
makes it diﬃcult to get the best of hands to manage the public sector because mundane prac ces
have overtaken objec vity which is against global prac ce.
Ethnicity can lead to lingering suspicion among diﬀerent groups which limits tendencies for trust
and even corpora on. Par es are hardly able to access new informa on for common good or be
recep ve to the ideas of perceived opposing groups in other not to place others at an advantage.
Minds are so crowded with assump ons and prejudices that they are usually not willing to allow
anything to change even if it is to their beneﬁt. Any community with such an experience is at the
verge of a violent erup on, perpetually insecure and unstable. Any minor disagreement may push
things beyond precipice 3. They will hardly be willing to join forces to discuss the progress of
the society or a na on and if they are compelled, they will be more interested in protec ng their
interest as stated above.
We must come to a realisa on that ethnicity and many other factor have actually undermined
many states' capacity to discharge fundamental obliga ons of a modern state to its ci zens
such as socio-economic provisions, guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms, ensuring
law and order and facilita ng peace and stability which are all pre-condi ons for growth and
development3. Leaders have failed to deliver and may not even be ques oned because they are
hiding under ethnic canopies for protec on from accountability seekers. Governance has become
a turn by turn syndrome with everyone wai ng for his/her turn to perpetrate impunity rather than
to deliver.
To round oﬀ this discussion, at this level, we must be reminded that mul -ethnicity has become
a socio-poli cal phenomenon in most civil socie es with inter-ethnic cleavages, compe on and
conﬂict seemingly acquiring a higher intensity. We must be very conscious of our environment
to avoid a situa on where we will be deeply rooted in the war of all against all contrary to the
tenants of development adopted by global na ons.
RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper will be incomplete if we discuss the nomenclature of the concept without proﬀering
some recommenda ons which are expected to serve as a ladder upon which we can build a
society of tolerance, love and sustainable development as Africans because we are Africans.
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In the ﬁrst instance, we must all be reminded that our diversi es are conscious eﬀorts of God,
evident in the variety of liturgies and the spiritual es in the diverse theological expressions
and even in the variety of expressions of the same doctrines. These doctrines complements one
another showing that as a result of the communion with God Himself, diversity is not supposed
to divide us but serves to bring glory to God for his gi s especially as Chris ans 9.
There should be the entrenchment of the rule of law as s pulated in the cons tu on where
everyone is equal before it. This will ﬁght group insecurity arising from fear of ethnic imperialism
and unhealthy compe on as stated above. To add to this, there is the need for government at all
levels to fashion out a leadership that will reﬂect the interest of all based on everyone’s needs and
not a projec on of the interest of another especially when it endangers others. This will go a long
way to show that government is impar al 3.
Also, the extent and magnitude of poverty in the con nent must be addressed so that the right
a tudes will be entrenched among people to avoid instances where they are easily mobilized
along such vices based on who can pay more.
We also have to cul vate the habit of interac onal habita on in our communi es. This will help
us appreciate the beauty in each other’s culture as a result of interac on and informa on sharing.
This should also be backed by consistent inter-cultural dialogue in every community that is
mul cultural in nature so that conﬂict elements are discussed at that level to avoid misinforma on.
There is the need for value reorienta on among people especially the too young and very elderly.
This will become like an an dote to cure greedy and selﬁsh disposi on that has been built over
a period or that is about to be built. It will guide people into becoming more accommoda ng,
tolerant, and harmonious in their rela onships and coexistence.
We are reminded today that the role religious bodies play is of great implica on on not just their
immediate environments but also the society as a whole. This is because, as Africans we are
assumed to be religious and the religious leaders have great impact on their followers whether
young or old.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, people are challenged to always see themselves as one single race regardless of
accidents of births which are always inconsequen al to who people later become in life from an
objec ve point of view. This will help Africa grow from a con nent of war to that of love and
unity for sustainable development. It is necessary that we remind people that our diﬀerences are
smaller than we expect and our hearts larger than we imagined. Only if we ﬁrst admire each other
without border, though tribe and tongue may diﬀer, because in brotherhood and sisterhood we
stand, will our society grow because variety is the spice of life. We must be able to reﬂect more
on the advantages of collec ve living in-spite of our ethnicity rather than those things that have
divided us thereby dehumanizing each other. In the words of pope John Paul II in Asia in 1986, “ if
we fail to accept one another with love and as a common journey to a lo y des ny, if we realise
other people are our brothers and sisters… it is either we learn to walk together in peace and
harmony or we dri apart and ruin ourselves and others. ”
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OVERVIEW
An es mated 450 million people suﬀer from a mental or behavioural disorder. According to
WHO’s Global Burden of Disease 2001, 3% of the years lived with disability (YLD) are due to
neuropsychiatric disorders, a further 2.1% to inten onal injuries (WHO, 2013). Only 1% of the
medical doctors and 4% of the nurses were specialized in psychiatry. The last revision of the
mental health legisla on was in 1964. The legisla on basically focused on the custodial care of
the mentally ill persons and is an an quated kind of law that has been overtaken by events. One
percent (1%) of health care expenditures by the government health department was speciﬁcally
directed towards mental health in primary care. Despite developing Uganda's mental health policy
in 2000, it was s ll at dra level. The policy included the following components: (1) developing
community mental health services, (2) downsizing large mental hospitals, (3) developing a mental
health component in primary healthcare, (4) human resources, (5) involvement of users and their
families, (6) advocacy and promo on, (7) human rights protec on of users, (8) equity of access to
mental health services across diﬀerent groups, (9) Monitoring system. Of the overall expenditure
on mental health, 55% was directed towards the Na onal Mental Hospital. The whole popula on
(100%) had free access (of at least 80%) to essen al psychotropic medicines. This is based on the
fact that medica on is provided at no cost in all public health facili es. For those who pay out of
pocket, 37% of the daily minimum wage was needed to pay for one day an psycho c medica on,
while 7% of daily wage was needed to pay for one day dose of an depressant medica on. Mental
disorders were not covered in the current social insurance schemes (WHO, 2013). Moreover,
goal three (3) of the Sustainable Development Goals was good health and wellness.
IMI Background Informa on
Mental health was everyone’s business –individuals, families, employers, educators, and all
communi es who all had to play their part. The idea of forming a mul -disciplinary, mul ideological and interac ve in union, using vital mental exercises and communica ve human
behavior to create healthy rela onships that turn out to be sources of mental wellness emerged in
2005, was documented in 2006 and was registered in 2015 as a community-based organisa on.
Around this me, Integrated Mental-Health Ini a ve (IMI) focused on social and environmental
advocacies. Eight (8) years later, IMI accelerated its work towards the realisa on of its vision,
mission and goal to most concrete levels with the “ac on now” drive amidst steadily rising
cases of mental illness, breakdown of social ﬁbre, ecological breakdown, and humanly induced
elimina on of life systems. It aimed at iden fying and pooling together underu lized mental
health professionals, allied prac oners, and stakeholders to foster the wellbeing of communi es
through the mindful use of ecological resources of every nature. It targeted gradua ng from a
local ini a ve to a na onal and interna onal non-government organisa on in 3 to 6 years. In all
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its opera ons, IMI followed system’s perspec ve, in which mul plicity of ideals interact without
bias for the beneﬁt of each other and everything (or everybody) connected to it. It linked humanproblem areas, communi es, and their leadership through informa on gathering, evalua on and
re-evalua on, diagnoses, and therapy design and administra on using its established network of
healthy corps, volunteers, interns and experiences from collabora ng ins tu ons. The ini a ve
was and is s ll based in Jinja, Plot 15, Narambhai Road and it has had partnership arrangements
with Makerere University, Restless Development, Uganda Buddhist Center, John Paul II Jus ce
and Peace Center, Na onal Associa on of Professional Environmentalists and individual
consultants. IMI joined sister agencies and aﬀected communi es in realizing local beneits from
their local environment that in many ways cause mental healing, beginning with its own staﬀ
who are our primary agents of change.
IMI GEOGRAPHY
Jinja District has an area of 767.7 sq km of which 701.9 sq km is land and the rest (65.8 Sq
km) is covered by water bodies. The district is subdivided into 3 coun es namely, Butembe,
Kagoma and Jinja Municipality. There are 11 sub-coun es, 46 parishes and 381 villages. Jinja
Municipality has three sub-coun es and 55 villages. It is the tourist capital of East Africa and the
second largest city in Uganda, located in the East of the country, 80 Kilometers from Kampala,
and with a popula on of 491,000. Its major hospital is the Jinja referral hospital. The IMI is
located on Narambhai Road, Plot No. 15.
NEEDS STATEMENT
The predominantly clinical and ins tu onal management of mental health problems addressed
fully-grown symptoms that were comorbid in nature yet needed diagnosis. Rapid assessments
were inadequate to arrive at the righ ul case for management, which, like an onion, several layers
had to be peeled oﬀ to arrive at the founda onal concern for all others that are physically and
behaviorally seen. There was a ques on of who informed who in the diagnosis of our professional
biases and pre-professional beliefs, which interfered with the administra on of psychotherapy.
While many mental health prac oners suﬀered the tempta ons to regard their religions as the
model element in therapy administra on, healing too suﬀered along the course of trying to support
recovery. Much of the professional-pa ent rela onships were based on hypotheses development
as the interac ons with pa ent went on, which in instu onalised se ngs such as clinics, were
not given me and a en on. Some prac ces linked and harmonised well, the conscious and
subconscious mind such as mindfulness are easier to engage pa ents with - collec vely and
individually. Even for respec ve tradi ons, experiences showed that over me, disconnec ons
from one's background values and tradi ons explained later confusion while reconnec ng to same
tradi ons caused unity with the individual. Tradi onal healing was fundamentally concerned with
interpersonal interac on extending beyond the dyadic pa ent-healer rela onship to necessary
inclusion of par cular rather than human interac ons e.g., drummers, dancers, music, family.
It was an important characteris c of media on between vulnerable individuals who suﬀered at
the hands of powerful human beings. Tradi onal healing depended on the interpersonal rather
than the mechanis c, on rela on rather than technical, and typically reinforced cosmologies, in
which instrumental manipula on of naturalis c mechanisms - interac ng with all things - was
largely unknown. Also, the strong link between poor governance and mental health was never
an issue for discussion, and therefore, undermined eﬀorts in comprehensive interven ons for
pg |075

sustainable mental well-being. Such dimensions were found interes ng and eased psychotherapy
administra on and pa ent recovery away from self-defea ng professional biases that gave
limited singular approaches to interven ons. And if approaches were integrated into healing as
part of the professional service package, it would predict good sustainable mental well-being,
where vulnerability is eradicated, recovery eased and mental well-being maintained. However, an
increasingly evidence-based prac ce was promoted. Scien ﬁc evalua ons in rela on to expected
outcomes were important for the sustainability of any integra on eﬀort.
IMI AIM
IMI aimed at establishing a pool of human and ecological resources to tackle emerging mental
health complica ons, holis cally, and speciﬁcally designed to meet mental health needs of
individuals and communi es so as to transform mental health challenges, reduce vulnerability,
accelerate recovery and achieve sustainable mental well-being. Key objec ves were: to reduce
economic stress and depression and revitalize good func oning of the body and mind; to encourage
human and ecological-based health diagnosis and administra on of IMI approved medicinal herbs
and alterna ve medicine(s); to lead formula on and applica on of humanly dignifying policies
adoptable by leaders in life-threatening environments; and to inculcate ra onal understanding of
spirituality, science, and philosophy – integrated studies to provide a be er understanding of the
world we live in by everyone.
In view of the above, the Integrated Mental Health Ini a ve (IMI) carried out research on current
and persis ng human life stressors or general health problems. Through making informa on found
available to the studied communi es (concerning human and ecological safety), IMI generates
awareness around major factors for the development and persistence of mental disorders. IMI
maintains a brainstorming and consensus-building forum that helps provide answers to the everemerging human problems related to mental health. By gaining input from local communi es,
government oﬃcials, and local and interna onal health experts, the project ﬁnds appropriate
solu ons for the common good of the community. In that respect, the Integrated Mental Health
Ini a ve (IMI) set out to undertake the following ac vi es:
Current and on-going ac vi es
• Regular studies and analyses on mental health related subjects.
• Home visits and home-based care.
• Psychotherapy sessions.
• Inculca ng the discipline of mindfulness for mental development and peaceful states of the
mind and the environment
• Caregiver training.
• Community sensi sa on for mental health empowerment.
• Partnerships and collabora ons for conduc ng interven ons and resources mobilisa on.
• Forma on of community mental health clubs for self-help and self-suﬁciency .
• Capacity building for organisa ons, community leaders, teachers and parents.
• Strengthen development linkages and form aﬃlia ons for clients, supported communi es
and auxiliary mental health services reinforcers.
• Streamlining mental health prac ces among development agencies and grass root
organisa ons.
• Monitoring and learning.
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• Integra on of best prac ces in programing.
• Competency and professional development for staﬀ and updates on newly developed
psychotherapeu c programmes.
• Advocacies and campaigns to promote public mental health.
• Concepts development and partnership for development.
• Outreaches, proﬁling, research and advocacy.
• Fund-raising ac vi es – individual and ins tu onal.
• Home-based care for clients.
• Par cipa on in stakeholder fora.
• Organising professional seminars for knowledge and experience sharing.
• Speaking against injus ces that are detrimental to well-being and peace.
• Oﬀer consultancies for organisa on development and collabora on pla orm.
• Support clientèle ac vi es and businesses by buying oﬀ their products and recrui ng other
clients to sell them for a livelihood, and oﬀer free psychotherapy sessions to the aggrieved
and bereaved as a charity.
• Periodically oﬀer representa ve as guest speaker at interna onal conferences.
• Forming networks for future engagement within development work.
IMI Experience (Lessons)
The mind was the vehicle for achieving the highest of goals, including public health goals.
However, mental illness from across the globe was increasingly evident and highly contagious.
The sick and neglected environment set the stage for the trials and tribula ons. Healing needed
integra on. The macro-level condi ons provided trying moments for individuals to either be
subdued or to subdue and prevail. It was those who failed to overcome the condi ons that suﬀered
and both preven ve and healing medicines were rendered ineﬀec ve. Life a er the chronic stage
was not catered for, yet clinical condi ons were insuﬃcient without aspects of environment
and spiritual diagnosis of mental illnesses. Without dealing with macro-level condi ons, mental
healthcare was no care at all. Stronger a en on ought to focus on ins tu onal networking
and coopera on with related ins tu ons and persons combining forces to realise the project’s
goal through carrying out annual na onwide conferences on conﬂict resolu on, interna onal
rela ons and nurturing peace as gateways to human and ecological security as well as ini a ng
community-led infrastructure development to reduce vulnerability to mental dysfunc on and
create prosperity for all. Such conferences formulate adoptable guidelines, legisla ve or legal
structural designs and policies for local and interna onal managers for use in decision-making
processes. The project membership and aﬃlia ons were unlimited (consis ng of its staﬀ, hired
experts, researchers, volunteers, interns, guest speakers, collabora ng ins tu ons, etc) in nature,
since we all needed one another in the struggle for human and ecological rights and are en tled
to them. In its interven on programmes, the project has interests and undertakings in spirituality
(faiths, beliefs or religious sects); mental and general health, including socio-cultural, socioenvironmental, ecological, socio-economical, and socio-poli cal spheres for general well-being
and func oning of the communi es in their day-to-day lives. IMI project had a macro-vision of
becoming a self-sustaining organisa on in a period of ten (10) years, fully equipped to sustainably
manage resources under its supervision and monitor se ngs supported by its central fund that
funds and manages projects relevant to the aims and objec ves of IMI. There was currently
no mental health infrastructure to address the macro - psychosocial, economic, governmental,
environmental and globalisa on issues that trigger vulnerabili es or accelerate mental health
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problems. Interven ons were s ll on clinical or ins tu onal basis that oﬀered services in unreal
life situa ons that caused vulnerabili es and mental cases.
GOVERNANCE AND MENTAL HEALTH
We have ac vely been involved in faith building among voters despite their distrust for
government ins tu ons like the electoral commission. We knew those who never voted aﬀect any
li le change we would have. I pointed this through the opposi on leadership and directly to the
masses using social media, leadership and peace pla orms in Uganda and around Africa, in light
of local communi es served. We have reached out to individuals and aﬀected areas to develop
reports I can share with colleagues around the country and world. We have subsequently held
sessions to develop right development journeys for bright future. We have demys ﬁed fear for
impending crisis and focused on building hope for development and peace. We have liaised with
friends from Asia and Africa to form a pro-African pla orm for good governance, development
and peace in Africa, which we are currently working on.
Through IMI, we demys ﬁed non-par cipa on in governance, to ill the service gap in the
mental health sector and support suﬀerers and their families to sustainable well-being, which
was an abandoned and neglected sector. We reconstruct poten ally vic mising statements given
by leaders and inﬂuen al people to be shunned and jus fy struggles for good governance as
reciprocal to community well-being; help the youth to rediscover their poten al, to cope and
exercise resilience in the face of adversity un l a me when maladministra ons and poor
governance systems collapse unsupported. In other words, the youths recover and are able to
exercise resilience by adop ng private business ventures that detach them from the ill eﬀects of
poor governance as they denounce corrupt regime, rather than give in to subsistence abuse and
hopelessness. This keeps the youth in endless struggles for be er livelihoods and good governance,
which constantly reﬂects their well-being. In the last general elec ons, we managed to encourage
and model ac vi es that promote par cipa on in na onal elec ons as either voter or candidate.
But even with the injus ces and fraudulent elec ons that characterised the elec ons, we are
helping to sustain the hope through ac ons that disassociate the people with an -people ventures
of government, recognise legi macy, and keep the spirit of the struggle for legi mate leadership
and be er governance high. It is from here that Ugandans can be assured of peace, rather than
employ repressive ac ons and oppression as the means to achieve it and consider the absence of
counter physical violence as peace - as many believe. We con nue to make it clear to the public
that, there can be no peace under state repression, corrup on, illegi mate rule, unjust jus ce
systems, unemployment, famine, poor health of Ugandans, poor infrastructure, poor livelihoods,
and aliena on of the popula on. People are not peaceful in these states, whether there are bullet
sounds and bullet deaths or not. That too, is a ma er of me.
SUSTAINABILITY STRATEGY AND LESSONS
•
•
•
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Community ownership and mainstreaming mental health services in the main vessel of health
care delivery.
Representa on of mental health concerns in key areas of health administra on and policy
formula on.
Forma on of mental health clubs and associa ons - with which to build capacity and help
reduce pressure on exis ng manpower while helping to reduce adverse impact caused

•

•

•
•

•

by mental poor health - characterising violence, abuse and neglect of family and social
responsibili es.
Integrate major predisposing factors to mental illnesses such as human rights abuses,
environmental degrada on, ignorance and poor socio-economic environment, to lessen
vulnerability and promote economic and general mental well-being.
Beneﬁciaries will be grouped in viable economic forces to gain economic, social and
par cipa on power so as to recover fully from economic and psychological depression - in
addi on to strengthening mental abili es to adjust towards and forth from any degree of
depression (Mental health empowerment).
A er working for the parent organisa on, they are graduated to manage their own businesses
with minimal supervision.
The IMI con nues to thrive from the shared resources to run organisa ons projects further
ahead with remits from its internal investments built from the tapping of mighty talents and
skills of its clients.
We align them with the organisa on report and share with stakeholders, design new projects
based on the insights got, and conduct research or write papers to gain wider understanding
and conclusions on those insights so that they can be used to help others or ill development
gaps.

REPLICABILITY
• A er three years of clients working with IMI, they are prepared to enter a one-year transi on
into gaining administra ve independence so that they can run and thrive on their own using the
proceeds gained from working for the parent organisa on (IMI) plus a booster grant of 500USD
- given to them.
• First by widening resource base through renewable resource strategy, direct engagement with
poten al funding, u liza on of local engagement to raise resources for self-help, and investment
in its accumulated assets for sustainable revenue and self-funding as well as maximize private
consulta ons. In line with increased resource base, the organisa on, which now operates at a
district level, will ini alize country-wide, regional, inter-regional, and global mental health
facili es for it service and products u liza on.
Best prac ces:
• Improve oﬃce infrastructure,
• Support sessions so that we do not have to charge fees to needy clients,
• Reach out to communi es who cannot make it to our oﬃces,
• Provide free food and clothing to beneﬁciaries,
• Support self-sustenance of our beneﬁciaries,
• Provide basic literacy training to children and youth,
• Support mental empowerment programme for our beneﬁciaries - including youths, parents
and local leaders.
WAY FORWARD
Future IMI will provide the entrance for sustained healing and also empower aﬀected individuals
to cope with the wider worldly challenges, brave the test, ind mechanisms for problem solving
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and overcoming them so that they emerge victorious, happy and mentally well. IMI in its response
relishes mul -systemic and mul -ideological strategies to transform aﬄic ons of individuals,
groups, communi es, na onals, and regions into drivers of mental and general well-being.
Without such amount of leadership that rallies forces and professional responses towards social,
economic, governmental and individual aﬄic ons, communi es like any other organism will
endlessly be threatened by misery and extermina on from life while adding more pressure to
already vulnerable sec ons of society that are unable to cope with macro development pressures
and overcome them in order to be mentally well. This is with established comprehensive mental
healing infrastructure under IMI that, a er chronic stages of mental illness, caregivers are
supported, the community is prepared on how best to relate with vulnerable members, leadership
is lobbied to allocate resources, vulnerable communi es are supported with physical and spiritual
needs with es to mental illness as well as mental and skills training for vulnerable sec ons of
the community.
A $200,000 USD budget will be needed as basic fund for IMI infrastructure. However, speciﬁc
programmes and ac vi es a ract funding of between $1500.00 USD and $50000.00 USD from
direct and indirect funding arrangements – to address current and priority community needs.
Generally, the project is a mul -stake type that integrates the diﬀerent societal forces capable of
helping to create a change in people’s lives. Account Number 6004667822 Barclay's Bank, Jinja
Branch, Uganda.
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Radio Micah was launched in Lomé on May 1, 2015 by its founder, Mr. A vi, Okey to broadcast
programmes to listeners online with the goal of transmi ng content about Togolese agriculture
on the airwaves and thereby increasing the visibility of the work performed by the community,
various supervisory authori es, na onal and interna onal organisa ons. The company MICAH
FARM S.A.S recognized and responded to the need for a suitable communica on medium,
resul ng in the birth of Radio Micah. The inten ons behind the crea on of Radio Micah can be
summarised in the following statements:
•

Radio Micah, the Farmer’s Voice, is an ini a ve of the MICAH FARM S.A.S agricultural
society, which works in the produc on, promo onal and distribu on sectors of agriculture,
dealing with agricultural products, breeding, farms, and the impor ng and expor ng of
commodi es.

•

Radio Micah is the voice of the agriculturalist and a dynamic website containing both wri en
and audio-visual informa on.

•

Radio Micah, the Farmer’s Voice, presents programming in French, English, and various
indigenous languages of Togo, such as Ewé, Kabyè, etc. Broadcas ng from our website, www.
radiomicah.com, and from our Android app, we discuss issues of interest and importance to
farmers, as well as ma ers pertaining to our organisa on.

Conscious of the fact that our African homelands cannot experience development without
par cular emphasis being placed on agriculture, the Togolese people launched the Na onal
Agricultural Investment and Food Security Programme (Programme Na onal d’Inves ssement
Agricole et de Sécurité Alimentaire, or PNIASA) in 2011. Its areas of focus are threefold, namely
the crea on, distribu on, and adapta on of technologies which could have a signiﬁcant impact
on three subsectors of the agricultural industry: plant, animal, and ish produc on. Enthusias c
and suppor ve towards this undertaking, and indeed Togolese agriculture in general, Radio
Micah wishes to shine a spotlight on PNIASA and serve as a medium of communica on for
all par cipants therein. Speciﬁcally, our vision is to create a forum where all players in African
agriculture can exchange their views, share their experiences, and suggest improvements. The
vision of the Farmer’s Voice, according to its founder, Mr. A vi, Okey is thus:
“We intend
to impact the agricultural industry through our radio programmes. Our repor ng is meant to
vitalize this growing sector and involve African youth at the centre of it.” At present, Radio
Micah has two studios. One, in Lomé, houses its produc on studio, where the network’s content
is created, while another in Canada hosts a team of dynamic, young anchors and correspondents
on the North American con nent.
Radio Micah, the Farmer’s Voice seeks to be a leader in informa on technology and heighten
public awareness on agricultural ma ers. Our ambi on for the future is to expand the scope of our
coverage, educa ng more and more people by reaching out on the FM airwaves and by satellite.
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ABSTRACT
It is common knowledge that the success of an economy rests on the strength of its entrepreneurs.
Present-day challenges make it impera ve for countries in the same bracket as Nigeria to deemphasize reliance on oil and government for social crumbs, to embrace innova ve ac vi es and
deepen small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs). SMEs are important drivers of economic
growth but they face signiﬁcant challenges as obtained in Nigeria where infrastructures such as
power, transporta on and ﬁnancing needed to make entrepreneurship work seldom exists. With
a high unemployment rate, young Nigerians are required to embrace entrepreneurship. The aim
of this paper is to present the Nigerian entrepreneur within the country’s challenging business
environment as a true deﬁni on of an entrepreneur despite the general deﬁni on. We presented
a set of ques ons and gathered feedback through a set of ques onnaires administered using
purposive sampling on 6 trade associa ons in Iwo Town, Osun state, Nigeria.
INTRODUCTION
Nigeria is the largest economy in Africa, a laudable feat going by its popula on of over 179
million people (WPR, 2016), not considering the country's lower per capita income and monoeconomy dependent on importa on.
The country has the resources necessary to make its economy great: a large expanse of arable
land that supports agriculture, a large market from within and without and communi es that team
up with each other for communal economic development.
With its huge popula on, Nigeria boasts of huge human capital, accoun ng for 15 % of the
con nent's popula on, 11 % of its output and 16 % of the foreign reserves, with phenomenal
dominance in West Africa to include half of the sub-region's popula on and 70 % of its output.
Nigeria's human and non-human resources help Africa and the greater world by providing
economic aid to Africa, poli cal resolu on of crises across the con nent, skills, and technical aid
to countries in need in diverse sectors of the society. The na on's human resource endowment is
such that one in ive Africans is a Nigerian.
The country is the largest economy on the con nent with an annual gross domes c product (GDP)
of $509.9 billion USD. It is the 13th largest oil producer in the world with 32 billion barrels of
oil reserves, enough for 37 years (Bri sh Broadcas ng Corpora on, 2014). The country's gas
reserves, going by the 2005 es mates, will last for 110 years at the current rates of usage (Oloja
& Oretade, 2006). Some developed countries opposed debt relief for the country in 2005 ci ng
the above.
Nigeria has abundant solid mineral deposits including coal, n ore, gold, gemstones, marble,
uranium, salt, soda, and sulphur (Na onal Planning Commission, 2004). The country earned
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N300 billion (Nigerian naira) from oil exports between 1970 and 2000. With these natural and
other resource endowments, Nigeria has the poten al to sustain its status as Africa’s largest
economy and a major player in the global economy, yet the country is wan ng.
The economic development status of Nigeria in the midst of these resources perplexes many. For
example, in the build-up to nego a ons with the country's interna onal creditors on pardoning
the country's debt in 2005, many of the creditor countries opposed Nigeria receiving debt pardon
ci ng its vast resources. Hence, the need for another golden nest away from oil, to be found in
entrepreneurship and SMEs.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ITS CONCEPTUALIZATION
An entrepreneur is a person who manages and takes business decisions. He/she innovates, comes
up with ideas, iden ﬁes opportuni es, seeks ﬁnance and strives to succeed. He/she decides what
to produce, how to produce and for whom to produce, to make a proﬁt.
Shane (2003) deﬁnes entrepreneurship as an act of being an entrepreneur, or someone who
undertakes innova ons, ﬁnance and business in an eﬀort to transform innova ons into economic
goods. This can be internal expansion otherwise called intra-preneurship or new venturing
altogether.
T he se ng of entrepreneurship is two-faced: the internal environment (psychological traits
such as an entrepreneurial person being recognisable by his personal a ributes) and the external
environment (the pla orm and characteris cs on which the ac vi es of the entrepreneur takes
place). Three major ac vi es of entrepreneurship are discovery (of opportuni es and ideas),
inves ng (pu ng to use of any or all available resources) and taking decisions (the use of the
resources including resource alloca on and risk-taking). The entrepreneur is the heart and brain
of the business. He has all the units and departments in him alone. He knows where he wants to
be and decides when, how and some mes, if he wants to get there.
The vast majority of developed and developing countries rely on dynamic, resourceful and risktaking entrepreneurs to trigger and sustain economic growth. In economic development, SMEs
play an important role. Characteris cs such as endurance, compe on and entrepreneurship,
have external beneﬁts to the economy besides eﬃciency and growth in produc vity. Advocates
of SMEs support claims that they are generally more produc ve than larger irms.
Another argument further states that SMEs’ expansion boosts employment more than large
ﬁrms' growth because SMEs are more labour-intensive. This may mean that subsidising SMEs
can represent a poverty allevia on tools. By promo ng SMEs, individual countries and the
interna onal community at large can make progress towards the main goal of reducing poverty.
Entrepreneurial development is important to the Nigerian economy which is characterised by
heavy dependence on oil, low agricultural produc on, high unemployment rate, low use of
industrial capacity, high inﬂa on rate and lack of industrial infrastructural base. These constraints
can also limit the rate of growth of entrepreneurial ac vi es in Nigeria.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP CHALLENGES IN NIGERIA
The challenges faced by entrepreneurs are the same faced by established Tier-2 businesses. Chief
among the challenges is corrup on, regulatory bo lenecks, access to credits or loans, power,
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transporta on problems, infrastructure and market access.
The ‘Doing Business’ report is based on the regulatory environment of business, measuring the
economies of countries from many areas of the life of a business. The focus is on regulatory
constraints for businesses. Crea ng a regulatory pla orm that allows entrepreneurship to blossom
has huge posi ve impact on job crea on and the economy.
Table 1: 2015 GDP and Doing Business Ranking, 2016
Country
GDP (billion US $)

Nigeria

South Africa

Egypt

Ghana

Libya

Angola

Kenya

594.3

341.2

275.7

50.0

67.6

129.8

56.3

Global Ease of Doing
Business

169

73

131

114

188

181

108

Star ng a Business

26

17

3

13

18

27

31

Dealing with
Construc on Permits

40

10

12

23

19

13

28

Ge ng Electricity

41

31

18

9

15

29

12

Registering Property

46

11

15

5

20

38

17

Ge ng Credit

7

7

1

4

18

45

3

Paying Taxes

41

2

18

15

19

23

11

Trading Across
Borders

42

21

14

36

9

41

22

Enforcing Contracts

25

16

18

14

16

47

9

Source: World Bank Group (2016); Africaranking.com
Let us discuss the ‘Doing Business 2016’ data from the World Bank economic ranking. The
data highlights the country’s business environment deﬁned as ease of doing business with key
indices like star ng a business, ge ng electricity, ge ng credit (loan), and trading across borders
(interna onal trade) as key focus (see Table 1). Nigeria has not fared be er than a smaller country
like Ghana.
Primary data was developed from modiﬁed ‘Doing Business’ indices and data collected using
purposive sampling with ques onnaires administered on members of 5 trading and business
associa ons in Iwo Town of Osun state, Nigeria. Find the summary of key ques ons and responses
in Table 2. The ques ons are based on the World Bank’s Doing Business indices.
The indices by which data is collected from members of the trade associa ons is deﬁned with
reference to the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ indices as follows.
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1.

Star ng a business: Referring to the ease of star ng a business by an entrepreneur. This also
involves third-party (family, friends, public or government) support, the ease of business
names registra on or incorpora on of new companies and access to business support
services.

2.

Obtaining business permits: This has to do with the ease of ge ng business licence,
regulatory and professional permits. It also tends towards enforcing legality and quality of
the products and services oﬀered.

3.

Access to electricity: This refers to reliability, adequacy, aﬀordability and transparency.

4.

Registering business property or obtaining a cer ﬁcate of occupancy: This means ge ng
a proper trading outlet. Access to credits is o en predicated on collateral with both
commercial and microﬁnance banks. With the clog created by the Land Use Act of 1978
and considering the expensive fees, registering of landed proper es is complex and almost
impossible.

5.

Ge ng credit/loan: This has to do with access to ﬁnancial supports for businesses from
banks in par cular.

6.

Public economics and policies: This refers to the extent to which government agencies,
their ac ons and policies aﬀect business opera ons. Worthy of a en on are levies, taxes
and public ﬁnance which includes injec on of funds into the local economy through regular
and adequate payment of salaries, pensions, etc.

7.

Trading across borders: Deﬁned with regards to interna onal trade-related policies like
foreign trade, foreign exchange policies and processes issued by government agencies.

8.

Enforcing the law and contracts: This refers to the strength of the rule of law in taking its
course in the disposi on of jus ce par cularly on business transac ons.

9.

Access to knowledge and skills supports: This is explained with regard to access to
knowledge and informa on as well as skills necessary to equip the entrepreneur for a
successful start-up. This is about addressing skills' shortage.

10. Road and other infrastructure: This refers to the availability of good roads and proper transport
systems that are eﬃcient for business transac ons. It also includes telecommunica ons and
other social ameni es that will aid business success.
Table 2 shows data collected in a survey of ive trading operators in Iwo Town, Osun state,
Nigeria. Over 50 members of each associa on took part in the survey, giving group answers.
Ques ons documented by each indicator are asked in the posi ve while respondents answer YES
or NO. For example, ques on starts like “Is it easy…?” The percentage of YES responses to the
total respondents appears on the table. The data collected is also presented in table 2.
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CONCLUSION

Considering the country's economy and the fact that the world is currently in regression, the
Nigerian entrepreneur is a goal ge er and risk-taker. And if entrepreneurs, amidst challenges
become proac ve, develop a sense of survival and seek deeper dimensions to the obstacles
highlighted in Table 2, their success is a given.
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22
15
45

14
46
12
33
5

n/r

Obtaining business
permits

Access to
electricity

Ge ng a business
outlet / registering
property /
obtaining C of O

Ge ng credits /
loans

Public economics
and policies

Trading across
borders

Enforcing the law
and contracts

Access to
knowledge & skills
support

Road and other
infrastructure

n/r

56

21

n/r

66

9

14

7

35

12

Computer
services
operators

77

21

8

n/r

71

2

82

n/r

60

25

Motorbike
operators

Source: Author; n/r – not required to operate the business

17

Mobile phone
operators /
sellers

Star ng a business

Country

85

69

91

n/r

11

73

35

n/r

89

5

Cement
sellers

96

68

46

n/r

16

51

48

2

44

23

Cold ﬁsh
sellers

Table 2: Survey of Associa ons on the Nigerian Environment of Business (in %)

98

86

98

n/r

82

49

95

9

98

32

Agriculture
(farming,
poultry, etc.)

89

50.8

49.5

12

48.67

33

53.17

8.25

58

19

Average
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ABSTRACT
This paper looks at why it is necessary for churches to take part in the response to sexual and
gender-based violence within the African context. As a star ng point, it is necessary to discuss
the nature of inﬂuence that religion has on the society. The discussion focuses on understanding
religion as a coping mechanism for stress. A en on is then turned to the context of the Chris an
faith and available theological frameworks that can be a basis for response to sexual violence.
The last part of this paper looks at the ability of the Chris an church to mobilise communi es
and harness a wide geographic footprint to create a sustainable response to sexual violence within
communi es. The paper concludes with a few recommenda ons targeted at policy makers and
church leadership on developing responses to sexual violence within communi es.
RELIGIOUS RESPONSE TO SEXUAL VIOLENCE: A BLACK THEOLOGY
PERSPECTIVE
Before we delve deep into the above outline, let us ﬁrst conﬁne our discussion to a concise meaning
of the term sexual violence. The concept of sexual violence is one that is o en diﬃcult to pin
down to one deﬁni on and is o en misunderstood (Bradford, 2006). One cause for this diﬃculty
is that several schools of thought deﬁne the concept diﬀerently. Psychiatry and psychology look
at it as a behavioural disorder and deﬁne it within that framework. In the ﬁeld of law, it is viewed
from a perspec ve of social norms and legal principles. The World Health Organisa on (WHO)
deﬁnes sexual violence as: “ Any sexual act, a empt to obtain a sexual act, unwanted sexual
comments or advances, or acts to traﬃc, or otherwise directed, against a person’s sexuality using
coercion, by any person regardless of their rela onship to the vic m, in any se ng, including but
not limited to home and work. Coercion can cover a whole spectrum of degrees” (WHO, 2002).
It is regarded as the broad range of violent sexual behaviours that ranges from minor sexual
deviant behaviours to sexual homicides (Bradford, 2006). Sexual violence is regarded as a
spectrum of non-consensual sexual experiences, the most common one being that of rape (Brown
et al., 2006). The key elements of sexual violence include the absence of consent and the varying
nature of the ac ons that can be ﬁ ed into this deﬁni on. This gives us a clearer understanding
of the concept of sexual violence. Now we can look at the inﬂuence of religion and its uses as a
way to cope with life stress.
Reports state that 796 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa, out of 822 million, claim associa on
to some religious group, be it as an adherent or an ac ve member within that group (Pew Research
Center, 2015). Africa is, by no stretch of imagina on, a highly religious society. It is interes ng
to note the inﬂuence that religion has within any society. In this paper, the area of focus will be
to explore the eﬀects of religion in rela on to coping with life stress.
pg |088

Religion serves as a framework by which life events are understood and interpreted within the
African context (Mbi , 1969). An individual’s religious belief systems operate as the lens through
which the reali es of everyday life are perceived and interpreted (Silberman, 2005). What this
suggests is that any explana on of events is supported by a certain worldview. According to this
view, religion oﬀers its congregants a coherent belief system that gives meaning to the world.
Silberman argues that, much like any other meaning-making system, religion can inﬂuence the
formula on of goals for self-regula on, aﬀect emo ons and inﬂuence behaviour (Silberman,
2005). Religion is at the epicentre of an immense web of beliefs, a tudes and feelings that form
a worldview (Co ngham, 2003). There are varie es in worldviews and the African context has
its own worldview through which events are understood. The African view interprets reality as a
closed system where everything hangs together, with changes aﬀec ng all aspects of the en re
system (Van Der Merwe, 2008). Within the African worldview the metaphysical, as represented
by God and the ancestors, has a direct link to the physical manifesta on of life experienced by
humanity and the rest of nature.
In the Western worldview, religion is also a means of interpreta on of the experiences
of life events. Within the western view, this is known as religious coping. Religious coping
is understood as being the use of cogni ve or behavioural techniques that emanate out of an
individual’s spirituality when an individual is confronted with life stress (Tix and Frazier, 1998).
A characteris c of religious coping is that it provides a signiﬁcant end and meaning to events that
are stressful (Pargament et al., 1999). It is viewed as the quest for purpose, emo onal comfort,
personal control and in macy with others using one’s spirituality and religious beliefs rela ng to
stressful life events. Pargament et. al. argued that the most common use of religious coping takes
place within the most disenfranchised sectors of society.
There is an ever-increasing body of empirical studies that have looked at religious coping and its
eﬀects in mi ga ng life stress. Some studies have looked at the short-term eﬀects of religious
coping and others the long-term eﬀects. In a 2005 study that looked at the how religious meaning
can inﬂuence the coping process in bereaved college students in America, evidence showed
that religion can serve as a framework through which the bereaved can reframe their loss, look
for more non-threatening interpreta ons, ﬁnd coping resources, and iden fy areas of personal
growth (Park, 2005).
Research also suggests that sexual vic misa on has nega ve eﬀects on an individual’s trust
of others in society (Tamburello et. al., 2014). In this context, trust is used to mean a default
expecta on of others’ goodwill. He further suggests that the regular a endance of religious
services weakened the nega ve eﬀects that sexual vic misa on has on trust in individuals (Ibid,
592). There is a body of evidence that proves that religion has the capability of shaping the
lens through which individuals view their world. In stressful life events, religion can also be an
an dote.
The signiﬁcance of religion is not only on individuals but also on society (Silberman, 2005).
The centrality of religion in modern day society is one that cannot be underplayed. There is no
doubt that within the Western worldview, Chris anity is one of the most dominant religions.
It then becomes important that we understand Chris an texts and how their interpreta on has
implica ons on our experience of the world. These interpreta ons of Chris an texts are used
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to create various theological frameworks. The theological frameworks that result from various
interpreta ons of Chris an texts become the theological founda ons upon which churches across
the world anchor their ac ons.
Mosala argues that biblical appropria ons and interpreta ons are always framed by the social
and cultural loca ons and commitments of those who do them (Mosala, 1989). Inherent in that
idea is the no on that there are always biblical appropria ons and interpreta ons that are being
made. Within the Chris an tradi on, there are many theological frameworks that exist but the
one that will be our focus will be that of Black theology of libera on. Moreso, the focus is on
the relevance of black theology of libera on as a theological framework within the Chris an
tradi on that can serve as a founda onal basis for ac on against sexual violence.
It is necessary to look at black theology within its proper context if we are to get a full understanding
of what black theology is. The emerging of black theology came around the 1960s in America
during the civil rights movement. Wri ngs of James Cone such as “Black theology and black
power”, published in 1968, are amongst some of the most inﬂuen al wri ngs that popularised
the prophe c voice of ﬁgures such as Mar n Luther King Jnr and Malcolm X, cri cs of racism
(Mtshiselwa, 2015).
Black theology arose out of the suﬀering of black people in the United States of America and is
anchored on the idea that any exposi on of the Gospel of Jesus Christ that omits God’s libera on
of the poor is not a true exposi on (Cone, 2010). In South Africa, the idea took form during the
same me that the philosophy of black consciousness was taking root in the country. One cannot
talk of black theology without referring to the philosophy of black consciousness (Mtshiselwa,
2015). Within the South African context, black theology emerged from the oppression of the
apartheid regime. What is evident is that the theology was born in the face of oppression.
Black theology is a cultural tool born out of the struggle of black people that seeks to break
the silence of Chris an theology on the oppression of black people (Mosala, 1989). Black, in
this context referring to those people that Boaventura de Sousa Santos classifies as nonexistent.
"Nonexistent is to exist without any relevant or comprehensible way of being " (Santos, 2007).
Black theology is a theology of libera on which reﬂects upon the socio-economic, ecclesias cal
and poli cal reali es of the people in the African context (Muzorewa, 1989). It is deemed to be an
a empt at presen ng the Chris an gospel to the black man with all its libera ng power (Gqubule,
1974). As a model of theology, black theology is entrenched in the actuali es of oppression
(Vellem, 2015). What sets apart this framework of theology from other forms of theology is that
the interlocutor of black theology is the “nonexistent”. It is a counter-cultural form of theology
that brings to the fore the lived experiences of the marginalised people in the society and seeks to
use its interpreta on of the Bible as a tool of libera on for such classes of people.
The rise of black theology out of a context of suﬀering and oppression makes it, as a theological
framework, much more sensi ve to the struggles of people across the world irrespec ve of the
type of struggle. The manner in which black theology has found root in diﬀerent parts of the
globe such as La n America, North America, the Caribbean and Africa illustrates how people
with diﬀerent struggles have found a voice within this theological framework. Sexual violence is
highly prevalent in the African contexts and those that are mainly at the receiving end are women
and children (Kilonzo et al. 2013). It is within a theological framework such as black theology
that voices of marginalised women and children can find ediﬁca on.
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Black theology's presence, therefore, suggests that within the Chris an tradi on there is a
theological framework that can be a founda onal basis to build upon a response to sexual violence
within the African context. A theological framework upon which a response can be built is not the
only reason to encourage churches to respond to sexual violence. Kilonzo et. al. suggest that if
responses to sexual violence are to be eﬀec ve, they need to be community driven (Ibid: 5). The
responses need a mul -faceted approach along the preven on-treatment con nuum (Magner et.
al., 2015).
Churches are the best places to use educa on to arouse dialogue on sexual violence as a way
of crea ng awareness of the issue within their local context. These religious ins tu ons are
nodal points that need to be harnessed to educate and transform social a tudes towards sexual
violence. " The use of religious spaces, as a whole, has not been properly examined by policy
makers and neglects the sheer inﬂuence that religious communi es have within the African
con nent." (Tearfund, 2013). A unique vantage point that churches have is that they are present at
the local level and command respect within the communi es they serve (LeRoux, 2015). Another
key considera on is that the church has an ability to mobilise local communi es that cannot
be matched. In 1986 the Free Methodist Church in Congo (DRC) embarked on mobilising the
communi es they operate from to build schools. Within less than four years the church mobilised
29 churches to build 15 schools across the Democra c Republic of Congo (Tearfund, 2010).
The response of the Ecumenical movement in South Africa and its resistance to apartheid
illustrates the ability of the church to mobilise communi es (Khumalo, 2009). It is evident that
government and organisa ons cannot match the church's presence in communi es. Coupled with
that presence is the ability to mobilise people and devoted members making it fer le ground in
which responses to sexual violence can be planted and rooted.
We have seen that religion has an ability to negate the eﬀects of life's stress to its membership
and acts a coping mechanism in the face of stress as a response to sexual violence. Further
to that, within the Chris an context, it is necessary to have a theological framework upon
which responses to sexual violence can be anchored. Black theology of libera on can be such
a theological framework. The church has a footprint in every community that enables it to
reach grassroots level, yet it operates at varying levels. This footprint coupled with its ability to
mobilise communi es makes it well placed to respond to sexual violence. One may even stretch
the argument to say that the church is located strategically to further the African development
agenda. If the church is to be useful in responding to sexual violence, several things need to
happen.
1. At policy formula on stage, policymakers need to ensure that faith-based organisa ons are
an integral part of the policy-making. There is a need to ensure that faith-based organisa ons
such as churches are also an integral part of policy implementa on regarding sexual violence
due to their access to communi es.
2. Churches need to show more interest to capacitate their membership on sexual violence and
train their leadership on the issues that face the African context and how best to respond to
the challenges of the African context.
3. There is need for a mul -stakeholder approach towards responding to sexual violence that
also takes into cognizance the value faith-based communi es bring into that discussion.
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ABSTRACT
The world is on a quest to achieve United Na ons Sustainable Development Goal 5 (SDG5),
which seeks to promote gender equality and empowerment of women and girls. Women have
been oppressed over me in most socie es. Sta s cs con nue to project increasing rates of
various acts of gender based violence such as domes c violence, sexual violence, cultural and
economic abuse and so on. These acts of abuse are accelerated by several factors per nent to our
social systems such as culture, patriarchy and the Law. Using Kenya as a case study, this paper
examines how these three factors contribute to diﬀeren al gender treatment. The purpose is to
inform on the extent to which the welfare of African women has been compromised by the law,
culture and patriarchy, to ﬁnd relevant long-term solu ons to curb further degrada on of women
in Africa and subsequently, achieve SDG5.
ISSUES
The following issues shall be discussed in this paper:
1. Culture
2. Women and poli cs
3. Family Law (marriage and divorce)
4. Property ownership
5. Domes c violence
6. Female genital mu la on (FGM)
7. Sexual inequality

INTRODUCTION
Culture largely deﬁnes behaviour and prac ces of any African society. The do’s and don’ts of
the female gender are to a large extent, dictated and directed by the prac ces of society during
a par cular period, either adop ng what was done from me immemorial or the current norm.
This has created stereotypes that are gendered in nature, such as to adversely aﬀect the human,
economic, civil and poli cal rights of women. For instance, few women opt to vie for elec ve
posi ons in government because of the misguided percep on that such opportuni es are reserved
for their male counterparts, who were tradi onally the chiefs and clan elders. Customs and
prac ces of the people are subsequently considered as one of the sources of Law, which is created
by enac ng of statutes by the same male-dominated Parliament. Loopholes in legisla on have in
some cases, failed to protect women from gender based violence or provide adequate jus ce in
family disputes.
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However, progress has been witnessed by amendment of legisla on and enactment of statutes
that curb barbaric cultural prac ces and uphold the welfare of women in various situa ons that
previously were gender discriminatory and oppressive.
1. CULTURE HAS CREATED A PRISON ENVIRONMENT FOR WOMEN
Culture and tradi on greatly inﬂuence the family system in Kenya. Our society is patriarchal and
is known for its history of oppressing women. Many women surrender their power and human
rights and remain prisoners of the society (Engels, 1972).
Feminists and women empowerment ac vists have contested that women are yet to get the credit
they deserve for their important role in the family and society. According to Cain, " …the category
‘woman’ has not so much been wrongly deﬁned by men, as it has been ignored and undervalued.
Yes, women are nurturing. Yes, women value personal rela onships. These a ributes are to be
valued” (Cain, 1990, p.836).
An African saying goes, " The place of a woman is in the Kitchen." This is the conven onal role of
the woman; to be a good wife, to take care of the children, to be caring, forgiving and sacriﬁcing
(Kabira & Muthoni, 1994). Most men will propose that good wives are the ones who hold families
together, are not ambi ous or interested in poli cs, are hardworking and submissive. They should
stay at home to love, obey and care for their husbands. Even when husbands are unfaithful, it is
because their wives have neglected them. At work, they refuse to apply for posi ons because it is
not feminine to look ambi ous. A woman should only be seen and not heard.(Kabira & Muthoni,
1994).
2. WOMEN AND POLITICS
All kinds of contradictory statements are given when a woman shows an interest in poli cs. We
hear women being told:
•
•
•
•

"You are divorced. You cannot maintain a household, much less a Cons tuency."
"You are married, steer clear of poli cs."
"You have not gone to school; your opinion is not relevant."
"You are educated; you do not understand our women at the grassroots."

It is unfortunate that such cultural idiosyncrasies are assimilated into our mindsets so much as to
inﬂuence how both men and women exercise their vo ng rights.
Radical feminists agree that women are subject to male poli cal domina on, as Catherine A.
MacKinnon (1989) puts it, “ The state is male jurispruden ally: meaning that it adopts the
standpoint of male power on the rela on between law and society… those who have freedoms
like equality, liberty, privacy and speech socially keep them legally free of government intrusion.
No one who does not have them socially is granted them legally. ”
The Cons tu on of Kenya, 2010 a empts to tackle gender equality in poli cs. Ar cle 81(b)
provides that not more than two-thirds of the members of elec ve public bodies shall be of the
same gender. To give eﬀect to this, Ar cle 97(1) (b) creates in the Na onal Assembly, posi ons
for forty-seven women, each elected by the registered voters of the coun es, each county making
up a single-member cons tuency.
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However, the reality is that gender equality is far from being achieved in poli cs. A Gender
Bill introduced to the Na onal Assembly, to give eﬀect to Ar cle 27 of the Cons tu on, which
seeks to promote aﬃrma ve ac on mechanisms that ensure that not more than two-thirds of
the members in elec ve and appoin ve bodies shall be of the same gender, was rejected. The
Gender Bill was debated upon in early May, 2016 at the Na onal Assembly. Out of the 199
members present, 178 objected to it. The general feeling among male members of parliament was
an interpreta on that it was a move to give ‘free’ seats to women.
In the mean me, any issues pertaining to women that are raised are either ignored, debated and
not acted upon, legislated but not implemented, given low priority, misinterpreted as destroying
our tradi ons and culture and most o en, they do not even pass to law as they are rejected by the
majority of the Members of Parliament who are men.
3. FAMILY LAW (MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE)
Feminists propound that the structuring of the law itself is a reason for gender inequality. Family
and matrimonial issues con nue to be approached from a gendered perspec ve.
According to tradi onal African society, culture ruled that property should be owned by the
husband in marriage. The place of women in society was to maintain a family and raise children.
In divorce cases, the insistence on dividing property according to contribu on has in many
instances, failed to protect women who are housewives and whose contribu ons are not monetary
yet who work so hard to keep their families intact while their husbands go to work.
Before the enactment of the Matrimonial Property of 2013, Sec on 17 of the Married Women's
Property Act (MWPA) of 1882 (now repealed) was used to divide matrimonial property in divorce
cases. It was ﬁrst applied in Kenya in the case of I vs I (1970), as a statute of general applica on.
Such a statute can only be applied if there is no other wri en law to that eﬀect and in so far as the
circumstances of Kenya and its inhabitants permit, according to sec on 3 of the Judicature Act
(Chapter 8, Laws of Kenya). It states: " In any dispute between husband and wife as to the tle
or possession of property, either of them may apply to the High Court... and the judge may make
such order with respect to property in dispute... as he thinks it. " (ibid).
Kenyan courts have innova vely interpreted sec on 17 of the MWPA to develop jurispudence in
the division of matrimonial property (Baraza, 2009). The problem is that sec on 17 was applied
inconsistently by case law, o en to the detriment of women. In the Kenyan case of Karanja vs
Karanja (1976), the wife alleged she had contributed money to the purchase of their matrimonial
property, which included a matrimonial home but the husband evicted her from their home. The
court awarded her only a third of the property while the husband remained in the matrimonial
home.
It is also important to note that housewives are not the only women vulnerable to economic
domina on and exploita on by their husbands. Elite women may also be oppressed in other
non-cultural ways. For example, many working women take loans to purchase property to be
registered in their husbands’ names or buy cars for their husbands while they go to work by bus
(Kabira and Muthoni, 1994). The reason is simply because of the cultural ideologies entrenched
in our society that a man should be 'seen' as the one who is doing economically be er than his
wife. Neither educa on nor the law can fully erase this tradi onal mindset.
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Ar cle 45(3) of The Cons tu on of Kenya (2010) is a great milestone as it tries to cure the defect
of sec on 17 of the MWPA. It states; " Par es to a marriage are en tled to equal rights at the
me of the marriage, during the marriage and at the dissolu on of the marriage." (COK, Art 45).
The Matrimonial Property Act however provides for the division of matrimonial property on
the basis of contribu on, which contradicts the cons tu onal right to equality in marriage.
To remedy this, courts have construed the meaning of contribu on to matrimonial property to
include contribu on in both monetary and non-monetary terms. For instance, the holding in
Kivuitu vs Kivuitu (1997) suggests that par cipa on of a wife in managing the famiy aﬀairs is
suﬃcient contribu on (Baraza, 2009). However, strict evidence has to be adduced to convince
the court to adopt such posi on, hence the assump on that neither party is an 'automa c asset' to
the matrimonial property un l the value of their contribu on is proven.
4.

PROPERTY OWNERSHIP

Ar cle 40 of the Cons tu on provides that every person has the right to own property. Under all
customary law, property, land in par cular, could only be possessed by men. Women could not
own property as they were also considered property. The inequality has been reﬂected in divorce
and succession disputes, many of which were se led by clan elders. Kenya's Cons tu on and the
Law of Succession now protects women from customary depriva on of property rights.
The Law of Succession Act, which is the main legisla on in succession ma ers, does not
discriminate against children as any child of the deceased is en tled to inherit, whether male or
female. This posi on has been upheld by the Cons tu on which invalidates any customary law
inconsistent with the Cons tu on.
5.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

Domes c and family violence occurs when someone in an in mate or familial rela onship
a empts to gain and/or maintain power and control over another through a wide range of abusive
behaviours. Abuse may be demonstrated by a single act as well as several acts that form a pa ern,
even though some or all of those acts, when viewed in isola on, may seem insigniﬁcant.
Many cases go unreported because the vic ms accept and condone the violence. In African
Tradi onal society, a man had a right to chas se his wife, and she had a duty to apologise. The
customary ideology was that the wife had wronged the husband and therefore deserved a bea ng.
In Kenya, as in many socie es, women are socialised to accept, tolerate, and even ra onalise
domes c violence, and to remain silent about such experiences. One reason is because the family
is said to be a private se ng, whose issues are further considered private family ma ers. Families
will o en hide and dismiss blatant and frequent crimes, including murder, rape, and physical
abuse of women in the home, in the name of defending the family honour. Subsequently, many
vic ms of abuse in in mate rela onships do not seek help or report for fear of s gma sa on.
Others cover up for the perpetrators because they may be the bread winners and they think they
cannot live without them.
6. FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION (FGM)
The barbaric prac ce of Female Genital Mu la on (FGM) is one of the ways which gross
violence has manifested itself by way of customs. It is also a unique form of violence against
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women because it is o en perpetrated by women against other women, in the furtherance of
culture and tradi on.
The agony that accompanies FGM is intolerable and detrimental to human rights. It is a criminal
oﬀence and campaigns to eliminate this prac ce have been successful in many parts of the
country.
7. SEXUAL INEQUALITY
Women's place in marriage has been held by culture to provide sex and consor um. One of the
reasons given for polygamy in Tradi onal African society was to ensure that a man is sa sied
sexually at all mes. The wife had no similar conjugal rights. Women have been looked upon as
sex objects by men and the society.
Rape and deﬁlement are criminal oﬀences rampant in most African countries, including Kenya.
Marital rape is not included in the Sexual Oﬀences Act. Vic ms con nue to suﬀer in silence with
nowhere to run for help. Cases of rape and deﬁlement are rampant within the family, the majority
of vic ms being women and children.

LEGAL MILESTONES: CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER PROVISIONS
The Penal Code as read with the Sexual Oﬀences Act criminalises all forms of sexual oﬀences.
However, other factors hinder jus ce to rape vic ms. Many vic ms have complained that Police
oﬃcers are not coopera ve in the inves ga on of cases and arrest of culprits while others have
a ributed delayed jus ce to the complicated evidence gathering process.
The enactment of the Protec on Against Domes c Violence Act in 2014 is a milestone that has
shown the state’s determina on towards curbing family perpetrated gender violence. However,
it only grants an interim protec on order to the vic m but does not ini ate criminal proceedings,
which are s ll ins tuted under the Penal Code, as normal assault.
Currently, the Prohibi on against FGM Act seeks to protect women from this barbaric prac ce.
It criminalises the prac ce of FGM of any kind in Kenya. Other than the statutes in place to deal
with gender-based violence, such as the Sexual Oﬀences Act, the Cons tu on of Kenya provides
for the Bill of Rights (Chapter four of the Cons tu on), which provides for various fundamental
rights and freedoms.
Ar cle 27(4) outlaws discrimina on on the basis of sex while Ar cle 29(d) guarantees protec on
for all Kenyans from torture, inhuman or degrading punishment and other treatment whether
physical or psychological. Rape, marital or otherwise is a demeaning and undigniied act. It
therefore falls into the category of inhuman and degrading treatment as enshrined in the
Cons tu on.
Equally, the protec on of the right to life under Ar cle 26 as well as the right to the security of
the person is also evident and upholds the dignity of women. It states that no person shall be
subjected to any form of violence from either public or private sources. The family is a ‘private’
se ng and therefore is prohibited from perpetra ng acts of violence.
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Ar cle 2(4) of the Cons tu on invalidates any law, including customary law, contrary to the
Cons tu on. This automa cally invalidates tradi onal and cultural prac ces contrary to the Bill
of Rights or repugnant to jus ce and morality.
Ar cle 2(5) of the Cons tu on, provides that the general rules of interna onal law shall form
part of the law of Kenya; and ar cle 2(6) provides that any treaty or conven on ra ied by Kenya
shall form part of the law of Kenya. Whether the ra ied trea es and conven ons will have the
same force as laws enacted by the Kenyan legislature remains to be seen.
Interna onal trea es and conven ons that con nue to guide Kenya on the upholding of human
rights and eradica on of gender-based violence include:
1. Universal Declara on of Human Rights
2. Conven on on the Elimina on of All Forms of Discrimina on against Women (CEDAW)
3. Declara on on the Elimina on of Violence against Women (DEVAW)
4. The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Banjul Conven on) Provisions on the
Rights of Women
5. The Interna onal Covenant on Civil and Poli cal Rights (ICCPR)
6. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in
Africa.
7. The Interna onal Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)

CONCLUSION
Culture and patriarchy remain dominant in the African family system. Some cultural prac ces
infringe on human rights per nent to women, while some cultural stereotypes are a barrier to
women empowerment. The law itself is male dominated, in its structure, interpreta on and its
prac ce. The majority of the lawmakers are men, therefore, making it diﬁcult to pass laws that
beneit women.
Judicial approach on gender issues is not impressive. Courts have a duty to interpret the
cons tu on in a manner that upholds its dignity and supremacy. Several Judges have been
accused of displaying ignorance on gender equality, notably in ma ers of divorce. Police oﬁcers
also relax on their role in maintaining law and order, in ensuring that the female gender is not
vulnerable to gender-related abuse.
Women should also strive to promote their own empowerment. For instance, one wonders why
women are the minority in Parliament despite being the majority of voters. Is it because they are
jealous of their fellow women? The ques on remains rhetoric. Certain types of Gender Violence
such as FGM, are perpetrated by women.
However, despite the setbacks, Kenya has witnessed remarkable improvement in the welfare
of women. The Cons tu on itself has departed from harmful cultural prac ces and has upheld
a deep regard for human rights and dignity. This is an indicator that there is progress in Africa
towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, in par cular, SDG5.
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Black colonialism is the neo-oppression of black people by other black elite groups within a
certain area according to the researcher. In this instance, some war veterans who fought for the
libera on of Zimbabwe and other poli cians seem to have fought in order to replace the white
oppressive regime. Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980 from the Ian Smith colonial rule
and for a while, independence meant enjoying self-black majority rule ll the elected poli cians
began to ignore the needs of their masses. This ar cle serves to explicitly express the eﬀects
of black colonialism in Zimbabwe and how the wrath of the elite elevated their divide and rule
tac cs. However, the researcher urges the youths to challenge the new type of oppression to
guarantee a be er future for their children and grandchildren.
Poverty, hopelessness and tremendous pain are traits marked on the faces of every person branded
Zimbabwean. Ques ons of what tomorrow will be hover around the stressed skulls of the great
Zimbabweans as not enough love is buried deep underneath the li le overburdened hearts due
to the incorrigible means of survival. Even these incorrigible means of survival have resulted
in overnight mushrooming of Chris an movements as a guise to poverty deliverance and hope
restora on. In our Shona vernacular 'they' is a proverb that says “mudzimu wakupa chironda
wa nhunzi dzikudye,” that is, the spirits that have wounded one has le them to be fed by lies.
Just like the proverb, the researcher thinks that’s what we have become as Zimbabweans, in
rela on to the very dry rain spell, pathe c poli cs and economics alas, we have become cursed as
each day presents itself. Due to the hardship posed on by Black colonialism, Zimbabweans have
entered into both the second and third stage of emo onal depression which are anger and bargain
respec vely according to Kubler-Ross model (2005). This is why they have a lot of fault-inding
ques ons in their minds. Is it God or the Ancestors or both who have placed this curse on us or
have we self-inlicted the curse upon ourselves? What is wrong with being Zimbabwean? The
ques ons remain unanswered but a solu on to break this bad spell upon our beloved Zimbabwe
is needed urgently.
Furthermore, describing Zimbabwe as the “land of Milk and Honey” according to the researcher
is unmen onable, especially to the majority of Zimbabweans silently in agony with lat dry
chests as well as honeyless bees that prohibit them from making ends meet as described in the
previous paragraph. Perhaps the term “milk and honey” is rela ve to the elite poli cians who
have, over the years, amassed wealth for themselves by abusing their powers as public oﬃce
holders, resul ng in them having well-pronounced milk blossoms and honey bees to only feed
their families. It is now diﬃcult for an educated person to ind formal employment that suits their
qualiﬁca on. Instead, the people have resorted to survival means and according to The Standard
(February 9, 2014), the streets have developed the phrase ‘degreed vendor’ reﬂec ng how
milkless the na on has become in accommoda ng graduates. Many University graduates have
resorted to selling secondhand clothes or air me to make ends meet since the few job openings
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some mes are ﬁlled with the well-connected elites. Most of these 'degreed vendors' occupy the
pavements, at the present moment, in Harare and other ci es which served as reference in The
Herald of May 28, 2015 and Nehanda radio ar cle of April 17, 2016.
In rela on to the la er, it seems like yesterday, when our parents encouraged us to be educated
in the belief that educa on holds the key to success. This belief was based on evident examples
of family and friends who had made it. But today, here we are, with the highest educa onal
qualiﬁca on and yet refered to by society as educated loafers or educated vendors. How then
does one console such parents whose hopes have dwindled and who have had poverty slammed
them in their faces a er educa ng their children for years? How does one mo vate the li le
children whose dreams are as far reaching as their sleep can be, in a jobless society? How does
one expect to receive a blessing from the creator where poverty, hopelessness and misery are
inherited through the bellows of birth? No one wants to be born in poverty and shame despite
how humble they will become later in life, that is if they escape the scourge and snares of being
Zimbabwean by birth. Be that as it may, the eﬀects of Black colonialism have destroyed our
educa on sector to an extent that a university degree seems a worthless thing to a ain.
We can go on to say that hard work does not pay in Zimbabwe. With the example of the current
economic situa on, such a statement can seem so valid. Zimbabwean children work so hard in
their academics all through the years of acquiring knowledge and at the end, they become jobless
in their own country where they are expected to have ﬁrst preferences to opportuni es. Perhaps
some might have been caught up in a maze, like Dambudzo Marechera (1979) describes, “…
smaller room: numb, dark, and also u erly empty. I could not bring myself to touch the walls to
prove that they were there….” Some may ﬁnally escape the “House of Hunger” by skipping the
borders for greener pastures, but in the end “...you travel to search and you come back home to
ind yourself there ” accentuates Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie (2002). Zimbabweans are sca ered
world over, not because they enjoy foreign na ons but as a way to escape the depressing eﬀects
of Black colonialism. This unfortunate exile exposes Zimbabweans to xenophobia, human
traﬃcking among other evils found in living far from home.
Black colonialism has oppressed the rights of those workers who are trying to serve the na on
with their skills. Lest we forget, the civil servants as well as parastatal workers who have relessly
served our country with services to develop the na on for many years lose their job for no reason
and are not given any beneﬁts as evidenced in Reuters of 16 august 2015. Correspondingly, The
Herald of April 15, 2016, writes about the 15 months unpaid salaries of railway workers: The
abuse of workers’ rights in Zimbabwe has rife, thus the Chloe Mitchell (2010) mindset of ‘ …
so much of everything how do we leave with nothing?’ wrestle the workers’ minds resul ng in
hampered progress. These workers have no choice but to remain working for no salary since
ﬁnding another job in a jobless Zimbabwe (that has less than 11% employment rate) is equivalent
to searching for a needle in a haystack. The elite poli cians are suﬀoca ng the workers for their
own beneﬁt because there is no month that a minister or parliamentarian goes unpaid, therefore,
for the reason that their stomachs are full they will not represent the workers even if they are the
ones who made them get into those powerful posi ons.
However, Zimbabwe is proudly and loudly applauded for being a hardworking na on, our
weakness is that moment we are pinned to accept substandard rewards for our work and that is
when these powerful poli cians step on us to reinforce their power. The researcher believes that
what we consistently do becomes a habit. Let us break the habit of accep ng substandard rewards
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for our hardwork. This should also apply to the rest of the con nent. We do not need to be irm to
stand for the quality that we truly deserve; we only need to be more united in one voice, which is
bold and authorita ve, to alter the system of things and become valid as we truly are. We need to
have the a tude of Dambudzo, “when all else fails, don’t take it in silence: scream like hell…. ”
With the case study of Zimbabwe, Africa has become vulnerable to predators channeling Black
colonialism within and outside the land that preys on the masses' weakness as they amass their
wealth by abusing mass power.
More so, Zimbabwe as well as Africa at large needs to work towards developing the youths and
harnessing their poten al in various skills. The youths have so much energy to do a lot, plus
they are technologically informed. It is evident that the youths in the 80's managed to change
the face of Africa which was under colonial oppression. The likes of Kwame Nkrumah, Haile
Selassie, Julius Nyerere, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Sekou Toure amongst other pan-Africanist
formed the Organisa on of African Union (OAU) now African Union aiming “ to promote unity
and solidarity of African states, safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states,
coordinate and intensify their coopera on and eﬀorts to achieve a be er life for the people of
Africa. "
Nevertheless, as Zimbabwean youths of this genera on, we do not only stand and complain but
our voices are being thwarted and so are our ac ons. The playing ﬁeld of ac vism is compromised.
This is the same reason Zimbabwean youths have decided to be silent but con nue gnashing their
teeth, being unable to reach their pinnacle for reasons they know but fear to express. Zimbabwe
has had a fair share of brave youths that tried to challenge the oppressive system but they were
silenced. Itai Dzamara was made as an example to bring fear on the youth for being poli cally
expressive. Ace Lumumba’s reputa on was destroyed as soon as he turned his back on the power
that mentored him which also made sure that young youthful leaders follow and not cri cize the
system. Pastor Evan Mawarire with his #theflag movement gained mileage as youths found a
brave man to rally behind in order to air their views but was cri cized and described as displaying
childish emo onal outburst by Tafadzwa Musarara, a poli cal analyst in a debate interview on the
Pla orm of ZI FM. In the mean me, Pastor Evan Mawarire has been standing against the black
to black oppression system in Zimbabwe by organizing ci zens mee ng with the Reserve bank
Governor, Dr Mangudya, to denounce the introduc on of bond notes which the elite poli cians
are trying to introduce to Zimbabweans.
To conclude, Zimbabwean youths, as well as other African youths, need to focus on preparing
our future and that of our children. Despite the challenges we face, we need to focus on raising
our voices and ac ng towards our goals by uni ng and strengthening our voices together just
like the OAU forefathers did in figh ng against Black colonialism. Let us begin to write our own
stories to develop our countries, con nuing with the legacy of the OAU. This is not the me just
to ask the ques on "what is wrong with being Zimbabwean or African ", it is the me to accept,
ind solu ons and the purpose of being Zimbabwean or African. Young African Leaders Forum
(YALF) is now bridging the gap aiming to move African na ons to the ﬁrst world status and
this begins by pu ng our voices out through such pla orms. The pen is migh er than the sword
let us speak out Zimbabweans, let us speak out young Africans! Black colonialism is the new
oppression that has aﬀected our educa on, industries and social setup. The researcher desires the
youths to unite themselves to amplify their voices against this oppression, to regain Zimbabwe’s
status again.
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ABSTRACT
With the underlying hypothesis that the quality of a teachers’ training is directly propor onal
to the quality of educa on pupils eventually receive, this essay explores and cri ques the basic
educa on teacher training process in Cameroon, using two notable educa onal theories to
assess the possibility of quality educa on resul ng from Cameroonian government-trained basic
educa on teachers. It was found that there is dire need to improve the quality of teachers we train
to ensure that they can deliver the quality of educa on we seek. A brief outline of sugges ons is
made towards improving the ﬂawed training system.
INTRODUCTION
Discourse on quality educa on is fairly recent. Though the interna onal community has long
priori zed educa on as a fundamental human right, un l the year 2000, li le had been said on the
quality of the compulsory basic educa on (EFA: GMR 2005). Today however, there is a notable
shi in both scholarly debate and interna onal development advocacy, which now emphasizes
on the quality of educa on achieved more than the rates of enrolment, years of schooling or
gender parity (Barre et al. 2006). Though these are worthy and necessary indicators, they are
considered limited as evidence of impac ul educa on for development.
But what is quality educa on? A review of literature suggests that quality has a diﬀerent
connota on depending on what lack in educa on is being addressed; whether lack in gender
sensi vity, equality, pragma sm, relevance of content, pedagogic style or cultural rela vity.
However, ‘Deﬁning Quality in Educa on’, a working paper presented by UNICEF at the mee ng
of The Interna onal Working Group on Educa on at Florence, Italy in June 2000, denotes ive
‘dimensions’ of quality; learners’ well-being, environment, content, process, and outcome. A
quality Cameroonian educa on would therefore entail holis cally healthy learners, provided
with the adequate resources, facili es, and environments that are safe, secure, gender-sensi ve
and inclusive (not barring the handicapped or those with diﬀerent languages). Quality educa on
as per this deﬁni on requires teaching content that is relevant and able to add value; involving
processes through which trained teachers use child-centred teaching in well-managed classrooms
to facilitate learning rather than dictate.
It is clear by this deﬁni on that teachers and educators have a long standing order of how and
what to impart in the classroom as well as a responsibility in ensuring the right frame of mind
and environment for quality educa on to be carried out. The produc on of the required “ﬁrst-rate
teachers” then is a vital part of ensuring quality educa on is delivered.
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In Cameroon, the “produc on” of the majority (the majority refers to those under government
employ) of teachers is in the hands of certain government ins tu ons. With the underlying
hypothesis that the quality of a teacher’s training is directly propor onal to the quality of
educa on pupils eventually receive, this essay shall outline the situa on of training of basic
educa on teachers in Cameroon, using two notable educa onal theories to assess the possibility
of quality educa on resul ng from such Cameroonian government trained teachers. These
theories, the Social Reproduc on theory and the Nussbaum’s Capabili es Approach, will be used
interchangeably to forward arguments answering the ques on of if and how well the teachers
(of basic educa on par cularly) produced in Cameroon are equipped and up to the challenge of
providing the quality of educa on sought a er.
BASIC EDUCATION TEACHER TRAINING IN CAMEROON
Formal training of basic educa on teachers in Cameroon remains primarily in the hands of the
government. This means that while there are a few private (mission) teacher training schools
(Tchombe, 1998), the state does the greater share of teacher training with ﬁ y-seven government
owned teacher training ins tu ons (almost one for each of the country’s ﬁ y-eight divisions).
The state is also solely responsible for the provision of teachers to state schools, which are free and subsequently the largest providers of educa on.
With the implementa on of free basic educa on in 1999, the primary Gross Enrolment Rate (GER)
increased from 87.7 percent in 2000 to 105.4 percent in 2002 (Ka an, 2006). New government
policy limited basic teacher educa on to only courses for the Grade I teacher cer ﬁcate based
on law no. 98/004 of 14 April 1998 (Tchombe, 1998). The government intended to improve
quality by revising student curricula, providing textbooks and teaching materials, improving
school infrastructure, oﬀering in-service training for exis ng teachers and hiring new teachers
(Ka an,2006). Although government inten ons are rarely ever followed by ac ons, there has
been noted changes in teacher training syllabus as of 2012, the crea on of an alternate route to
teaching qualiﬁca on via a university degree from the University of Buea, Cameroon and an
increase in enrolment into teacher training colleges (MINESEC, 2012; Tchombe, 1998).
As of now, the teacher training procedure consists of selec ve admission into teachers’ training
ins tu ons based on registra on for and success in an entrance examina on of wri en and oral
parts (Tambo, 1995). The examina on, which is limited to ci zens between the ages of 18 and
32 years, is in two parts: a language paper and a maths paper, both set at secondary school
comprehension level by the Ministry of Secondary Educa on (MINESEC, 2012). Candidates
who make it through this wri en session then have to pass an oral test/interview. This concludes
the entry process into the teachers training college.
As a student teacher, training generally focuses on educa onal theory, principles for prac ce and
of course the academic disciplines they would teach (Tchombe, 1998). A more deﬁned syllabus
was drawn up by the Ministry of Secondary Educa on decree no. 2012/267 of 11 June 2012,
(MINESEC, 2012).
This current syllabus is illustrated in the following tables.
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Figure 1: Table Displaying Time Alloca on in Teacher Training Courses
Levels
Training
domains
Teaching Prac ce
Didac cs of Primary
and Nursery School
Ac vi es
Science of Educa on
Subjects
Bilingual Training
Total

Three-year Three-year Three-year Two-year Two-year One-year
course: 1st course: 2nd course: 3rd c o u r s e : c o u r s e : course:
year
year
year
1st year
2nd year
(in
(in hours) (in hours) (in hours) (in hours) (in hours) hours)
222
510

222
420

222
510

222
510

222
510

222
510

420

510

420

450

420

510

60
1212

60
1212

60
1212

60
1242

60
1212

60
1302

Annual Dura on: 36 weeks
Average number of weekly teaching hours: 34 hours
The speciﬁc subjects within the training domains outlined above (except for teaching prac ce)
with the corresponding hours per subject for all three pathways can be seen below.
Figure 2: Time Alloca on and Coeﬃcients
SUBJECTS

Educa onal
Psychology
General Pedagogy
Educa onal
Policies and
Compara ve
Educa on
School
Administra on
and Legisla on
Pedagogic
Supervision
Philosophy of
Educa on
Sociology of
Educa on
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Three-year Three-year Three-year Two-year Two-year O n e - Coeﬁcourse: 1st c o u r s e : course: 3rd course: c o u r s e : y e a r cient
year
2nd year
year
1st year
2nd year course
4

3

3

3

3

3

3

3
2

2
1

3
1

2
1

3
1

3
2

3
1

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

//

1

1

1

1

1

1

//

1

1

1

1

1

1

//

1

1

1

1

1

1

Deontology and
Professional
Ethics
Introduc on
to Educa onal
Sta s cs
Informa on and
Communica on
Technologies
First Language

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

//

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

//

2

//

//

1

Second Language

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

French Didac cs

2

2

2

2

2

2

1

English Didac cs

2

2

2

2

2

2

1

Didac cs of
Matheme cs
Didac cs
of Na onal
Languages and
Culture
Didac cs of
Sports and
Physical
Educa on
Didac cs of
Educa onal
Technologies

2

2

2

2

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

2

2

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

MINESEC - Syllabuses for T.T.C one-year course p. 7 of 134
SUBJECTS

Didac cs of Song
and Music
Didac cs of
History and
Geography
Didac cs of
Ci zenship
Educa on
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Three-year Three-year Three-year Two-year Two-year O n e - Coeﬁcourse: 1st c o u r s e : course: 3rd course: c o u r s e : y e a r cient
year
2nd year
year
1st year
2nd year course
1

1

//

1

1

1

1

//

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Didac cs
of Prac cal
Ac vi es
Didac cs of
Sciences and
Environmental
Educa on
Ini a on to
Ac on research
Didac cs of
Nursery Ac vi es
Total

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

//

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

//

1

1

1

1

34

35

32

35

35

35

31

MINESEC New Syllabus Manual, 2012 P. 7-8
As seen above, the training program comprises of one part theory, two parts content acquisi on
(subjects to be taught) and one part teaching prac ce or tutorials in schools. Over the course of
one, two or three years depending on the cycle, the candidates write a ﬁnal examina on. They
are also observed and evaluated on prac cal teaching skills by their professors, government
inspectors and selected classroom teachers in the schools in which the students did their prac ce.
In addi on, students are required to submit a long essay (supervised) on a topic related to their
training (Tambo, 1995).
Upon successful comple on candidates receive cer ﬁca on for teaching called the Teacher Grade
I cer ﬁcate or the Cer icat d’Ap tude Pédagogue de l’Enseignement Maternel et Primaire
(Tchombe, 1998). Teachers are subsequently deployed as regional delegates as per the needs of
the schools in the regions.
Despite certain changes in curriculum, several aspects have remained the same and issues
persist with the “teacher produc on” process in Cameroon. According to the 2011 Transparency
Interna onal Cameroon report, corrup on pervades the educa onal process from the admission of
students into teachers' training ins tu ons through to the recruitment of teachers upon comple on.
As stated earlier, entrance into GTTC/ENIEG ins tu ons is done through the passing of a
compe ve wri en examina on followed by an oral test for the shortlisted candidates. While the
content of the wri en exam is rela vely transparent, the oral segment has been heavily cri cized
and is a medium for the passing of bribes to interviewers ensuring admission (Fokwang, 2003).
This prac ce has been inves gated and proven as common with na onal entrance examina ons
or concours.
Again, VSO (2013) has cri qued Cameroon’s teachers’ training process as 'ungendered'. Aside
from the lack of policies to address the wide gender disparity in basic educa on (Lyonga, 2014;
EFA Global Monitoring Report, 2013/14), VSO (2013) further states that there is no a empt at
raising gender consciousness via teacher training and this results in a lack of gender sensi vity
in the classroom.
The inadequacy of teaching prac ce has likewise been noted by Tchombe (1998) and more
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recently by Lyonga (2014). The amount of me allocated for teaching prac ce is by far less than
the focus given to the subject didac cs. Issues related to class popula ons were also perceived:
student teachers mostly prac ce in pairs or more, and as such, do not really experience what it
would be like to handle the overpopulated classes they will be recruited to teach, par cularly in
rural areas.
Tambo (1995) equally cri cizes the lack of diversity in teaching styles taught to teachers in
training. He suggests that as a result of this inadequacy they eventually teach homogenously in
classrooms, unable to cater to students with disabili es or ensure individualis c/student centred
learning which considers diﬀerences in ap tudes.
Likewise, this weakness in teaching style is echoed by Lyonga (2014). In her research, studentteachers hinged their own intelligence and subsequently that of the students they taught on the
amount of knowledge they could reproduce in examina ons, this not only proves that they are
trained to ignore diﬀerent learning styles, but also illustrates what Freire (1970) refers to as a
“banking system of knowledge”.
The most common issue with the process of teacher produc on in Cameroon however, would be
the low quality of candidates applying for training. Mingat (2002) found that teaching is mostly
a last resort in African countries. In Cameroon for instance, prospec ve basic educa on teachers
enter training ins tu ons above the age of twenty having only secondary school qualiﬁca ons
of Advance and/or Ordinary level GCE cer ﬁcates with below average scores (above average
would be more than two papers in the Advance level and ive or more at Ordinary level).
Considering that the standard age for those qualiﬁca ons are age eighteen and below, it can be
concluded that becoming a primary school teacher was not their original plan but rather something
they have resigned to do for sustainance. Tambo (1995) asserts that poten al teachers ought to
be required to demonstrate an interest in teaching and screened thoroughly to substan ate their
academic qualiﬁca ons in order to ascertain their mo va on for and a tude toward teaching and
working with children as this would aﬀect their quality.
Finally, with inadequate libraries and ICT equipment in training schools, student-teachers are
trained without necessary resources for their capacity building and professionaliza on (Tchombe,
1998). This results in the teachers produced being somewhat inept in this informa on age.
THEORETICALLY CRITIQUING THE SITUATION
It is clear that there are signiﬁcant problems with Cameroon’s basic educa on teacher training
process. The subsequent part of this paper shall use two theories to assess the possibility of
quality educa on resul ng from the situa on outlined above.
The idea of Social Reproduc on ﬁrst came to public a en on through the work of Bowles and
Gin s (1976), American Marxist theorists who argued against the idealis c belief that educa on
and schooling was a means of equalizing dispari es across social classes. Their work asserted
that on the contrary, educa on was a means to a capitalist end of reproducing economic/social
classiﬁca ons (Nash, 1984). In summa on the Social Reproduc on theory asserts that formal
educa on reproduces class structures either by who has priority access to the educa on or by
what is taught and passed on in classroom.
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The Capabili es Approach on the other hand is a mul disciplinary framework that was originally
formulated by economist Amartya Sen in the 1980’s (Sen, 1985). This framework is a norma ve
one which proposes that the true indicator of well-being is what people are capable of doing/
being/achieving (func oning) (Unterhalter, Vaughan and Walker, 2007). The Capabili es
Approach asserts that educa on is an instrument of expanding people’s capabili es and freedoms
to achieve those func onings (Robeyns, 2006) which are important to them. Alkire (2005) also
asserts that educa on is vital to agency as people need to be educated to par cipate poli cally and
strive for change and the expansion of their valuable freedoms. Educa on is thus an achievement
(func oning) on its own as well as a means enabling the individual to pursue subsequent
freedoms (Robeyns, 2006). The Capabili es Approach is thus employed in educa onal research
in evalua ng and assessing the extent to which the educa on one receives oﬀers the individual
necessary freedoms and abili es to achieve valuable func onings.
It is these two theore cal lenses which shall be employed to assess the poten al output of quality
from teacher training in Cameroon. For one, the aspect of gender sensi vity in required quality
educa on is impinged by the ungendered teacher training process. Due to the lack of gender
sensi ve training, teachers produced subsequently carry their tradi onally patriarchal percep ons
and stereotypes into the classrooms where, as the Social Reproduc on theorist would have us
understand, class/social structure speciﬁcaly in terms of gender construc on is generated and
passed on to the next genera on.
Likewise, the absence of diﬀerent learning styles in training student teachers ensures they caters
to learners of certain cogni ve styles over other children with diﬀerent ap tudes or special needs,
thus reproducing an unequal learning system. This teacher training therefore leaves teachers
inept at providing learner centric educa on required of quality educa on.
Following the Capabili es Approach, the teacher training process equally falls short given that
most applicants for teacher training ins tu ons are below average students who venture into
teaching resignedly as opposed to inspiringly. They can hardly deliver an educa on which enables
func oning, when their teaching as a last resort expresses the limits of their own func oning.
Using the Capabili es Approach, we can equally ques on the prospec ve teachers’ ability to
deliver current, relevant content demanded of quality educa on, considering the inadequate
resources, libraries, textbooks and ICT knowledge available for them to foster themselves with
(Tchombe, 1998). It is worthy to note that a per nent problem facing basic educa on in Cameroon
is the lack of textbooks with a majority of primary school pupils lacking accompanying texts
(Worldbank, 2014). This could be interpreted by social reproduc on theorists as a result of
teachers who have been trained without necessary resources and thus the absence of text-reading
culture.
Both the Capabili es Approach and Social Reproduc on theory, would suggest that the presence
of corrup on in the recruitment process of poten al teachers inhibits the possibility of delivering
quality educa on. On one hand, this brings the risk of reproducing corrupt a tudes and ensures
that only a par cular class (those able to bribe their way in) would serve as teachers, inlfuencing
the next genera on and s ﬂing the agency of other groups from the classroom.
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CONCLUSION
In summary, the interna onal call for quality educa on - while an admirable one, is unlikely to
be realised in Cameroon un l teacher training enables prospec ve teachers with the capabili es
to deliver quality and curbs the reproduc on of certain socio-cultural inequali es.
It is recommended that in addi on to current government eﬀort in increasing enrolment rate
towards universal basic educa on, the quality of teachers' training is focused upon. Increased
and be er investment in teacher training resources, gender sensi ve curriculum, an inclusive
pedagogy, a more rigorous recruitment process which would diminish routes of corrup on and
demand that candidates prove their mo va on for this career ﬁeld are some sugges ons towards
ensuring a more eﬀec ve teacher training process.
Un l be er eﬀorts and inputs are commi ed to training teachers, which Zumwalt (in Tambo,
1995) describes as the key to educa on, no considerable a empt would have been made towards
achieving quality in educa on.
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ABSTRACT
This study aimed at assessing the impact of conﬂict on the level of availability of selected nonmber forest products around Omo forest reserve of Ogun State. Data was collected with the aid of
well-structured ques onnaire on one hundred and twenty marke ng households using mul stage
sampling technique. The data was analyzed using descrip ve sta s cs, categoriza on method and
t-test. The data analysis targeted socio-economic characteris cs, the level of availability of NTFP
before/a er the conﬂict in the study area. It was revealed that majority (69.2%) were farmers and
(75%) had experienced conﬂict more than 3 mes. It was discovered that the selected NTFPs
were available in abundance with bi er kola and kola nut recording higher levels respec vely
before conﬂict, while wild mango and walnut were NTFPs that were s ll available in excess a er
conﬂict. The test of diﬀerence analysis result shows that there is a signiicant diﬀerence in the
availability level before and a er conﬂict.
INTRODUCTION
Forests can be simultaneously recognized as a ‘daily net’ and a ‘safety net’ for the rural dwellers
that use forest resources (F.A.O 2005). Forests have sustained life on earth through the ages.
They supply food, medicine, energy, shelter, fodder, wood and non-wood forest products and
are a source of economic development for individuals and communi es. They have cultural
and spiritual values. It is es mated that 90% of the world’s poor depend on forests for at least
a por on of their income (World Bank, 2000; Scherl et al., 2004; USAID, 2006). In Nigeria,
users of forest products include forest dwellers, nearby farmers, commercial users (including
small traders, producers and employees) and the urban poor. Timber, non- mber forest products
(NTFPs) and animal protein are all used by the rural poor for subsistence, and also as a source
of income and employment. Nigeria NTFPs are a key resource for many poor communi es.
NTFPs are o en open-access resources and require li le processing or the use of low cost (o en
tradi onal) techniques. An overview of case studies indicates that forest products contribute
between 20% and 40% of total household income in forest areas and that poor households tend
to be dispropor onately dependent on forest resources (especially fuel wood and fodder) (Vedeld
et al., 2007). Based on this type of ﬁndings, investment in NTFPs use has o en been proposed
as a method of poverty allevia on (Brown & Williams, 2003). Conﬂicts have several mes been
related to poverty. Li le wonder it is o en said that a hungry man is an angry man. As stated
by Draman (2003), with the end of the cold war, poverty and conﬂict have become the biggest
challenges to sustainable development. Furthermore, he submi ed that (even though debatable)
poverty is con nuously cited as one of the principal factors responsible for instability in many
parts of Africa. Onigu (2001) in his view of conﬂict stated that what makes a society an ideal
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polity is the extent to which the conﬂic ng interests and needs in the society are construc vely
managed so that violence does not threaten its con nued existence. In Omo forest reserve, the
dwellers around the reserves depended on the NTFPs for their income and survival. The income
generated from the NTFPs was being threatened by various forms of conﬂicts around the reserve.
In 2009, there was a serious conﬂict between the dwellers and government which threatened
the livelihood of the dwellers within the forest reserves. The Ogun state government forcefully
displaced the dwellers in the enclaves resul ng in the destruc on of lives and proper es. The
displacement of people from the enclaves lasted for a period of two years before the government
was ordered by the court of law to allow the people con nue with their day to day ac vi es.
Against this background, the study intends to ascertain the eﬀect of recent conﬂict on cost and
return of NTFPs in the study area as well as level of availability of the iden ied selected NTFPs
before and a er conﬂicts.
METHODOLOGY
The Study Area
The study was carried out in Omo Biosphere Reserve, the largest reserve in Ogun State, situated
in Ijebu East and North Local Government areas located between la tude 06 o 35N to 7 o 05N and
Longitude 04 o 19N to 4 o 40E in the South-West of Nigeria; about 135km North–East of Lagos,
about 120km East of Abeokuta and about 80km East of Ijebu-Ode. The Reserve covers about
130,500 hectares in the area. There are more than 30 communi es/enclaves within and around
Omo Forest Reserve with a popula on of 59,100 (N.P.C, 2006). A 460 hectares forest block is
found within the expanse of land to the south of the conﬂuence of Omo river and has a tributary
in Owena river. The popula on of the study is the rural households in the forest communi es
within the J4 enclaves of Omo forest reserve. Mul stage random sampling method was used in
carrying out this study.
First stage
There are four (4) zones (J1, J3, J4 and J6) in Omo forest reserve with 50 enclaves. J4 was
purposively selected because of records of conﬂicts and excess availability of NTFP. The J4
comprises of 27 enclaves- Osoko, Abeku 1, Abeku 11, Temidere, Aba Baale (Ajebandele), Eseke,
Etemi, Sojukodoro, Tamitami, Erin Camp, Queens Forest, Opepe, Esiri, Ori Apata, Ologuna,
Imopa, Gbonpa, London village, Erinla, Eleyele, Owonifari, Oloji, Ejegun, pocket money village,
Aba tutun, Adekanbi Abatutun, Eriin.
Second stage
Simple random sampling method was used to select eight (8) enclaves that are mostly aﬀected by
conlicts in J4 – Aba tutun, Oloji, Aba, Baale, Etemi, Tamitami, Temidere, Osoku, Erinla. In Aba
tutun, 38 households were iden ied, 32 in oloji, 30 in Aba Baale, 16 in Etemi, 20 in Tamitami,
38 in Temidere, 50 in Osoku and 16 in Erinla.
Third stage
Systema c random sampling techniques were used to select 19 in Aba tutun, 16 in Oloji, 15
in Aba Baale, 8 in Etemi, 10 in Tamitami, 19 in Temidere, 25 in Osoku and 8 in Erinla. The
diﬀerences in the number of respondents selected per enclaves are due to the diﬀerences in the
number of households in these enclaves. In all, a total of 120 respondents were selected for the
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study. The heads of selected marke ng households were interviewed by means of structured
ques onnaires.
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS
The socio-economic characteris cs from Table 1 shows that majority (60%) of the respondents
belonged to age bracket of 50 - 59 years and those in the ac ve age of 30 and below were 5.8%.
Those between the age group of 40 - 49 years recorded 21.7% while age group above 60 years
was 12.5%. This implies that the NTFPs marke ng and collec ng is less ﬂexible and much easier
for older people compared to real farming which requires energy. This is in agreement with
F.A.O (2005) which stated that old people engaged in the collec on of NTFPs. On marital status
distribu on of the respondents, the result showed that majority (65.8%) were married while
18.4 % were divorced, single and widow were 2.5% and 13.3% respec vely. This revealed that
marriage conﬁnes responsibili es. This is in agreement with the submission of Afolayan (1998)
that majority of the married people were engaged in processing and marke ng of NTFPs in the
rural area.
It was revealed from the table below that females (55.8%) were into NTFPs collec on and
marke ng than their male (44.2%) counterpart. This ﬁnding is in agreement with FAO (1991)
report that women o en dominate forest gathering ac vi es for household produc on,
consump on and income. On occupa onal distribu on, the result revealed that majority (69.2%)
were farmers while the remaining 30.8% were non-farmers. This implies that farmers in the study
area combined gathering of NTFPs with farm work to assist them in genera ng more income
to improving their standard of living. Furthermore, it was revealed from the table that majority
(75.0%) of the respondents had experienced conﬂict in the area more than three mes while 15%
had experienced less than three cases of conﬂict. This implies that the respondents interviewed
were aware of the eﬀect of conﬂict on the gathering of non- mber forest products.
Table 1: Personal Characteris cs of the Respondents
Variables
Age
<39
40 – 49
50 – 59
> 69

Frequency

Percentage

7
26
72
15

5.8
21.7
60.0
12.5

Total

120

100

Marital Status
Single
Married
Divorced
Widow

3
79
22
16

2.5
65.8
18.4
13.3

Gender
Male
Female

53
67

44.2
55.8

pg |116

Total
Occupa on
Framers
Non-Farmers

120

100.0

83
37

69.2
30.8

Total

120

100.0

Conlict experienced
Less than 3 mes
18
Above 3 mes
108

15.0
75.0

Total

100.0

120

SOURCE: FIELD SURVEY 2013

LEVEL OF AVAILABILITY OF NON-TIMBER FOREST PRODUCTS (NTFPS) BEFORE
AND AFTER CONFLICT
Table 2 shows the level of availability before and a er conﬂict. The level of the ive selected
NTFPs was high before the conﬂict with all the mean values for each NTFPs higher than the
calculated mean which is 4. The availability varies with Walnut having the higher mean value
of 4.36 which was closely followed by mango with mean value of 4.30. Bi er kola which has
cultural and tradi onal value had a mean value of 4.57 while kolanut and African star apple had
the mean value of 4.53 and 4.30 respec vely. This supported the ﬁnding of Aluko et al. (2013)
who reported that livelihood ac vi es of dwellers within and around forest reserves can only be
sustained in the atmosphere of peace.
The table reveals that the availability of non- mber forest products dropped dras cally a er
conﬂict. It was observed that the mean value of bi er kola (Garicinia kola ), kolanut ( Cola
acumulata) and African star apple ( Chrysophyiium conophorum ) were 3.03, 3.50 and 3.50
respec vely. Also, wild mango ( Irvingia wombulu ) and walnut ( Tetracarpidium conophorus )
were low compared to the value before conﬂict. In general, it was deduced that the level of
availability of NTFP was low a er conﬂict. This implies that conﬂicts led to destruc on of NTFPs
which in turn resulted in the reduc on of products. This is in line with Aluko et al (2013) that
NTFPs will be reduced when there is displacement and conﬂict within and around forest reserve.

Table 2: Availablity Level of NTFPs Before and A er Conﬂict
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Before conﬂict
Product
Bi er kola ( Garicinia kola )

A er conﬂict
Yes
No
Mean Level Yes
No
Mean Level
78
42
4.57 High
27
90
3.03 Low
(65.0) (35.0)
(22.5) (75.0)

Kolanut ( Cola acumulata )

70
50
(58.3) (41.7)

4.53

High

45
75
(37.5) (62.5

3.50

Low

African Star apple
(Chrysophyiium conophorum)

61
54
(55.0) (45.0)

4.30

High

45
75
(37.5) (62.5)

3.50

Low

Wild mango ( Irvingia
wombulu)

99
19
(82.5) (15.8)

4.79

High

61
54
(55.0) (45.0)

4.30

High

Walnut (Tetracarpidium
conophorus)

90
30
(75.0) (25.0)

4.72

High

69
51
(57.5) (42.5)

4.36

High

Source: Field Survey 2013
Note – Calculated Mean = 4 , therefore < 4 = Low and > 4 = High
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
The availability of products was discovered to decrease except wild mango and walnut. The
dras c reduc on was as a result of conﬂict in the study area.
Conlﬁct can have great consequences on both forest products and non-forest products if not
properly managed by the stakeholders in the forest environment. It is therefore recommended
that eﬃcient conﬂict management should be put in place to address the issue of conlict in the
forest environment so as to reduce or solve completely the problem of conﬂict. Also, the dwellers
should form a habit of tolerance with each other to prevent conﬂict. It is also recommended that
proper policies should be put in place to discourage people from plan ng food crop in forest
reserves but rather focus on NTFPs planta ons.
Finally, government should provide funds for researchers to engage in the domes ca on of
NTFPs in large quan ty which in turn will be passed across the NTFPs farmers. This will reduce
the pressure on the NTPFs in the wild.
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ABSTRACT
World oil price is a momentous determinant of global economic performance. In most cases, when
oil prices skyrockets, it leads to a transfer of income from impor ng countries to expor ng countries
through trade shi s. The link between oil and inﬂa on is mostly seen as being correla onal. The
direct rela onship between oil and inﬂa on was evident in the 1970’s nevertheless this rela onship
started to deteriorate a er the 1980’s. Quite a cornucopia of researchers have made relentless
inquiry on the macroeconomics impact of world oil price shocks and hikes on economic growth
and consumer price inﬂa on on impor ng countries. Also, an inﬁnitesimal analyses have tackled
the impact of the world oil price on inﬂa on. For many developing countries, oil price hikes
over the last few years has warranted the need for structural reforms of the domes c petroleum
pricing system. The role of economic policy in a enua ng the poten al adverse economic and
social impact of world oil prices in Ghana cannot be overemphasized. The causes of inla on in
Ghana has precipitated vehement canvassing among policy makers. Some analysts have ascribed
that the causes of inﬂa on emanate from the consumer goods market, with others repudia ng
the consumer goods market argument, ascribing it as namby-pamby and sta ng that inﬂa on in
Ghana is rather more from the money market. Another group of scholars maintain that inﬂa on in
Ghana is imputed to be from the exogenous variable (world oil price). The debate lingers on and
in Ghana the shocks to prices are mixed and dynamic. This paper, through quan ta ve review
and analysis a empts to determine the impact of world oil price on Ghana’s inﬂa on, expound
on the factors that drive Ghana’s inﬂa on and suggest perpetual remedies to Ghana’s inﬂa on.
This paper employed mul ple OLS regression, correla on matrix and linear regression model
and found that world oil price is correla onal to Ghana’s inﬂa on. Other factors like interest rates
(Bank of Ghana policy rate) and exchange rates also strongly proved to drive Ghana’ s inla on.
THE IMPACT OF THE PRICE OF OIL ON GHANA’S INFLATION
Inﬂa on occurs when the quan ty of money rises appreciably, more rapidly than output. Milton
Friedman propounded that “inﬂa on is everywhere, a monetary phenomenon”. The causes of
inﬂa on can be ascribed to numerous factors which precipitate temporary ﬂuctua ons in the rate
of inﬂa on but tend to have perpetual eﬀects only if they aﬀect the money growth. Inla on in
Ghana is not banal and has caused a lot of quagmire for policy makers. More o en, poli cians
and some policy analysts canvass on whether the cause of inﬂa on can be imputed to the prices
of oil on the world market. The frui on of the prices of oil on the world market does have
quizzical impacts on the economies of countries. With oil prices skyrocke ng, the quan ty of
goods and services that tend to be available for people to choose from tend to be limited because
an economy will have to export more abroad to pay for prices of oil. Again, the 1973 oil shocks
buﬀeted many countries and distorted their economies. When the 1974 oil price embargo was
increased from $3 per barrel to $12 globally, it caused an upsurge of prices in countries like
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America, Germany, Japan, and UK among other countries. Furthermore, In the 1970's, the cost
of oil rose from a nominal price of $3 before the 1973 oil crisis to close $40 during the 1979 oil
crisis. Is there a direct rela onship between world market oil prices and domes c inla on in
countries?
In Ghana, the impacts of the price of oil on inﬂa on has engendered ambivalent debates. An
overview of informa on from the Energy Informa on Administra on (appendix ﬁg.1) on world
oil prices and inﬂa on rates (CPI) of Ghana from 1990 to 2013 shows how oil prices luctuated
with its corresponding inﬂa on rates. Upon analysis (by looking at ﬁgure 1), it is conspicuous
from the graph that the lowest oil price recorded was $23.59 in 1993 corresponding to a higher
inﬂa on rate (CPI) of 3.51% in Ghana. The highest oil prices were recorded in 2007 at $106.73
which matches a higher inﬂa on rate (CPI) of 65.07%. In addi on, Ghana commenced its irst
oil export in commercial quan es by the ﬁrst quarter of 2010. During this auspicious epoch,
about 60,000 barrels of oil were expected to be exported a day at the ini al stage. One could
expect that when the produc on of oil started in 2010 and was augmented in the subsequent
period, inﬂa on in Ghana would dwindle especially as the world oil prices plummeted sharply.
However the table sta s cs indicate that from 2009 to 2010 as world oil price increased from
$81.58 to $96.34, inﬂa on rate (CPI) upsurged from 100% to 108.73%. A more careful overview
of the data shows that from 2013 to 2015 as world oil price dropped, inﬂa on (CPI) con nued to
increase incessantly. The impact of world oil price on Ghana’s inﬂa on brouhaha has triggered
unremi ng agita ons raising the key issues concerning whether the exogenous factor (world oil
price) is correlated or uncorrelated to Ghana’s inﬂa on. This research is momentous in the sense
that it will help policy makers and government determine the true eﬀect of world price of oil on
Ghana’s inﬂa on to assist in cogent evalua on of polices. Also, it will assist individuals to plan
eﬃciently and eﬀec vely on the lethal canker of inﬂa on. Moreover this research will add to
knowledge in academia. This paper will therefore a empt to determine the impact of the price of
oil on Ghana’s inﬂa on using empirical analysis to accomplish the following objec ves:
i. To explain whether world oil price correlated or uncorrelated to Ghana’s inﬂa on.
ii. To explain whether oil price changes generate inﬂa on.
iii. To determine other factors that drive Ghana’s inﬂa on.
iv. To suggest an appropriate remedy for inﬂa on in Ghana.
This paper is arranged to encompass part A which explains theories on inﬂa on, part B, which
expounds on literature review, part C highligh ng methodology, part D which dilates on data
analysis and tests and ﬁnally the necessary sugges ons and conclusion.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
Inﬂa on is a lethal disease which is perilous and if not checked, can destroy society. There are
major theories that have been postulated to explain the concept of inﬂa on. The quan ty theory
of money is a seminal theory of inﬂa on. It asserts that there is a direct rela onship between
money supply and general price level of the economy. The quan ty theory of money formed the
core of the 19th century classical monetary analysis and this further provided a concrete pla orm
to preserve the gold standard. In sum, the quan ty theory of money is spelled out as MV = PT
where M is the money stock, V is the velocity of money, P is the general price level and T is the
number of transac ons. This further explain that, the aggregate money expenditure on goods
and services (MV) is held equal to the monetary value of goods and service that are produced in
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the given period. Moreover, the monetary theory of inﬂa on is also much desired. According to
Milton Friedman (1912 - 2006) who maintained that “only money ma ers” monetary policy is
a more per nent tool than ﬁscal policy in economic stabiliza on. He dilates that money supply
is the determinant of both the level of output and prices in the short run and the level of it is not
inﬂuenced by the money supply. Milton Friedman further emphasized that “inﬂa on is always
and everywhere a monetary phenomenon” that arises from a more rapid expansion in the quality
of money than total output.
Also, demand pull theory is another eﬀec ve theory to elaborate. John Menard Keynes (1883 1946) postulated that increase in aggregate demand which encompasses consump on, investment
and government expenditure militates for demand pull inﬂa on. He explained that when increase
in the value of aggregate demand exceed the value of aggregate supply at full employment level,
the inﬂa onary gap upsurges. Also, policies that cause decrease in the components of aggregate
demand are eﬀec ve in the reduc on of demand and inﬂa on. Cost push theory is another
theory that explains that inﬂa on is caused by wage increase enforced by unions and increase
in employers' proﬁts. This type of inﬂa on was witnessed during the medieval period and was
reviewed in the 1950's and the 1970's, later christened as the “New inﬂa on”. The simple case of
cost push inﬂa on is the rise in money wages more rapidly than labour output. This may further
be exacerbated by upward adjustment of wages to compensate for rise in cost of living. Another
cost of cost push inﬂa on is proﬁt-push inﬂa on. Oligopolists and monopolists ﬁrms raise the
price of their products to oﬀset the rise in labour and cost of produc on to earn higher proﬁts.
Since these markets structures have imperfect compe ons, they dictate prices for their products
which can precipitate inﬂa on.
Structural inﬂa on theory also tends to propagate de facto statements in the cause of inﬂa on.
They expound that inﬂa on arises due to unstable and slower growth rate of export in the
economy which is inadequate to support the required rate of the economy. A uniform rate of
growth of money wages throughout the economy must lead to permanent cost pressures in the
service sector which is assured to have the lower produc vity growth. This in eﬀect results
from supply inelas city leading to rise in agricultural prices and costs. Structural analysis of
inﬂa on therefore a empts to recognize how economic phenomena (the eﬀect of structures on
inﬂa on) and ﬁnding the root cause of inﬂa on can further explain its rela onship. Moreover,
the ra onal expecta ons revolu on led by Lucas, Mc Callum, Sargent and Hansen also known as
the ﬁrst genera on of classical macroeconomists, argued that people do not consistently make the
same forecas ng errors as recommended in the adap ve expecta ons idea. The economic agents
formed their macroeconomic expecta ons “ra onally” based on all past and current relevant
informa on available and not on past informa on as in the case of backward-looking or adap ve,
price expecta ons.
In addi on to this, the neoclassical synthesis led by Paul Samuelson explains that monetary
demand factors are key determinants of business cycles because of the incorporated new Keynesian
assump on of price s ckiness in the short run. At the same me however, the neoclassical
synthesis assigns a poten al large func on to supply shocks in explaining real economic ac vity.
The highly complex model of the new neoclassical synthesis allows the Keynesian and real
business cycle mechanisms to operate through somewhat diﬀerent channels. The Neoclassical
synthesis, postulated IS-LM-Philips curve version which views price level as an endogenous
variable. The Neoclassical synthesis also views expecta ons as cri cal to the inﬂa on process
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and also accepts expecta ons as amenable to management by a monetary policy rule. The IS
curve relates expected output growth to the real interest rate which is a central implica on of
the modern theory of consump on. The aggregate supply and Philips curve components of the
model relates inﬂa on today to expected future inﬂa on and output gap. New poli cal theories
of inﬂa on also assert that poli cal forces not the social planner choose economic policy in the
real world. Economic policy is the result of a decision process that balances conlic ng interests
so that a collec ve choice may emerge. The new poli cal economy, literature provides fresh
perspec ves on the rela onship between ming of elec ons, performance of policy makers,
poli cal instability, policy credibility and reputa on and inﬂa on process itself.
LITERATURE REVIEW
To further expound on the impact of the price of oil on Ghana’s inﬂa on, an exis ng literature
was reviewed to analyze and discuss the work of various authors. There are several analyses made
by scholars on the impact of the price of oil on domes c inﬂa on of countries. Numerous groups
of empirical research have conﬁrmed that oil price hikes have strong and nega ve inluences for
the real economy (Hamilton, 1983; Burbidge and Harrison, 1984; Gisser and Goodwin, 1986;
and Cuñado and Pérez de Gracia, 2003). When oil prices plummeted in 1986, the established
model was cri cally challenged. Also, there was li le evidence to suggest that oil price decrease
improves economic ac vi es, in the same way that oil price increase suppresses economic
ac vi es. Several authors therefore re-examined the oil price-macroeconomic rela onship, using
instead, asymmetric or nonlinear methods (Mork, 1989; Mork et al., 1994; Lee et al., 1995;
Hamilton, 1996; Hamilton, 2003; and Cuñado and Pérez de Gracia, 2005). They found that the
nega ve linkage between oil price increases and economic ac vity s ll held. Consequently, it
may be reasonable to par on oil price changes into oil price increases and decreases for the
analysis of the related issue. Although a considerable amount of research has found that oil
price shocks have aﬀected the real output, only a few emphasize the eﬀects of inla on. Quite
recently, Blanchard and Galí (2007) examined the eﬀects of the recent oil shock on output and
inﬂa on and a empted to answer why the current shocks (as in the 2000s) have had smaller
eﬀects on output and inﬂa on than that in the 1970s. De Gregorio et al. (2007) provided a variety
of es mates of the degree of transmission from oil prices to inﬂa on over me for a large set
of countries. Moreover, using a structural coﬁntegrated VAR model for G-7 countries, Cologini
and Manera (2008) found that for all countries except Japan and U.K., changes in oil prices did
inﬂuence the inﬂa on rates.
In addi on, some researchers suggested that oil price shocks on real GDP growth or CPI were
compara vely small on average, but that they did ma er in the par cular me period. For example,
Bernanke et al. (1997) es mated their model over the whole sample and over each of the three
decades (1966- 75, 1976- 85, and 1986- 1995); Kilian (2008) focused on ive speciﬁc oil shock
episodes: 1973 / 74, 1978, 1980, 1990 / 91, and 2002 / 03, respec vely. However, some problems
may arise from these two studies. In the paper by Bernanke et al., the division of ten years as a
sub-sample is arbitrary. In the Kilian paper, on the other hand, the es mates may be sensi ve to
the 6 choices of sample and as such may lead to poten al bias due to inadequate observa ons.
METHODOLOGY
In analyzing this paper, the method used to complete this assignment is per nent. The major
objec ve of this paper is to assess whether a correla on between oil price and domes c inla on
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(CPI) of Ghana exist. This research employs quan ta ve data in its analysis. In this empirical
analysis of mul ple regression, annual me series data for consumer price index, exchange rates,
interest rates (Bank of Ghana policy rate), and oil prices from the period of 1987 to 2015 were
employed. The data on consumer price index were selected from the World Bank, while oil prices
were collated from World Texas Intermediate oil prices. Also, exchange rates and interest rates
were assembled from the Bank of Ghana. For this empirical study, Ordinary Least Square (OLS)
is employed to accomplish the researcher’s objec ve of determining the correla on between the
world market oil price and domes c inﬂa on of Ghana. Furthermore, a hypothesis is formulated
to test the rela onship between the regressor and the regressand variables. In this analysis,
obtaining data for real interest rate was fruitless and hence the Bank of Ghana’s policy rate were
used as a proxy for interest rates. This is per nent since this research is focused on validity,
measurement and objec vity in explaining the variable of interest. A major tool employed by
countries to control inﬂa on is monetary policy. Central banks may tend to (a signiﬁcant extent)
control inﬂa on through targe ng interest rates. Research papers have found that interest rate was
an important factor in the discussion of the rela onship between the price of oil on GDP such as
Huang et al (2005) and Huang (2008). Based on this, interest rate was employed in the controlled
model. Also, exchange rate has been largely omi ed from the related literature and hence the
inclusion of this variable tends to be per nent because it plays a major role on monetary policy
in the interna onal economy as established by Krugman (1983) and Rogoﬀ(1991). In eﬀect,
exchange rate becomes signiﬁcant in this regard. Oﬃcial exchange rate used in this analysis
is deﬁned as to the exchange rate determined by na onal authori es or the rate determined in
the legally sanc oned exchange market. It is calculated as an annual average based on monthly
averages (local currency units rela ve to the U.S. dollar). Also, the correla on coeﬃcient will
be calculated to determine the rela onship between the dependent and independent variables of
interest.
SPECIFICATION OF THE MODEL
The model to be used for the analysis is summarized as follows:
CPI = β

0

+ β 1OILP + β 2 EXR + β 3 INT μ………………… equ(1)

For the purpose of accomplishing the goal of this research, the variables of interest are logged.
ln(CPI i ) = β 0 + β 1 In(OILP i ) + β 2 InEXR i + β 3 InINT i + μ ……………… equ(2)
In the speciﬁed model above, CPI i which is the dependent variable represents the Consumer Price
Index, which reﬂects changes in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods
and services that may be ﬁxed or changed at speciﬁed intervals, such as yearly with 2010 as base
year. OILP i as an explanatory variable, denotes oil prices on the world market. Moreover, other
independent variables in the model are EXR i and INT i which represent foreign exchange rates in
currency units per U.S. dollar and real interest rates respec vely. μ i in the equa on is known as
the disturbance term which encompasses other variables that could aﬀect CPIi but are not listed
in the equa on. Also, β 0 in the equa on, is the constant of the equa on which represents CPI
when OILP, EXR and INT are equal to zero.
This research is hypothesized as:
H 0 : = 0 - There is no correla on between prices of oil and domes c infla on.
H 1 : = 1 - There is a correla on between prices of oil and domes c infla on.
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ANALYSIS
The price of oil and inﬂa on is o en seen as a causal rela onship. Also, the conven onal
wisdom of economics is that, as oil prices change, inﬂa on moves in similar direc on. The
direct rela onship between oil and inﬂa on was experienced in the 1970’s when the cost of oil
upsurged from a normal price of $3 preceding the 1973 oil crisis to around $40 during the 1979 oil
crisis. The oil crisis canker precipitated the consumer price index to double from 41.2 during the
incep on of 1972 to 86.3 by the end of 1980. Irrespec ve of the ﬁndings of the direct rela onship
between oil price and inﬂa on, the rela onship between oil and inﬂa on started to deteriorate
a er the 1980s and the detachment was more lucid during the oil price run-up from 1999 to 2005
when the annual average nominal price of oil rose from $16.56 to $50.04 during which CPI
increased from 164.3 in January 1999 to 196.8 in December 2005. Again, various scholars have
accentuated that the link between oil and inﬂa on has signiﬁcantly been debilitated. Blanchard
and Gali (2007) directed their research on prices, wage inﬂa on, output and employment to oil
shocks. They concluded that the responses of all these variables to oil shock have become muted
since the mid 1980’s. Also, Hooker (2000) maintained that the structural wearing between oil
and inﬂa on cessated by the end of 1980. What then is the rela onship between oil and inﬂa on
in Ghana?
In this quan ta ve analysis, the frui on of the regression analysis connotes that:
In(CPI) = 1.051953125 + In(-0.232035205) OILP
INT i

i

+ In 0.960250032 EXR

i

+ In 0.000306063

The R square recorded 85% from 24 observa on. The analysis of this research explains that the
results obtained are in disparate direc on with the research by Blanchard and Gali (2007) that
maintained that oil price shocks have li le or no eﬀect on inﬂa on. In the cri cal analysis of the
data, it was unequivocal that the data overview is rather in tandem with the research conducted by
Hamilton, 1983, Burbidge and Hanison 1984, Gisser and Goodwin 1986 and Cunado and Perez
de Gracia, 2003). An overview of table 4 in the appendix elucidates that the R square of 0.9847
illustrates that 98.47% of the varia on in the inﬂa on (CPI) is explained by the independent
variables (World Texas oil price, exchange rate and interest rates). This further presupposes that
a signiﬁcant aspect of the varia on is captured by the model with 1.53% accounted for as error.
Moreover, it is per nent to expand on the overall signiﬁcance of the mul ple regression model.
The tool of signiﬁcance F is used, which Wilcox (2010) asserted that for the correla on in the
regression model to be meaningful, its signiﬁcance F must be less than 0.1 (10%). In this analysis,
the mul ple linear regression model read 0.00000000000000000264 and hence the model is thus
very signiﬁcant in that regard. The further signiﬁca on between the overall rela onship of the
independent and dependent variables is sta s cally signiﬁcant. Also, the coeﬃcient of OILP i ,
the independent variable of interest, is shown to have a posi ve and sta s cally signiﬁcant
rela onship with (CPI i ). The correla on between OILP i and (CPI i ) is signiﬁcant since the p-value
(0.049685) of the coeﬃcient of OILP i is lesser than the signiﬁcant level of 5%. The p-value of
each variable tests the null hypothesis whether the respec ve coeﬃcients are equal to zero. When
a low p-value is obtained (lesser than the signiﬁcance level (5%), the null hypothesis is rejected
because the p-value signiﬁes that the variable is likely to be meaningful in the model hence
sta s cally signiﬁcant (Fenton & Neil, 2012). The posi ve coeﬃcient of 0.273692 (27.37%)
of OILP i indicates that a percentage increase in OILP i will lead to n 27.27% increase in CPI i
.In a nutshell, an increase in OILP i which precipitates an increase in CPI tends to generally
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conform to the major research argument by various scholars that world oil price is correlated
with inﬂa on. This research further repudiates what researchers like Hooker (2002) suggested
that a structural break in the rela onship between inﬂa on and oil prices occurred at the end of
1980s. Direc ng the analysis to the other independent variables of interest, the regression output,
shows a posi ve correla on between EXR i and CPI i . The coeﬃcient of 0.908044 EXR i explains
that, a percentage increase in EXRi will engender an increment 0.908044 (90.8%) in CPI. When
exchange rates are high, this causes a deprecia on of the domes c currency and this tends to
upsurge CPI i as es mated in the regression model. Moreover, the coeﬃcient of the INT i was
nevertheless insigniﬁcant since its p-value is 0.797581 higher than the signiﬁcance level of 5%.
Furthermore, the interest rates, INTi , showed a posi ve and insigniﬁcant rela onship with CPI i in
the es mated model. Its coeﬃcient and p-value were 0.046257 and 0.797581 respec vely. The
posi ve rela onship indicates that as INT i increases, CPI i increases by an insigniicant margin
of 4.6%. This explains that a major factor that tends to inﬂuence inﬂa on is interest rate and it
is per nent to formulate policies that will keep the interest rate low. Also, the Bank of Ghana
(monetary policy) tends to correlate posi vely with Ghana’s inﬂa on (CPI) and as such it will be
discreet to adjust the monetary policy as and when needed to engender low inﬂa on.
A further tes ng on the results of the hypothesis given the already established statements:
H 0 : = 0 - There is no correla on between prices of oil and domes c inﬂa on; and
H 1 : = 1 - There is a correla on between prices of oil and domes c inﬂa on.
By employing the linear regression tool which was used in tes ng the hypothesis, the rela onship
between the dependent and the independent variable is signiﬁcant since the slope was greater
than zero. According to the data on table 2 which established a rela onship between the prices of
oil and inﬂa on (CPI), using a signiﬁcance value of 5%, the calcula ons produced a p-value of
0.0000000472. Since the p-value is lesser than the signiﬁcance level, the H 0 is rejected meaning
that the slope of the regression is not equal to 0. Hence there exists a signiﬁcant rela onship
between prices of oil and inﬂa on. Also, this results further corroborates the outcome of the
mul ple linear regression that the world oil price is correlated with the domes c inﬂa on of
Ghana. Moreover, from table 2 at the appendix, it is witnessed that, the correla on between
oil prices and inﬂa on (CPI) is 0.8655 (86.55%), which is posi ve. This shows that there is a
posi ve linear rela onship between the world oil price and inﬂa on (CPI). Given the correla on
of 86.55 % the two variables are said to be highly correlated.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Oil price is a momentous determinant of global economic performance. In most cases, when
oil prices tends to be creeping high, it leads to a transfer of income from impor ng countries
to expor ng countries through shi s in terms of trade. The link between oil and inﬂa on is
mostly seen as being correla onal. The direct rela onship between oil and inla on was
evident in 1970’s, nevertheless, this rela onship started to deteriorate a er the 1980’s. Quite a
cornucopia of researchers have made relentless inquiry on the macroeconomics impacts of oil
price shocks and hikes on economic growth and consumer price inﬂa on on impor ng countries.
Also, an inﬁnitesimal analyses have tackled the research ques on about the impact on the oil
price on inﬂa on. For many developing countries, oil price hikes over the last few years has
warranted the need for structural reforms of the domes c petroleum pricing system. Numerous
governments across the world have been reluctant to pass on upsurging prices to consumers due
to its ramiﬁca ons of exacerba ng the quandary of the have-nots in their respec ve countries.
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Irrespec ve of being solicitous about ci zens, governments are obliged to cut social spending if
they do not pass on higher prices to consumers since there is a higher tendency for governments
to experience ﬁscal burdens if they fail to pass on higher prices to consumers. The adverse
eﬀects of oil price shocks tend to jeopardize economic growth since businesses, consumers and
government budgets are bedeviled with ﬁscal pressures. In Ghana, the debate on whether prices
correlates with domes c inﬂa on lingers on. The debate has created major polariza on among
policy makers and analysts with some analysts subscribing to the fact that the world oil prices
are correlated to Ghana’s inﬂa on, while on the other hand another group of people repudiate
the correla onal eﬀect of world oil on Ghana’s inﬂa on. This paper therefore quan ta vely
examined the rela onship between the world prices of oil on Ghana’s inﬂa on. To expound the
analysis to gain a be er insight, a mul ple OLS regression was employed with annual me series
data on the consumer price index, exchange rates, interest rates (Bank of Ghana policy rate) from
1987 to 2015. Moreover, a hypothesis was formulated and tested to determine the rela onship
between world oil price and inﬂa on. To tell the rela onship, linear regression was established
in conjunc on with correla on matrix. In this analysis, the ﬁndings revealed that the research is
analogous with scholarly work done by Hamilton, 1983; Burbidge and Harrison, 1984; Gisser
and Goodwin, 1986; and Cuñado and Pérez de Gracia, 2003. It was found that, world oil prices
have a posi ve and sta s cally signiﬁcant rela onship with inﬂa on (CPI). Focusing on the
linear regression, it was found that, there exists a signiﬁcant rela onship between world price
and inﬂa on (CPI) and the correla on matrix showed 86.55% correla on of the variables which
corroborates the high rela onship between the variables thereby rejec ng the null hypothesis.
In sum, this research concluded that oil price is correla onal with Ghana's inﬂa on and hence
ﬁndings by Blanchard and Galí (2007) and De Gregorio et al. (2007). This paper has taken cri cal
turn to review Gregario et al ( 2007) that the relentless deteriora on of the rela on between oil
prices and inﬂa on which has become more evident in the last ten years does not apply to a
developing na on like Ghana.
Inlfa on in Ghana has beso ed the economy with some ravages, crippling policies and budgets.
This horrendous eﬀects of inﬂa on has made many folks congregate and fulminate against
government in recent mes. In this empirical analysis, the research ﬁndings maintain that, world
price of oil is correlated with Ghana’s inﬂa on. The causes of inﬂa on can be ascribed to be
from the goods market or money market. The money market has to be parallel to that of the
goods market and whenever the cause of inﬂa on emanates from the goods market, government
ﬁscal policies can be employed to tame inﬂa on. On the other hand, inﬂa on from the money
market can be subdued with sagacious monetary policies. The research found that there is a
posi ve correla onal eﬀect of world oil prices and inﬂa on. Many countries also depend on
imported oil and yet they are frui ul in manipula on policies to keep inﬂa on low. For instance,
Germany and Japan depend 100% on imported oil, yet these na ons have a enuated inﬂa on to
the lowest levels. What then happened to Ghana that also imports oil? Many phenomena (like
the price of oil can have ephemeral ﬂuctua ons in inﬂa ons but they do not have perpetual eﬀect
so far as they do not aﬀect monetary growth. World oil price is a factor that tends to inﬂuence
inﬂa on in Ghana but the main cause of Ghana’s inﬂa on is macroeconomic indiscipline by
policy makers. It is signiﬁcant in this regard that government orchestrate eﬃcient policies to
cushion the economy from the adverse eﬀects of oil price shocks. The government of Ghana can
employ policies like fully passing on price increases and subsidies of end-user prices. Mostly in a
completely deregulated market, prices are passed on to consumers fully when oil prices increases.
In Ghana, the government could adjust the pricing formula to reﬂect oil price shocks. Also,
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the government should set up petroleum product price stabiliza on funds to manage revenue
shor alls when there are abrupt oil price shocks. The government can also acquire and store
more oil at a cheaper price to be released when there are supply shortages in the world market.
Subsidies may also be used by governments to address the oil price shocks. Since petroleum
products are used by the wider popula on in Ghana, the government may decide to subsidize
interna onal price increases of petroleum products par ally or fully. Moreover, the government
should pass policies to reduce the cost of supply of petroleum products. These policies could be
in the form of establishing bulk purchasing agencies or agreement between companies so that
economies of scale can be achieved to help reduce cost passed on to consumers and end-users.
Government can also encourage private sector hedging of oil products. By so doing, commercial
companies will hedge purchases of petroleum products to lower the average price paid. Also,
there needs to be transparent formula on and implementa on of policies by government during
oil price hikes to prevent fulmina ons and relentless agita ons from ci zens.
In addi on to this, the government of Ghana can diversify into non-petroleum sources of energy
to help cater for the adverse eﬀects of oil price shocks. The government can switch to alterna ve
sources of energy such as natural gas and renewable sources of electricity such as hydro,
geothermal, solar and wind power. There is also the need to increase the domes c supply of oil.
In Ghana, the government should increase the reining capacity of crude oil to enhance security
of oil supply. The government should increase the reining capacity of crude oil to enhance
security of supply to meet needs in the event of oil shocks. The impact of world oil price on
Ghana inﬂa on is direct. It is therefore indispensable that government policies should be geared
at mi ga ng the adverse eﬀects of oil on the economy of Ghana.
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APPENDIX
Fig1. Table 1

Source: World Texas oil prices and World Bank
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Table 2: Summary Output
Regression Sta s cs
Mul ple R

0.865591773

R Square

0.749249118

Adjusted R Square

0.73785135

Standard Error
Observa ons

19.88466976
24

ANOVA
df

SS

Regression

1

25992.21

25992.21058 65.73648

Residual

22

8698.802

395.4000917

Total

23

34691.01

coeﬁcients

MS

Signiﬁcance
F

Standard
Error

F

t-stat

p-value

4.72E-08

Lower
95%

Upper
95%

Lower
95%

Upper
95%

Intercept

19.42929051 8.585298

-2.26308854 0.033841 -37.2341

-1.62447 -37.2341 -1.62447

World oil
price

1.150036696 0.141843

8.107803705 4.72E-08 0.855872

1.444201 0.855872 1.444201

Table 3: Correla on Matrix
World Texas
oil prices
World Texas oil price
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Inﬂa on
rate
1

Inﬂa on rate (CPI)

0.865591773

Exchange rate

0.847926627

0.979717024

Interest rate

-0.773190647

-0.737297103

Exchange

Interest

rate

rate

1
1
-0.763045797

1

Table 4
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Sta s cs
Mul ple R

0.992305

R Square

0.984669

Adjusted R Square

0.982369

Standard Error

0.174583

Observa ons

24

ANOVA

Regression

df
3

SS
39.15166

MS
F
13.05055 428.1772

Residual

20

0.609587

0.030479

Total

23

coeﬁcients

Standard
Error

Intercept

2.777994

World Texas
Intermediate
oil price ($)

Signiﬁcance
F
2.64E-18

39.76125

p-value

Lower
95%

1.003512 2.768272

0.011859

0.684704 4.871284 0.684704 4.871284

0.273692

0.13591

0.049685 -0.00981

Exchange rate

0.908044

0.039414 23.03863

7.14E-16

0.825828 0.99026

0.825828 0.99026

Interest rate
(BOG policy rate)

0.046257

0.177967 0.259921

0.797581

-0.32498

-0.32498
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t-stat

2.013773

Upper
95%

Lower
95%

0.557195 -0.00981

0.41749

Upper
95%

0.557195

0.41749

Table 4: Macroeconomics data

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

World Texas
Intermediate oil prices
($)
42.13
34.87
32.43
23.59
27.18
29.42
37.96
26.93
16.32
36.75
38.79
25.94
38.57
41.38
53.99
71.61
72.89
106.73
46.27
81.58
96.34
104.73
93.8
99.84

Inﬂa on rate
(CPI)

Exchange rate

2.16
2.55
2.81
3.51
4.38
6.99
10.24
13.09
15.01
16.87
21.12
28.07
32.23
40.82
45.98
52.93
58.71
65.01
75.75
90.33
75.75
90.33
118.69
132.46

Data Source: World Texas oil prices, World Bank, Bank of Ghana
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0.03
0.04
0.04
0.06
0.1
0.12
0.16
0.2
0.23
0.27
0.54
0.72
0.79
0.87
0.9
0.91
0.92
0.94
1.06
1.41
1.43
1.51
1.8
1.95

Interest rate
(BOG Policy
rate)
30
20
30
35
33
45
45
45
37
27
27
27
24.5
21.5
18.5
15.5
12.5
13.5
17
18
13.5
12.5
15
16
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PREAMBLE
Emerging market economies have been an engine of global growth during the 2000s, especially
a er the 2007- 2008 global ﬁnancial crises. However, mes are changing. Growth rates in several
emerging market economies have been declining since 2010.
A further decelera on of ac vi es in key emerging and developing economies overshadowed a
modest recovery in major high-income countries in 2015. This decelera on was accompanied by
further decline in commodity prices and now global growth con nues to disappoint with 2.4% in
2015, 0.4 % point below June 2015. Going forward, global growth is projected to edge up, but
at a slower pace than envisioned in the June 2015 forecast, reaching 2.9 % in 2016 and 3.1 %
2017 - 18. (Figure 1.0).
Figure 1.0: Global Commodity prices for Energy, Agricultural raw materials and Metals

Source: World Bank

Again in January 2016, oil prices fell to their lowest levels in more than a decade. China, the
world’s second-largest economy, is experiencing sluggish growth than other emerging markets.
This slowdown in China could result in weakening commodity prices as well as African
economies more than most, because China and other emerging markets have not only been
primary consumers of African commodi es, but also have been development ﬁnancier for the
major infrastructure and other development projects that are essen al to Africa’s future economic
growth. This could cause China to delay further or lead to a cancella on of planned investments
in resource sectors.
Despite challenges in growth projec ons and op mism across the African con nent, it is possible
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to project which countries will emerge undamaged or be er oﬀ and which countries will or must
act quickly to change their nega ve economic situa on a er the emerging markets downturn.
North Africa is expected to grow at a steady rate over the next ive years, and countries like
Morocco will move well, while for others, like Libya, given the general poli cal instability and
insecurity in the country, the future is less promising. East African countries Kenya, Ethiopia,
Rwanda, and Tanzania will also perform well overall, each expected to grow at more than 6.5 %
in 2016, a full 3 percent over the con nental average. The forecast for West Africa is a mixed one,
as Nigeria struggles with falling oil prices and terror groups, while Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal
are widely considered some of the best prospects for inves ng in Africa, reﬂected by increased
public infrastructure investment, the boost for the private sector, improved agricultural ac vi es
and an improved business environment. In southern Africa, growth is expected to remain weak
due to inadequate power supply, droughts in some parts and weak business conﬁdence; but South
Africa will con nue to hold down the region’s overall economic outlook.
FUTURE OF AFRICAN ECONOMY
Sub-Saharan Africa faces a challenging near-term outlook. Commodity prices are expected to
stabilize but remain low through 2017 (Figure 2.0). The normaliza on of U.S. monetary policy
is expected to ghten global ﬁnancial condi ons. Although, governments are taking steps to
resolve power issues, electricity supply bo lenecks are expected to persist. These factors point to
a somewhat weaker recovery in 2016 than previously an cipated. A er slowing to 3.4 % in 2015,
ac vity is expected to pick up to 4.2 % in 2016 and to 4.7 percent in 2017 - 18.
Figure 2.0: Commodity Prices Outlook

Source: World Bank.
Note: Shaded area denotes an es mated or
forecast value.

This projec on assumes that commodity prices stabilize and electricity constraints ease (table
1.0). There are, however, considerable varia ons within the region.
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World Bank forecasts are frequently updated based on new informa on and changing (global)
circumstances. Consequently, projec ons presented here may diﬀer from those contained in
other Bank documents, even if basic assessments of countries’ prospects do not diﬀer at any
given moment in me.

a. GDP at market prices and expenditure components are measured in constant 2010 U.S.
dollars. Excludes Somalia, Central African Republic, and São Tomé and Principe.
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4.9

2013

4.6

2014

3.4

2 015e

4.2

20161

20171

4.7

Source: World Bank

Netexports.contribu ontogrowth
Memo items: GDP
Broader geographic region e
SSA excluding South Africa
Oil exporters f
CFA countries g
South Africa
Nigeria
Angola

Developing SSA, GDP b
GDP per capital (U.S dollars)
PPP GDP
Private consump onc
Public consump on
FIixed nvestment
Exports. GNFS d
Imports. GNFS d
0.5
4.5
5.7
5.4
5.5
1.5
6.3
3.9

4.8
5.8
5.5
4.6
2.2
5.4
6.8

4.6
1.9
4.9
3.2
3.9
8.7
5.0
3.0

-2.8

-2.2
6.8

4.8
2.0
5.0
9.9
1.9
9.6

3.3
4.1
3.3
4.4
1.3
3.3
3.0

-0.3

3.5
0.8
3.7
3.1
3.2
6.2
2.1
3.0

4.2
5.1
4.5
5.7
1.4
4.6
3.3

-0.2

4.2
1.5
4.4
3.7
3.5
6.6
2.6
3.1

4.6
5.7
5.2
6.0
1.6
5.3
3.8

-0.2

4.7
2.0
4.9
4.0
3.7
7.1
2.9
3.2

4.7
5.7
5.2
5.9
1.6
5.3
3.8

-0.2

4.7
2.0
5.0
4.1
3.8
7.2
2.9
3.2

b

20181

4.7

(Average including countries with full na onal accounts and balance of payments data only)

Developing SSA. GDP

(Annual Percent change unless indicated otherwise)

Table 1.0: Sub Saharan Africa Forecast summary

-0.7
-0.8
-0.8
0.3
-0.7
-1.2
-1.5

-0.2

-0.7
-0.9
-0.7
-0.9
-0.4
-0.5
-0.7
0.0

-0.8

2015e

-0.3
-0.3
-0.3
0.2
-0.7
-0.4
-0.6

-0.1

-0.4
-0.6
-0.4
-0.5
-0.2
-0.7
-0.5
0.0

-0.3

2016t

-0.4
-0.2
-0.3
0.0
-0.8
-0.2
-1.3

-0.2

-0.3
-05
-0.3
-0.5
-0.1
-0.7
-0.4
0.0

-0.3

2017t

(Percentage point
diﬀerence from June
2015 projec ons)

b. Sub-region aggregate excludes Liberia, Somalia, Central African Republic, São Tomé
and Principe, and South Sudan, for which data limita ons prevent the forecas ng of GDP
components.
c. The sudden surge in private consump on in the region in 2013 is driven by the revised and
rebased NIA data of Nigeria in 2014.
d. Exports and imports of goods and non-factor services (GNFS).
e. Includes developing SSA and the following high-income countries: Equatorial Guinea and
Seychelles.
f. Includes Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Gabon, Nigeria, Sudan, Chad and Democra c
Republic of Congo.
g. Includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon,
Democra c Republic of Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Chad and
Togo.
Consump on dynamics will con nue to diﬀer for oil exporters and importers. Private consump on
growth is expected to remain weak in oil exporter countries as the removal of subsidies to
alleviate pressure on budgets results in higher fuel costs and as currency deprecia on weighs
on consumers’ purchasing power. By contrast, lower inﬂa on in oil importers, owing in part
to lower fuel prices, should help boost consumer spending. The price level impact of currency
deprecia on combined with interest rate increases could, however, moderate these eﬀects.
Investment dynamics will also diﬀer among Sub-Saharan African commodity exporters.
The slowdown in major emerging markets, low commodity prices, and deteriora ng growth
prospects in many commodity exporters, are expected to result in lower FDI lows. Explora on
and development ac vity is expected to be curtailed in oil and gas.
Con nuing ﬁscal consolida on in oil-expor ng countries is expected to result in further capital
expenditure cuts, as governments seek to limit cuts in public-sector wages and protect social
spending. However, in a number of low-income, non-oil commodity exporters, governments are
expected to con nue to invest heavily in energy and transport infrastructure in a bid to improve
the opera onal environment for growth, drawing in part, on the proceeds from previous bond
issuances (Ethiopia), public-private partnerships (Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania), donor aid
(Rwanda) and, in some cases, ﬁnancing from Chinese en es (Ethiopia, Tanzania). Although
debt levels may rise, they remain manageable in most low-income countries as growth has been
robust.
The ﬁscal policy stance in commodity exporters is expected to ease gradually as commodity
prices stabilize. In Nigeria, ongoing eﬀorts to ra onalize the management and opera on of the
Nigerian Na onal Petroleum Corpora on (NNPC) should also help enhance revenue mobiliza on.
However, with oil prices projected to remain below their recent peaks, ﬁscal revenues are expected
to remain low in Angola and Nigeria. As a result, ﬁscal deﬁcits are likely to increase in these
countries, despite eﬀorts to restrain spending. Fiscal deﬁcits are also expected to remain elevated
in oil importer na ons, as spending on goods and services, wages, and physical infrastructure
con nues to expand.
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Net exports are expected to make a nega ve contribu on to real GDP growth in the near
term, despite currency deprecia ons. S ll-low commodity prices will depress export receipts,
especially among oil exporters, even as export volumes rise. The pull from advanced economies
is expected to stay modest, given their moderate prospects for medium-term growth. Among oil
importers, current account balances are expected to deteriorate in many countries on account of
strong import growth, driven by capital goods imports for infrastructure projects.
In this context:
•

Ac vity is expected to remain subdued in the region’s three largest economies. In Nigeria,
power and fuel shortages and ﬁscal consolida on, which weighed on ac vity in 2015,
are expected to diminish gradually. Growth is expected to remain weak in South Africa,
as inadequate power supply, weak business conﬁdence, diﬃcult labor rela ons and policy
ghtening slow down ac vity. In Angola, government spending remains constrained and
elevated inﬂa on has weakened consumer spending.

•

Among the region’s fron er markets, rising oil produc on and diminishing ﬁscal and current
account imbalances are expected to help li growth in Ghana. However, in Zambia, low
copper prices, compounded by regulatory uncertainty and electricity shortages, will curtail
copper produc on, export and investment. Meanwhile, despite pressure on the shilling, Kenya
and Tanzania are expected to grow at a robust pace, supported by large-scale infrastructure
projects, including the expansion of the railway system, which should help boost domes c
trade, and a new port.

•

The region’s low-income countries are expected to con nue to sustain high GDP growth.
Many of these countries have limited exposure to the commodi es that are experiencing
the most severe decline in prices. Meanwhile, large-scale investment projects in energy and
transport are ongoing, consumer spending remains robust, boosted by lower fuel prices,
and despite low minerals prices, mining output is set to rise in several countries. Public
investment, consumer spending, and mining produc on will help Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia,
Mozambique, Rwanda and Tanzania sustain rapid growth in 2016 and beyond. Several lowincome countries in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) region are
expected to see steady growth, helped in part by the stable currency peg to the euro.

HOMEGROWN PROBLEMS
The Chinese slowed down and falling commodity prices does not explain all of economic
problems facing African Con nent, but there are some internal problems in Africa which are also
the reasons for its economic shaking.
Poli cal Upheavals, Insecurity and Conﬂicts
The existence of domes c instability could deter domes c and foreign investments in some
countries, weigh on tourism and add to ﬁscal pressures. Fragmented poli cal situa ons could
also undermine the ability of governments to undertake and implement needed policies. So
on the domes c front, poli cal upheavals and conﬂicts in Burundi, Burkina Faso, and South
Sudan suggest that poli cal risks associated with the electoral process will remain a key issue
for the region in 2016 - 2017. Security risks ed to Boko Haram insurgencies are signiﬁcant
for Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria; while terrorist threats remain a concern for Kenya
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and Mali. These events could generate greater poli cal instability for the region if they were to
escalate, hur ng growth. Ethiopia’s escala ng protests have resulted in violence in various parts
of the country; and the Democra c Republic of Congo faces a fraught elec on cycle that could
easily put the country, or the region, back into conﬂict.
Corrup on and Mismanagement
In Africa, corrup on has been key barrier for economic growth. Misuse of public resources
by senior ranked leaders, government oﬃcial and public servants have been like a norm. This
occurred especially in priva za on of the sectors of economy like industrial sectors, mining
sectors, agricultural sectors, oil sector, infrastructure projects and others. From experience, SubSaharan oil resourced countries on average score lower PIM, reﬂec ng weak administra ve
capacity and low transparency in the use of public resources, than others, especially at the project
appraisal and evalua on stages of the PIM process. In Nigeria, for example, President Buhari
inherited a scandal concerning $20 billion in missing oil revenues. Similarly South African
President Jacob Zuma, where he agreed to repay $24 million of public funds he used to repair his
private house.
Heavy Debt Load
Fiscal risks are elevated in some countries, rela ng to large infrastructure projects, public-private
partnerships, and con ngent liabili es. Governments’ debts have risen rapidly in recent years, for
countries like Uganda, Ghana, Gambia and Mozambique to ﬁnance large infrastructure projects.
Uganda funds mining infrastructure and may ind it harder to service debt if produc on start dates
for oil projects are delayed further. Inconsistent and poor macroeconomic management has been
accompanied by sizeable ﬁscal slippages in the Gambia. As a result of growing ﬁscal pressures
from the drop in commodity prices and con ngent liabili es in state-owned enterprises, which
required government support in 2015, considerable risks remain in Mozambique and have led it
into nego a ons with the IMF for a ﬁscal support program (IMF, 2015). Ghana has also engaged
with IMF to bring debt relief and expand collec on of revenue by the implementa on of a special
petroleum tax, restraining the wage bill and other primary expenditures, while making space for
priority spending and for clearing all domes c arrears.
WHAT CAN BE DONE BY AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO BOOST ITS ECONOMY?
Strong Tourism Investments Ini a ves
Africa’s tourism must be set to boost economic growth, create new jobs, and outpace other areas
for new tourism investment. If Sub-Saharan Africa’s tourism industry is be er set, it will help to
spur more economic growth for the con nent and directly employ 6.7 million people by 2021,
according to World Bank report, 2013. If the tourism sector is developed eﬀec vely and managed
eﬃciently, over me, tourism has the poten al to accelerate Africa’s economic growth as well as
create jobs. It can also help accelerate the reforms needed to improve airline and road transport as
well as other key infrastructure, besides raising the incomes of young men and women, who form
a high percentage of the job holders in the sector. Also African countries must know that adding
high VAT rate to tourism business will cause the business to drop resul ng in li le contribu ons
to na onal revenue.
African economies are narrowly focused on agriculture, mining, and more recently,
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telecommunica ons. Export diversiﬁca on is a key concern. In 1980, agricultural products
represented 54% of Mauri us’s exports. As a result of the growth in tourism, agriculture now
accounts for just 16% of total exports while tex les account for 25% and tourism accounts
for 25%. In Rwanda, between 1995 and 1998, coﬀee and tea accounted for almost half of all
exports. Now travel and tourism provide 36% of exports while reliance on coﬀee and tea is
down to 20%. In Tanzania, the tourism sector, with a growth rate of 12 % for the last four years
is one of the fastest growing sectors, contribu ng about 17.2% of the GDP and 41.7% of foreign
exchange earnings in the last ive years. Many diversiﬁca ons make economies less vulnerable to
ﬂuctua ons in demand, more dynamic and more agile in the face of change. By bringing foreign
consumers to a des na on, tourism also provides an ideal opportunity for market - tes ng new
products and diversifying exports.
Emphasis on Digital Technology Investment
Africa should put emphasis on digital technology investment. Why? Because of the advantage
of rapid technological changes that are now making the world more prosperous and inclusive.
Also in Africa, development challenges are preven ng the digital revolu on from fulilling its
transforma ve poten al. Challenges include cyber-crimes, poor technological infrastructures,
poor policies, fewer availability of human capital and others. For many people, today’s increase
in access to digital technologies brings more choice and greater convenience. Through inclusion,
eﬃciency and innova on access, opportuni es are provided that were previously out of the reach
of the poor and disadvantaged. In Kenya, for example, the cost of sending remi ances dropped
by up to 90 % a er the introduc on of M-Pesa, a digital payment system. New technologies
allow women and youth to par cipate more easily in the labour market — as e-commerce
entrepreneurs in online work, or in business process outsourcing. All these will help to boost the
African economy.
The 2016 World Development Report shows that while the digital revolu on has forged ahead,
its “analog complements”— the regula ons that promote entry and compe on, the skills
that enable workers to access and then leverage the new economy, and the ins tu ons that are
accountable to ci zens — have not kept pace. And when these analog complements to digital
investments are absent, the development impact can be disappoin ng.
Strengthening Regional Integra ons and Trade Liberaliza on
Although the process of trade liberaliza on has advanced throughout the regions, trade regimes are
s ll signiﬁcantly more complex and restric ve than elsewhere. Import tariﬀ rates remain too high
and too dispersed, in part because governments are very dependent on this source of budgetary
revenue but also because of the prevalence of statutory and piecemeal exemp ons. Elimina ng
these exemp ons, preferably in the context of medium term tax reform programs would allow
tariﬀs to be reduced more rapidly. At the same me, export taxes could be substan ally reduced,
if not eliminated.
Eﬃcient regional integra on would allow many countries to surmount the obstacles posed by
their rela vely small sizes, permit them to realise greater economies of scale, and increase their
ability to trade on a global basis, thus, further enhancing growth. In addi on, trade liberaliza on
would also help improve the quality of governance because complex and discre onary tax
regimes are prone to abuse and create opportuni es for corrup on.
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Inspiring examples from East African countries – Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, South
Sudan and Burundi – have demonstrated that to a ack ineﬃciencies is not only possible but
yields rapid returns. Construc on of interna onal standard gauge railway to connect Tanzania
and Rwanda, also Northern Circuit Corridor project to connect Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya and
South Sudan will remove barrier to movement of goods, people and capital.
Intensify Diversiﬁca on Eﬀorts
Weak global growth and China's economic crisis have forced African economies to increase
diversiﬁca on eﬀort. African countries that have been able to diversify their products and trade
partners will suﬀer less during the current crises compared to those who depend highly on one or
two products or partners.
A good example is drawn from East African countries. Apart from East Africa, there is Cote
d'Ivoire which is also an interes ng example. One of the leading sources of cocoa for the world's
markets, the country looked at how to move from expor ng raw cocoa to manufacturing chocolate,
so that chocolate is now manufactured in the same place where its raw materials are sourced.
This has helped in making the country more resilient and is also helping it build an industrial
base. This is an encouraging story.
In Senegal there is the president's plan "Emergence" – a plan to invest in cri cal infrastructure in
order to allow Senegal to emerge and have a more robust economy.
Ethiopia has undertaken a local strategy of providing agricultural inputs and technical skills to
farmers; and as a result, doubled its maize produc on over a twenty-year period, now making it
the second largest maize producer in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Strong Emphasis on Conﬂict Resolu ons, Peace and Security
When state ins tu ons do not adequately protect ci zens’ legal and social rights, they do not
adhere to na onal cons tu ons; they do not guard against corrup on; and do not provide access
to jus ce. When markets do not provide job opportuni es, there is the occurrence of tribal and
religious conﬂicts and when communi es have lost social cohesion, the likelihood of violent
conﬂict increases.
The horn of Africa, which includes Sudan and Somalia contains today, nearly all the problems
that are on the world’s agenda: ethnic, religious and border conﬂicts, civil war, high military
expenditure, migra on and refugees, famine and the break-up of states. It is a region where the
Cold War played itself out, and s ll deserves a lot of world a en on.
West Africa also is a region that is becoming the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental
and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real “strategic danger.” Like Issues
of Boko Haram in Nigeria.
North African countries like Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Egypt s ll grapple with Islamic
fundamentalism. Although there are fundamentalist movements and trends in Israel, USA and
India, that of North Africa, par cularly Algeria, tends to defy any solu on as events there have
proved since 1992.
East and Central Africa are alike as the level of peace and instability is not stable. In countries
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like Kenya, there have been threats of terrorism like the West Gate Mall and Garrisa University
students’ a acks. Burundi has seen a lot of chaos following the president's announcement for third
term presiden al bid. There is the possibility of a similar thing playing out in the Democra c
Republic of Congo DRC.
For African economic prosperity, major stakeholders must work together to ensure peace and
security - star ng with state ins tu ons, regional integra ons like EAC, African Union (AU),
the Commonwealth as well as United Na ons (UN). All of these need collec ve bargaining to
combat the problem, but there are major structural gaps in our collec ve capabili es to support
these areas star ng from na onal level to Interna onal level. United Na ons Security Council
needs to be reformed. As a ma er of principle, there should at least be one representa ve from
the African con nent on the Security Council, along with representa ves from the other regions
of the world and some of the other powers that have emerged. So, inves ng in ci zen security,
jus ce, good governance, democracy and jobs crea on in Africa is essen al for reducing violence
as well as boos ng produc vity.
Strong Focus on Value Addi on
It has been observed that African countries export raw materials only to buy them back in the
form of ﬁnished products. It is high me African countries focused their eﬀorts on building up
industries, skills and technologies so they can produce their own high quality products, crea ng
much-needed jobs and income for their people. For many African countries that have been heavily
dependent on the export of raw commodi es, there is growing recogni on that the next stages of
economic growth will require much greater a en on to the work of ‘adding value’ to raw products
and commodi es as a means of accelera ng job crea on and promo ng higher proﬁt margins
and returns on investment. Also African governments must open the door to partnerships on this
issue par cularly Public Private Partnership. They must also collaborate and engage development
stakeholders like African Development Bank (AFDB). In Zambia, following challenges posed
by low copper prices, AFDB President, Akinwumi Adesina stated that Zambia needs to embrace
agriculture and increase value addi on through food processing, thereby reducing shocks as a
result of low copper prices. The AFDB is ready to work with Zambia on that issue.
CONCLUSION
The current emerging market downturn in economic powerhouses like China, has already
nega vely aﬀected African economic growth. For resource-rich countries, it is a chance to
improve their public investment management (PIM) system, which could help boost growth;
although from experience drawn, Sub-Saharan oil resourced countries on average score lower in
PIM, reﬂec ng weak administra ve capacity and low transparency in the use of public resources,
especially at the project appraisal and evalua on stages of the PIM process.
Countries that have successfully diversiﬁed their economies will suﬀer less than those that have
not and they will enjoy less stress than countries depending on expor ng one or two commodi es
for their economic growth. Some East African countries and countries like Morocco, Senegal and
Côte d’Ivoire are among countries that are harves ng the fruits of diversifying their economy and
facing less economic shock. It is hoped that this will be a lesson for others to learn from.
God bless Africa. Together for African prosperity!!!
pg |141

REFERENCES
Adeleye Oyeniyi. (2011). Conﬂict and violence in Africa: Causes, sources and types. Retrieved
from
h ps://www.transcend.org/tms/2011/02/conlict-and-violence-in-africa-causes-sourcesand-types
Aubrey Hruby. (2015, October). China’s Slowdown: An opportunity for Africa to address
longstanding economic ineﬃciencies. Financial Times. Retrieved from h p://blogs. .com/
beyond-brics/2015/10/26/chinas-slowdown-an-opportunity-for-africa-to-address-longstandingeconomic-ineﬁciencies/
Brussels oﬃce weblog. (2016, March). Embrace agriculture, improve food processing – Adesina. Retrieved from h p://brussels.cta.int/index.php?op on=com_
k2&view=item&id=12702:embrace-agriculture-improve-food-processing-adesina
Eugene Kwibuka. (2016, May). How Can Africa Reposi on Itself For Economic Growth?
Retrieved from H p://Www.New mes.Co.Rw/Sec on/Ar cle/2016-05-12/199810/
Food Security. (2015, October). Factors that transformed maize produc vity in Ethiopia. Food
Security, 7, 965 – 981. Retrieved from h p://link.springer.com/ar cle/10.1007/s12571-0150488-z
h p://www.cnbcafrica.com/news/special-report/2015/09/28/africa-permanent-seat-unsc/
Ghana lags behind Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal & Kenya. (2016, June). Retrieved from h p://
www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/Ghana-lags-behind-C-te-d-Ivoire-SenegalKenya-448053
Interna onal Monetary Fund. Promo ng Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, Learning What Works.
Economic Issues, 23. Retrieved from h p://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ /issues/issues23/
Interna onal Monetary Fund. 2015. “IMF Holds Discussions on the 5th Review under the PSI,
on a New SCF Arrangement, and on the 2015 Ar cle IV Consulta on with Mozambique.” IMF
Press Release 15/488, October 29, 2015, Washington, DC.
Interna onal Monetary Fund. (2016, April). World Economic Outlook: Too slow for too long.
Retrieved from h ps://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ /weo/2016/01/pdf/text.pdf
John O. Kakonge. (2016, February). Adding value to African products and services. Retrieved
from h p://www.pambazuka.org/governance/adding-value-african-products-and-services
Lisa Steyn, “Are We Heading for an African Debt Crisis?” Mail and Guardian, February 12,
2016, h p://mg.co.za/ar cle/2016-02-11-are-we-heading-for-an-african-debt-crisis
Lisa Steyn. (2016, February). Are we heading for an African debt crisis? Retrieved from h p://
mg.co.za/ar cle/2016-02-11-are-we-heading-for-an-african-debt-crisis
Manuela Kasper-Claridge. (2016). African economies diversify to become resilient. Retrieved
from h p://dw.com/p/1IlxO
Mauro P., et al. (2015). Monitoring and Managing Fiscal Risks in the East African Community.”
African Departmental Paper 15/7, Interna onal Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.

pg |142

Northern Corridor Integra on Projects (NCIP). Retrieved from h p://www.nciprojects.org/
about/about-us
OECD/United Na ons. (2011). Economic diversiﬁca on in Africa: A review of selected countries.
OECD Publishing. Retrieved from h p://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264038059-en
Rajaram, A., et al. (2014). The power of public investment management: Transforming resources
into assets for growth”. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Sudarsan Raghavan. (2016). As oil output falls, Libya is on the verge of economic collapse.
Retrieved from h ps://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/as-oil-output-falls-libyais-on-the-verge-of-economic-collapse/2016/04/15/5824a148-e16c-11e5-8c00-8aa03741dced_
story.html
Tanzania, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, “Tanzania’s Tourism Sector, Investments
Opportuni es h p://www.mnrt.go.tz/uploads/Download_File_Here!.pdf
Trust Matsilele. (2015). A no brainer ques on: Does Africa deserve a permanent seat in the
UNSC? Retrieved from h p://www.cnbcafrica.com/news/special-report/2015/09/28/africapermanent-seat-unsc/
World Bank Group. (2016). Global economic prospects: Spillovers amid weak growth. Washington,
DC: World Bank. Retrieved from h ps://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/23435
World Bank Group. 2016. World Development Report 2016: Digital Dividends. Washington,
DC: World Bank. © World Bank License: CC BY 3.0 IGO: h ps://openknowledge.worldbank.
org/handle/10986/23347.
World bank. (2013). Africa’s tourism set to boost economic growth, create new jobs, and now
outpace other regions for new tourism investment. Retrieved from h p://www.worldbank.org/en/
news/press-release/2013/10/03/africa-tourism-economic-growth-new-jobs-tourism-investment
World Bank. (2005). Global economic prospects: Trade, regionalism, and development.
Washington, DC: World Bank. Retrieved from h p://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/11/22/000160016_20051122165412/Rendered/PDF/34437
0PAPER0Gl101oﬁcial0use0only1.pdf
World Bank. (2011). World development report 2011: Conﬂict, security, and development”.
Washington, DC: World Bank. Retrieved from h ps://openknowledge.worldbank.org/
handle/10986/4389
World Bank. (2011). Africa region tourism strategy: Transforma on through tourism- harnessing
tourism for growth and improved livelihoods. Retrieved from h ps://openknowledge.worldbank.
org/handle/10986/12841

pg |143

YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS FORUM (YALF)
DEVELOPMENTAL PROJECTS
The Young African Leaders Forum is ac vely engaged in developmental projects that would
see a sustainable Africa in the near future. The young leaders have commi ed themselves to
undertaking speciﬁc projects in their countries. These projects keenly focus on playing a major
role in the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals and the African Union’s Agenda 2063.
YALF passionately undertakes these developmental projects because we believe that Africa has
the enormous poten al to empower her people and ensure her challenges are solved in an amicable
manner. The youth leaders have dedicated themselves to serving voluntarily in their communi es
and this has invoked a sense of patrio sm in the leaders. This is because YALF believes that
it is only through volunteerism that persis ng problems can be fully tackled. Bearing this in
mind, YALF has ini ated the following projects as a pathway to Africa’s long-term development
trajectory:
•

WOMEN EMPOWERMENT INITIATIVE (WEI)

An annual project which empowers several African women and creates a society of equality. This
is to support women in our communi es to mobilize resources and invest in ini a ves that are
sustainable and also to equip women with the requisite knowledge that will be u lized to improve
their livelihoods. For example, training on leadership, and other new ini a ves such as basic
technology. We believe in equality for all.
•

CHILDREN FOUNDATION

The children founda on is the branch of YALF which a ends to the needs of children and creates
the next genera on of mentors and youth leaders all over the con nent. This is done through
suppor ng the educa onal needs of the OVC (orphan and vulnerable children) and mentoring
them. Our main focus with children is educa on, where YALF ensures that children are taken
to school and supported fully. Mentorship also plays a key role. Youth are empowered on
entrepreneurship and on leadership roles.
•

WAYLS (WEST AFRICA YOUNG LEADERS SUMMIT)

A yearly training program which sensi zes and empowers millions of West African youths yearly.
So far, two summits have been held successfully.
•

YALJOD

Young African Leaders Journal of Development (YALJOD) is a biennial publica on which
hosts scholarly analysis and compe ng viewpoints about the development of Africa. YALJOD
accepts papers from varied disciplinary areas including Social Sciences, Physical Sciences and
Humani es, that show direct relevance to the development of Africa. It publishes researches
understood as the social, economic, poli cal, cultural and technological processes of change in
Africa. YALJOD indepthly explains the various challenges facing Africa and sheds more light
on their solu ons. It provides an insight for policy makers to implement policies that would
ensure change in all spheres of development. The maiden edi on of YALJOD will be launched
in October at the African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
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•

INFONO

This is a pan-African network system and marke ng tool which promotes technology in Africa –
connec ng Africans and their businesses.
•

YALF UNSC-CAMPAIGN

An ac on plan to create awareness and eventually secure a permanent seat for Africa on the
United Na ons Security Council. YALF has spearheaded this campaign on all social media
pla orms using the hashtag #Africa4UNSecurityCouncil
•

PAN AFRICAN SPORTS SCHOOL (PASS)

A sports world which would create high quality African athletes and raise sports standard in the
con nent.
•

TUBERCULOSIS CAMPAIGN

Following the health target of the SDGs and the death of our hero, Evance Mtsukwa, YALF
launched a campaign that seeks to create awareness against Tuberculosis. For 2016, it has
partnered with the Federal Ministry of Health, Ethiopia to ensure the success of this campaign,
which will take place during the 2016 YALF Annual Summit from 19 – 21 of October, 2016.
•

COMPUTER SUPPORT PROGRAM (CSP)

A special project targeted at improving the values and skills of African youths as it relates to
Informa on and Communica on Technology (ICT).
With these projects, we at YALF are calling on interested individuals and corporate bodies to
partner with us in execu ng these mandates and ensuring all round success. Your par cipa on is
highly appreciated.

Teresa Abila,
Vice President I, YALF
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ABOUT YALF (REG. No.: 157-631 NPO)
The Young African Leaders Forum (YALF) is an independent pan-African organisa on whose
major objec ve is to eﬀectuate sustainable development in every African na on. We achieve
this by tracing Africa’s development problems to their root causes, researching and proﬀering
workable solu ons to them as well as implemen ng strategic solu ons. We also work to empower
young African people to par cipate ac vely in the society so that they can improve their own
lives by represen ng and solving their needs whilst advoca ng for those of others.
YALF is incorporated and headquartered in South Africa with the oﬃces and ac ve representa ons
in 26 African na ons, USA and Canada. We own a pan-African network system tool called
iNFONO and our ini a ve is to move Africa to the First World Status in record me.
HEADQUARTERS:
Address: 54, Worraker Street, Newton Park, Port Elizabeth, South Africa
PO Box 488, Hunters Retreat, Port Elizabeth, 6017
Website: www.yalf-africa.org
Email: info@yalf-africa.org; p.ifoh@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +27 79 785 4282, +27 79 662 7444
NATIONAL OFFICES & CONTACT DETAILS:
YALF Nigeria
Address: Block DC4, Abia State Polytechnic, Aba, Abia State, Nigeria.
Email: nigeria@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +234 8064293023 / +234 8130422347
YALF Kenya
Address: 402, Blue Bells, Beijing Road, Nairobi, Kenya.
Email: kenya@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +254 722 168538
YALF Ghana
Address: 100, New Weija Broadcas ng, Accra, Ghana.
Email: ghana@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +233 246802099 / +233 54 7019934
YALF Cameroon
PO Box: BP 5007 Douala-Akwa, Cameroon
Email: cameroon@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +237 67 569 1857, +237 7989 4477
YALF Zambia
Email: zambia@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +260 9539 30950
YALF Ethiopia
Address: 12, Alert Hospital Street, Zenebwork, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Email: ethiopia@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +251 91 1799356, +251 91 347 2144
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YALF Zimbabwe
Address: 2805, Jerusalem High ield, Harare, Zimbabwe.
Email: zimbabwe@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +263 7730 92979 / +263 772 118783
YALF Benin
Address: LIC/YALF Training Centre, Carrefour Y, Porto Novo, Benin (PO Box 1044 P/N).
Email: benin@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +229 9763 8321 / +229 9614 2102
YALF Malawi
Address: 471, Kanzeja Street, Blantyre, Malawi.
Email: malawi@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +265 999 22 8518, +265 993 57 9732
YALF Sierra Leone
Email: sierraleone@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +232 7679 2403
YALF Rwanda
Email: rwanda@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +250 783 056302
YALF Swaziland
Address: FLAS/YALF Oﬁce, Lidlabe Street, Mbabane, Swaziland.
Email: Swaziland@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +268 7644 1361, +268 78 61 2970
YALF Guinea
Email: guinea@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +224 62 267 7506
YALF DR Congo
Email: drc@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +243 8153 13675 / +243 99 5886580
YALF Tanzania
PO Box 7491 Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
Email: tanzania@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +255 71701 1015
YALF Cote d’Ivoire
Email: ivorycoast@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +225 0734 8550
YALF Uganda
Email: uganda@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +256 702 585565 / +256 775 464917
YALF Burundi
Address: 74, Gishurushuru Street, Carama, Bujumbura city, Burundi.
Email: burundi@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +257 790 16863, +257 79 32 2251

pg |147

YALF Somalia
Email: somalia@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +252 907797843
YALF Liberia
Email: liberia@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +231 777 929 099
YALF Togo
Email: togo@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +228 92735798 / +228 96142818
YALF Burkina Faso
Email: bkf@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +226 79078564
YALF Egypt
Email: egypt@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +20 114 8226947
YALF Namibia
Email: namibia@yalf-africa.org
Phone: 264 81 1276505 / +264 81 4328464
YALF Morocco
Email: morocco@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +212 659 211238
YALF Sudan
Email: sudan@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +249 92642 339
DIASPORA – CANADA & USA OFFICES:
YALF Canada,
3527 40 Ave Edmonton Alberta,
T6L6M8 Canada.
Email: canada@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +17804908285
YALF, United States of America (USA)
700 Grove, Grove Street,
Apartment 2D, Jersey City, New Jersey, USA.
Pin Number 07310
Email: usa@yalf-africa.org
Phone: +1 201 496 4454
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